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ABSTRACT

This thesis fills a number of gaps in both the Australian and overseas literature on the
value premium, particularly with regard to the dearth of Australian studies on
behavioural explanations and the role default-risk plays in such explanations. First,
whilst a number of studies have investigated the value premium in Australia in the
context of rational asset pricing, there are no identified studies in the academic
literature that specifically investigate the existence of mispriced Australian value and
growth stocks. This gap is addressed by exploring the overvaluation of financially
distressed growth stocks and the undervaluation of low default-risk value stocks.
Second, there are no Australian studies that directly test the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis using biases in analysts’ earnings forecasts, as there are for some overseas
markets. This analysis is carried out for the Australian market, but unlike previous
studies introduces a highly-relevant control variable: financial distress. Finally,
previous studies have shown conflicting patterns of returns and analyst forecast errors
across value and growth classifications (high book-to-market stocks simultaneously
have over-optimistic forecasts and high returns). There have been no attempts to
reconcile these conflicting patterns, a gap addressed here by studying the relative
importance of book-to-market, default-risk and analyst agreement to the market
reaction to earnings surprises.

The findings of this thesis are consistent with overvaluation of distressed growth
stocks and undervaluation of low default-risk value stocks, and support the validity of
mispricing as a potential explanation of the value premium in Australia; a conclusion

vi

to which previous Australian studies have been averse. The findings also demonstrate
a marked bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts which is consistent with analyst
underreaction to distress, which dominates the relationship between analyst optimism
and valuation ratios, and which reveals a previously-undocumented problem with the
use of such forecasts to test the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. The findings also
shed light on the conflicting patterns of returns and forecast errors across value and
growth stocks. This anomaly is largely explainable by the previously-documented
asymmetric reactions of value and growth stocks to earnings torpedoes; the novel
finding here is that it is not explainable by differences in analyst agreement (which
affects earnings response coefficients) or in default-risk.

In general terms, the thesis makes contributions to the literature on market and analyst
efficiency, behavioural finance, the momentum life cycle, the pricing of default-risk,
and earnings response coefficients.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE SHEET .............................................................................................................. i
CERTIFICATION ........................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..........................................................................................iv
ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................xi
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................... xiii
ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................................................................xiv
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................1
1.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Key Issues ....................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Research Questions .......................................................................................... 8
1.4 Methodological Issues ................................................................................... 14
1.5 Contributions ................................................................................................. 16
1.6 Thesis Structure ............................................................................................. 17
CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE VALUE
PREMIUM, ANALYST EFFICIENCY AND MARKET REACTIONS TO
EARNINGS SURPRISES ........................................................................................... 19
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 19
2.2 Asset Pricing Anomalies ................................................................................ 24
2.2.1 The Size Effect and Value Premium............................................................ 26
2.2.2 Momentum ................................................................................................. 30
2.3 Alternative Explanations for Size and Value Effects ...................................... 31
2.3.1 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model .................................................... 31
2.3.2 The Link between Size, Value and Distress Risk ..................................... 38
2.3.3 Conditional Asset Pricing ........................................................................ 44
2.3.4 Explanations for the Value Premium based on Behavioural Finance........ 47
2.3.5 The Errors-in-Expectations Hypothesis ................................................... 53
2.3.5.1 Evidence linking valuation multiples to erroneous growth expectations 54
2.3.5.2 Evidence that future growth is unpredictable ........................................ 55
2.3.5.3 Extrapolation, Growth Expectations and the Value Premium................ 57
2.3.5.4 Evidence from Announcement Period Returns and Earnings Surprises . 60
2.3.6 Mispricing as a function of Valuation Ratios and Financial Distress ........ 66
2.4 Analyst Efficiency ......................................................................................... 71
2.5 The Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises.................................................... 75
2.5.1 The functional form of the relationship between unexpected returns and
earnings surprises ............................................................................................ 75
2.5.2 Key variables identified in the literature .................................................. 80
2.5.2.1 Risk ..................................................................................................... 81
2.5.2.2 Persistence, Growth and B/M ............................................................... 83
2.5.2.3 Nonlinearity, Uncertainty & Analyst Dispersion .................................. 85
2.5.3 Summary of the Literature on the Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises 87
2.6 Summary and Conclusions ............................................................................. 88
CHAPTER 3: THE VALUE PREMIUM, DEFAULT RISK AND MISPRICING: A
STUDY OF LARGE CAPITALISATION AUSTRALIAN STOCKS ......................... 91

viii

3.1 Abstract ......................................................................................................... 91
3.2 Introduction ................................................................................................... 92
3.3 Empirical Framework .................................................................................... 96
3.4 Data and Methodology..................................................................................100
3.5 Results ..........................................................................................................105
3.5.1 Returns and Pricing Errors from One-Way Sorts ....................................105
3.5.2 Analysis of Portfolios formed from Two-Way Sorts...............................109
3.5.3 Inconsistency with Rational Pricing and Market Efficiency ....................121
3.6 Summary and Conclusion .............................................................................130
3.6.1 Cross-sectional Determinants of the Returns of Large Australian Stocks 130
3.6.2 Value, Default Risk and Stock Returns...................................................131
3.6.3 Inconsistency with Rational Pricing and Market Efficiency ....................133
APPENDIX 3A ......................................................................................................... 136
CHAPTER 4: ANALYST OPTIMISM AND THE ERRORS-IN-EXPECTATIONS
HYPOTHESIS: AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF DEFAULT RISK143
4.1 Abstract ........................................................................................................143
4.2 Introduction ..................................................................................................144
4.3 Data and Methodology..................................................................................149
4.4 Results ..........................................................................................................153
4.4.1 Properties of Analysts’ Forecast Errors ..................................................153
4.4.2 Results Based Upon One-Way Sorts ......................................................157
4.4.3 Results Based Upon Two-Way Sorts on B/M and DD ............................165
4.4.4 Results Based Upon Two-Way Sorts on E/P and DD .............................171
4.4.5 Yearly Variation in the Relationship between Default Risk and Forecast
Errors .............................................................................................................178
4.5. Interpretation of Results ...............................................................................182
4.6 Conclusion....................................................................................................187
APPENDIX 4A ......................................................................................................... 191
CHAPTER 5: THE MARKET RESPONSE TO EARNINGS SURPRISE,
CONDITIONAL UPON BOOK-TO-MARKET, DEFAULT RISK AND ANALYST
AGREEMENT .......................................................................................................... 204
5.1 Abstract ........................................................................................................204
5.2 Introduction ..................................................................................................205
5.3 Empirical Framework ...................................................................................213
5.4 Data and Methodology..................................................................................216
5.4.1 Data .......................................................................................................216
5.4.2 Calculation of Unexpected Returns ........................................................217
5.4.3 Definition of Earnings Surprise ..............................................................218
5.4.4 Definition of Indicator Variables G, DR and AA ....................................219
5.4.5 Calculation of B/M, E/P, DD and Forecast Dispersion ...........................220
5.5 Results ..........................................................................................................221
5.5.1 Preliminary Data Analysis......................................................................221
5.5.2 Response Coefficients with simple slope dummy variables ....................224
5.5.3 Response Coefficients with asymmetric slope dummy variables.............227
5.5.4 Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts ................................232
5.5.5 Response Coefficients with slope dummy variables, asymmetric intercepts
and multiple conditioning variables ................................................................238
5.5.6 Robustness Checks.................................................................................243
5.6 Interpretation and Graphical Representation of Results .................................244
5.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................250

ix

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE,
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS ................................... 253
6.1 Summary of Findings....................................................................................253
6.2 Contributions to Knowledge .........................................................................262
6.2.1 Rational Pricing of Default Risk.............................................................262
6.2.2 Market Inefficiency and Mispricing .......................................................264
6.2.3 Behavioural Explanations of Cross-sectional Return Differences ...........267
6.2.3.1 The Errors-in-Expectations Hypothesis ...............................................267
6.2.3.2 The Momentum Life Cycle .................................................................270
6.2.3.3 Contributions to Behavioural Finance Theory .....................................272
6.3 Limitations of the Research ..........................................................................275
6.4 Extensions and Future Research....................................................................277
6.4.1 Value/growth, Default Risk and Mispricing ...........................................277
6.4.2 Analyst Optimism ..................................................................................279
6.4.3 Market Reactions to Earnings Surprises .................................................280
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................... 287

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1: Returns and Three-Factor Alphas of Large Capitalisation Portfolios formed
from One-Way Sorts ..............................................................................................107
Table 3.2: Characteristics of Large-Capitalisation Portfolios Sorted by Valuation
Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008 ............................................................112
Table 3.3: Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by
Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008 ............................................114
Table 3.4: Monthly Value-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by
Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008 ............................................116
Table 3.5: Risk and Performance Measures for High Default Risk Growth and Low
Default Risk Value Portfolios .................................................................................123
Table 3.6: Other Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Valuation Ratios and
Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008..............................................................................128
Table 3A.1: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Book-to-Market and
Size, 1996-2008 .....................................................................................................137
Table 3A.2: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Earnings-to-Price and
Size, 1996-2008 .....................................................................................................139
Table 3A.3: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Cash Flow-to-Price
and Size, 1996-2008 ...............................................................................................141
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Forecast Errors....................................................156
Table 4.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price (FE/P) for Portfolios
sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price and Distance-toDefault ...................................................................................................................161
Table 4.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for
Portfolios (FE/|F|) sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price
and Distance-to-Default ..........................................................................................163
Table 4.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price (FE/P) for Book-toMarket- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios ................................................168
Table 4.5: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Earnings-to-Price
and Distance-to-Default Sorted Portfolios...............................................................175
Table 4.6: Median Price-Deflated Forecast Errors of High and Low Default Risk
Portfolios and Sample Median DD by Forecast Year; Constant DD Portfolio
Breakpoints ............................................................................................................180
Table 4A.1: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast
for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios.............................192
Table 4A.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast
for Earnings-to-Price- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios ..........................195
Table 4A.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Cash Flow-toPrice- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios ...................................................198
Table 4A.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast
for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios........................201
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics and Correlations ......................................................223
Table 5.2: Earnings Response Coefficients Conditional on Book-to-Market (G),
Default Risk (DR) and Analyst Agreement (AA) ....................................................226
Table 5.3: Earnings Response Coefficients Conditional on Book-to-Market (G),
Default Risk (DR) and Analyst Agreement (AA) and the Sign of Earnings Surprise
(BAD) ....................................................................................................................230

xi

Table 5.4: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts Conditional
on Book-to-Market (G)...........................................................................................234
Table 5.5: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts Conditional
on Default Risk (DR) .............................................................................................236
Table 5.6: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts Conditional
on Analyst Agreement (AA) ...................................................................................238
Table 5.7: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts and Multiple
Conditioning Variables ...........................................................................................241
Table 5.8: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts and Multiple
Conditioning Variables (Robustness Tests).............................................................242

xii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 4.1: Yearly Variation in Price-Deflated Forecast Errors for High and Low
Default Risk Portfolios ...........................................................................................181
Figure 5.1: Fitted Unexpected Return-Earnings Surprise Relationships...................247
Figure 6.1: Returns and Four-Factor Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Value/Growth
(B/M and E/P) and Distance-to-Default (DD) .........................................................283
Figure 6.2: Price-Deflated Analysts’ Forecast Errors of Portfolios sorted by
Value/Growth (B/M and E/P) and Distance-to-Default ...........................................285
Figure 6.3: Fitted Unexpected Return-Earnings Surprise Relationships...................286

xiii

ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviation Meaning
AGSM

Australian Graduate School of Management

APT

Arbitrage pricing theory

ASX

Australian Securities Exchange; formerly the Australian Stock Exchange

B/M

Book-to-market

BHAR

Buy and hold abnormal return

C/P

Cash flow-to-price

CAPM

Capital asset pricing model

DD

Distance-to-default

∆ROA

1-year change in return on assets

E/P

Earnings-to-price

EPS

Earnings per share

ERC

Earnings response coefficient

ES

Earnings surprise

HML

Fama-French high-minus-low B/M factor

I/B/E/S

Institutional Brokers Estimate System

ICAPM

Intertemporal capital asset pricing model

P/E

Price-to-earnings

PR1YR

Carhart prior 1 year return (momentum) factor

ROA

Return on assets

SIRCA

Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific

SMB

Fama-French small-minus-big size factor

SPPR

Share price and price relative

UE

Unexpected earnings

UR

Unexpected return

xiv

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The value premium is the name given in the asset pricing literature to the observation
that value stocks (stocks with low share prices relative to accounting information such
as book value of equity or earnings) tend to have higher long-term returns than growth
stocks (stocks with high share prices relative to the same accounting information).
Research into the value premium is important because it has implications for investment
analysis and for the choice of cost of capital used in corporate decision-making. The
research frequently centres on the explanation(s) for its existence, which at the present
time fall into one of two schools of thought 1.

The first school of thought is that the value premium is due to the rational pricing of risk
that is not adequately specified in existing asset pricing models, such as the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). In this framework, investors are unwilling to pay high prices
for value stocks because they tend to be more financially distressed than growth stocks.
Financially distressed firms are those that are unable to meet or are experiencing
difficulty in meeting their financial obligations such as debt repayments (Ross,
Westerfield and Jaffe, 2002, pp.854-855; Brealey and Myers, 2003, p.497). The value
premium is thus seen as a return premium required by investors for investing in
financially distressed companies. A similar argument is that investors are willing to pay
high prices for growth stocks because they act as a hedge against risks associated with
1

A third school of thought that was once prominent but which has now lost support is that the Value
Premium is not a real or enduring phenomenon, but is rather an artefact either of inadequacies in the data
or of collective ‘data snooping’ by scores of researchers using the same data set to replicate previous
findings.

1

economic state variables in the spirit of the intertemporal capital asset pricing model
(ICAPM) of Merton (1973). This latter argument is frequently cited as the theoretical
justification for the Fama-French three-factor model developed in Fama and French
(1993) and proposed as an alternative to the CAPM. The Fama-French three-factor
model is routinely adopted in empirical work, and controls for the size and value
premiums in stock returns. The factor in the model that controls for the value premium
(referred to as HML) has been interpreted by some researchers as a priced risk factor
however this view is by no means universally accepted (Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin,
1999; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004).

The second school of thought is that the value premium can be explained in terms of
investor behaviour that is less than fully rational. This school of thought argues that
growth stocks are overvalued relative to value stocks, and hence the value premium is
due to mispricing rather than the rational pricing of an as yet unspecified form of risk,
possibly related to financial distress. Equivalently, HML is seen as merely another
representation of the value premium without the assumption that it represents a
rationally-priced risk factor, since by construction it is the return of a portfolio of value
stocks less the return of a portfolio of growth stocks. An important hypothesis regarding
the cause of the mispricing in this framework is the errors-in-expectations hypothesis,
which argues that the relative overvaluation of growth stocks stems from investors’
unrealistic expectations of future earnings growth. In other words, investors pay too
much for some companies because their growth expectations for these companies are
overoptimistic. The actual growth in earnings of highly-priced growth stocks turns out
to be much lower than what is justified by their high initial share price, and
disappointed investors subsequently lose interest in these companies causing falls in

2

share prices and relatively poor future stock returns (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny,
1994).

1.2 Key Issues
Within the value premium literature, three issues have been identified which have not
yet been adequately addressed and which underlie this thesis. These three issues all
involve the implications of financial distress for behavioural explanations of the value
premium.

Mispricing as a function of value/growth and default risk

In simple terms the first issue deals with the identification of mispriced securities. In
particular, the issue concerns the distinction between overvalued growth stocks and
rationally priced growth stocks, and the distinction between undervalued value stocks
and rationally priced value stocks. The fact that distressed firms are more readily
identifiable as value stocks than as growth stocks 2 is consistent with at least some
degree of rational pricing of distress by investors. However, returns-based tests of this
proposition suggest on balance that default risk, a widely-used measure of financial
distress, is not priced in equity markets (Dichev, 1998; Gharghori, Chan and Faff, 2007;
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008). Furthermore, there is growing evidence that a
substantial proportion of the value premium is attributable to the stocks whose
classification as either value or growth is not commensurate with their level of financial
distress. For example, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that the relatively poor average
returns of growth stocks as a group are concentrated in growth stocks with high default

2

See, for example, Fama and French (1995), Chen and Zhang (1998), Piotroski (2000).

3

risk. Similarly, Piotroski (2000) differentiates between undervalued value stocks and
otherwise similar value stocks on the basis of financial health measures derived from
financial statement analysis; Mohanram (2005) conducts a similar study based on
growth stocks; Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) do the same for both value and growth
stocks.

The common finding of the above studies is that mispricing is evident when valuation
ratios, such as book-to-market (B/M), are either too high or too low relative to a firm’s
state of financial distress or health. Thus, growth stocks appear to be overvalued when
they are financially distressed and value stocks appear to be undervalued when they are
financially healthy. This particular result has not yet been verified for the Australian
stock market, and the goal of the first empirical study of this thesis is to address this
deficiency. The investigation of mispricing as a function of both financial distress and
value/growth characteristics constitutes a significant departure from previous Australian
studies in the value premium literature which have generally fallen within the rational
pricing framework; for example tests of the applicability of the Fama-French threefactor model or other asset pricing models to the Australian market including Halliwell,
Heaney and Sawicki (1999), Faff (2001), Durack, Durand and Maller (2004); Gaunt
(2004), Durand, Limkriankrai and Smith (2006) and Gharghori, Lee and Veeraraghavan
(2009). Gharghori, Chan and Faff (2006a) and Gharghori et al. (2007) also fall within
this framework because they both implicitly assume that HML represents a rationallypriced risk factor. Until now, there is little mention in the Australian literature of the
possibility that behavioural explanations or mispricing might underlie the value
premium 3, despite the fact that this possibility has been recognised in the US literature
3

A notable exception is Chan, Faff, Ho and Ramsay (2006a), who study market reactions to earnings
surprises in the framework of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. Gaunt (2004) also briefly mentions
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(see for example Lakonishok et al., 1994; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998;
Chan and Lakonishok, 2004; Fama and French, 2004 4).

Analyst Optimism, Financial Distress and the Errors-in-Expectations Hypothesis

Financial distress is also relevant to the next issue addressed in this thesis, namely the
evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts regarding the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis. This issue is important primarily because of a study by Doukas, Kim and
Pantzalis (2002) which finds a relationship between analyst optimism (measured by the
errors in analysts’ current year earnings forecasts) and B/M that is the exact opposite of
that predicted by the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. The errors-in-expectations
hypothesis predicts that analyst optimism will be greater for low B/M than for high B/M
stocks. However, analysts’ earnings forecasts were found by Doukas et al. (2002) to be
more optimistic for high B/M stocks than they are for low B/M stocks. Until now, there
have been no studies critical of the findings of Doukas et al. (2002), or that have
attempted to explain why analysts’ short-term earnings forecasts appear to defy the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis whilst analysts’ longer-term growth forecasts appear
to be consistent with this hypothesis (La Porta, 1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997; Chan,
Karceski and Lakonishok, 2003). The second empirical study in this thesis addresses
this deficiency by re-examining the evidence of Doukas et al. (2002) using Australian
data and introducing financial distress as a control variable.

behavioural explanation, as does Gharghori et al. (2009); however neither study finds conclusively in
favour of behavioural explanation.
4
Note that Fama and French are arguably the chief proponents of the rational pricing view. However
even they concede in Fama and French (2004) that the debate between rational and irrational pricing is
not likely to be resolved.
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Financial distress is a relevant control variable in the above context for two reasons.
First, value stocks tend to be more distressed than growth stocks (Fama and French,
1995; Dichev, 1998; Chen and Zhang, 1998; Piotroski, 2000). Second, evidence in the
analyst efficiency literature suggests that analysts are inefficient and prone to
underreaction to information related to financial distress, such as prior earnings changes
and prior returns (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999;
Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Cohen and Lys, 2003). Consequently, the relationship
between forecast errors and B/M reported in Doukas et al. (2002) might arise because of
analyst inefficiency in recognising and underreaction to financial distress and because
of the relationship between B/M and financial distress. The second study in this thesis
sheds light on the issue by investigating how analyst optimism varies with valuation
ratios as well as distress.

The Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises, Conditional on Value/Growth, Financial
Distress and Analyst Disagreement

The final issue addressed by this thesis is also motivated by the direct relationship
between B/M and analyst optimism uncovered by Doukas et al. (2002); a relationship
that is counterintuitive because it implies earnings surprises are more negative for value
stocks than for growth stocks. Companies with negative earnings surprises are generally
punished by the stock market, such that their returns are lower on average than
otherwise similar companies. However, value stocks have higher returns than growth
stocks, the opposite situation implied by the results of Doukas et al. (2002). Put
differently, earnings surprises tend to be large and negative for high B/M stocks, despite
the fact that this group of stocks have relatively high returns on average. To increase our

6

understanding of this apparent anomaly, the third and final study in this thesis
investigates the market reaction to earnings surprises.

Previous studies have documented an inverse relationship between B/M and the
responsiveness of share prices to earnings surprises. For example, the earnings response
coefficient (ERC), the slope of the relationship between unexpected returns and
unexpected earnings, has been found to be inversely related to B/M (Collins and
Kothari, 1989; Biddle and Seow, 1991). Furthermore, Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue
that the ‘earnings torpedo’, or the abrupt price response to even a slightly negative
surprise, is substantially larger for growth stocks than for value stocks. Skinner and
Sloan (2002) attribute the total return differential between value and growth stocks to
this effect; a result they argue is consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.
Chan, Faff, Ho and Ramsay (2006a) also report similar results for Australian
companies, based on earnings surprises computed from management earnings forecasts
rather than from the final announced earnings.

However, the previous literature does not explain the counterintuitive result in Doukas
et al. (2002), which at first glance implies an inverse relationship between unexpected
returns and unexpected earnings for value stocks (because they have relatively high
returns at the same time as having relatively negative earnings surprises). For instance,
it is not known whether this particular result is due to an absence of market reaction to
negative surprises alone, or to the absence of value-relevant information in earnings
surprises of any sign for value stocks. Similarly, it is not known whether the result
might be due to variation in the market reaction with other variables correlated with
B/M. Based on the discussions earlier in this chapter, financial distress might be one
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such variable (because of the variation in stock returns with both this variable and B/M
and the possibility that analyst underreaction to distress might underlie the distribution
of earnings surprises with B/M).

Another potentially relevant control variable in the above context is analyst forecast
dispersion, for the following reasons. Market reactions to earnings surprises are known
to vary inversely with forecast dispersion (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Kinney, Burgstahler
and Martin, 2002), and forecast dispersion itself is directly related to B/M (Doukas,
Kim and Pantzalis, 2004). Forecast dispersion measures analyst disagreement and
therefore uncertainty regarding a firm’s future earnings. As forecast dispersion is greater
for value stocks than for growth stocks, earnings forecasts and (by implication) the
earnings surprises computed from those forecasts are relatively less informative for
value stocks than for growth stocks. Differences in forecast dispersion might therefore
contribute to an understanding of why value stocks can simultaneously have high
returns and negative earnings surprises.

1.3 Research Questions
The issues described above are investigated in this thesis by means of a series of
research questions. Following similar literature (for example Fama and French, 1992;
Doukas et al., 2002), the research questions operationalise the distinction between value
and growth stocks through the use of valuation ratios. Thus, value stocks are defined as
those with high B/M, earnings-to-price (E/P) or C/P ratios while growth stocks are
defined as those with low B/M, E/P or C/P ratios. Financial distress has been measured
in previous studies (for example, Dichev, 1998; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Vassalou
and Xing, 2004; Gharghori et al., 2007) using models that predict the probability of a
8

distress-related event, such as actual default on debt or the more extreme event of
bankruptcy. This thesis follows Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2007)
by operationalising distress in terms of the default risk of debt, measured in terms of
distance-to-default (DD). Thus, financially distressed firms are defined as those with
high default risk (or equivalently, with low DD) while financially healthy firms are
defined as those with low default risk (or equivalently, with high DD). The first issue is
therefore the relationship between valuation ratios, default risk and mispricing, and
specifically asks whether mispricing defined in terms of valuation ratios and default risk
is evident in the Australian stock market. Formally, this can be expressed as the
following research question:

Research Question 1: Are Australian stocks mispriced when their valuation ratios
(book-to-market, earnings-to-price or cashflow-to-price) are either high or low relative
to their level of default risk?

Stocks with valuation ratios that are high relative to default risk are referred to hereafter
as ‘low default risk value’ stocks, while stocks with valuation ratios that are low relative
to default risk are referred to hereafter as ‘high default risk growth’ stocks. Research
question 1 is therefore asking in effect whether low default risk value stocks are
undervalued while high default risk growth stocks are overvalued. One way of
answering this question is to compare the risk-adjusted returns (alphas) of stock
portfolios formed by sorting on the valuation ratios and default risk. Positive riskadjusted returns for low default risk value stocks and negative risk-adjusted returns for
high default risk growth stocks support an affirmative answer to this question. If the
asset pricing model used to risk-adjust returns is correct, risk-adjusted returns should be
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statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, an analysis of portfolio alphas can be
seen as a test of the asset-pricing model (used to compute the alpha) against a specific
mispricing hypothesis consistent with an affirmative answer to research question 1.
Chapter 4, the first empirical study in this thesis, explicitly carries out such tests.

However, it is possible that the portfolio alphas support an affirmative answer to
research question 1 because the asset-pricing model is incorrect, and that the true
portfolio alphas are actually zero in an alternative but as yet unspecified asset pricing
model. It is also debatable whether HML, a factor which features prominently in the
risk-adjustment process, does indeed represent a rationally-priced risk-factor rather than
the correction of mispricing (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). Thus, additional evidence
besides that obtained from portfolio alphas is required to answer research question 1, in
other words to demonstrate whether or not the observed differences in returns are more
consistent with rational pricing or with mispricing. Chapter 4 provides the additional
evidence in the form of alternative risk and return measures that do not depend on assetpricing models, and in the form of historical company performance characteristics
which demonstrate the role of market inefficiency in this type of mispricing.

The second issue is the evidence from analysts’ earnings forecasts that is contrary to the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis, but which was argued above to be potentially
sensitive to the omission of distress as a control variable. The evidence in question
shows that analyst optimism, measured in terms of analysts’ forecast errors, increases
with B/M. The second research question addresses this issue directly, using similar
variables and methodology to Doukas et al. (2002) with the exception of a new control
variable; namely financial distress measured in terms of default risk:
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Research Question 2: How do median analysts’ forecast errors vary with valuation
ratios and default risk?

Following similar research, the question is phrased in terms of a measure of central
tendency of the distribution of forecast errors, in this case the median. Rather than
examining average forecast errors as a measure of analyst optimism, median values are
used because they are less sensitive to outliers which are well-known to plague forecast
error distributions (Doukas et al., 2002).

For reasons outlined earlier, it is expected that median forecast errors are directly related
to default risk, a finding that might potentially explain the direct relationship between
analyst optimism and B/M documented in Doukas et al. (2002). For example the
relationship between analyst optimism and B/M might be apparent only because
analysts underreact to financial distress and because financial distress is correlated with
B/M. A finding that the relationship between median analysts’ forecast errors and
default risk subsumes that between median analysts’ forecast errors and B/M would be
consistent with this explanation. Moreover, it is plausible that analyst optimism might
actually vary inversely with B/M after controlling for default risk, a result which if
obtained would be consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis despite the
contrary evidence in analysts’ forecast errors that appears in the absence of controls for
default risk.

The final issue still remains as to how value stocks can be subject to greater analyst
optimism (and by implication, larger and more prevalent negative earnings surprises)
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and yet still deliver higher returns than growth stocks; an issue that leads to the question
of how the market reacts to earnings surprises, conditional upon valuation ratios, default
risk and forecast dispersion. Valuation ratios are important to this question because they
determine a stock’s classification as either value or growth. The relevance of default
risk is governed by the findings in response to research questions 1 and 2. For example
value stocks’ high returns might be attributable to low default risk value stocks while
value stocks’ negative surprises might be attributable to high default risk value stocks.
The question is then whether high default risk value stocks respond any differently to
earnings surprises than value stocks per se. As discussed earlier, forecast dispersion is
known to be an important determinant of the market reaction to earnings surprises, and
is relevant here because it might explain any inconsistency between the variation in
returns and the variation in earnings surprises across value/growth and default risk
categories.

Research Question 3: How does the market reaction to earnings surprises vary with
valuation ratios, default risk and forecast dispersion?

The phrase ‘market reaction to earnings surprises’ is used in the above question to
indicate either the abnormal return that accrues on average after a positive or a negative
earnings surprise, or to the abnormal return for a given magnitude of earnings surprise
(the abnormal return per unit of earnings surprise or ERC). In other words, research
question 3 asks how (i) the abnormal return attributable either to a positive or to a
negative earnings surprise, and (ii) the abnormal return per unit of earnings surprise,
varies with each of the three variables.
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Whilst the previous literature is inconclusive regarding the role played by default risk
(Dhaliwal and Reynolds, 1994; Billings, 1999) in the above question, it is expected
(based on the previous literature) that the market reaction to earnings surprises is
inversely related to valuation ratios (in other words greater for growth stocks than for
value stocks) and is inversely related to forecast dispersion. However, the interaction
between the three variables is somewhat uncertain prior to undertaking the analysis.
One possibility is that a high degree of forecast dispersion might explain the lack of
responsiveness to value stocks’ earnings surprises; another possibility is that the growth
stock earnings torpedo as documented in Skinner and Sloan (2002) can fully account for
the fact that negative surprises are punished by the market in the case of growth stocks
but not for value stocks, irrespective of the magnitude of the surprise or of differences in
default risk and forecast dispersion. Research question 3 thus attempts to determine the
incremental effect of each of the three variables on market reactions to earnings
surprises, with a view to increasing our understanding of why value stocks
simultaneously have earnings forecasts that are more optimistic and returns that are
higher than growth stocks.

The answers to this particular research question have implications regarding the
applicability of analysts’ earnings forecasts to tests of the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis. For example, an apparent lack of market reaction for some categories of
stocks suggests that the earnings forecast from which the earnings surprise is calculated
for these stocks either is not important to or unrepresentative of the views of investors,
or carries no valuation-relevant information. Therefore, the answer to this research
question potentially raises additional concerns regarding the use of analysts’ forecast
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errors to test the errors-in-expectations hypothesis across an unrestricted sample of
stocks.

1.4 Methodological Issues
The research design throughout this thesis follows conventional practice in the related
literature, with a few minor exceptions. The research design for research question 1 is
consistent with Fama and French (1992), Fama and French (1993), Gaunt (2004),
Halliwell et al. (1999) and others regarding the formation of portfolios and computation
of portfolio returns and alphas. The research design for research question 2 is consistent
with Doukas et al. (2002). There are some differences with previous studies pertaining
to the research design for research question 3 and to the sample selection criteria for the
thesis in general, which are discussed as follows.

For all of the studies in this thesis the sample is restricted to the largest 300 companies
by market capitalisation, for the following reasons. First, the large-cap emphasis
obviates the need to control for size, making the analysis more tractable. Size is not
emphasised as a control variable because findings in Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt
(2004) show that the size effect in Australia is due to small stocks and largely absent
from large stocks; a result which is confirmed in Chapter Four. Second, the market data
is substantially less plagued by thin trading than would otherwise be the case and
consequently the computations based on share prices are substantially more accurate.
Third, analysts’ earnings forecasts are only available for large companies, and therefore
the second and third studies have a large-cap bias by necessity; the size restriction has
the greatest impact on the first study but ensures consistency with regard to the sample
amongst all three studies.
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The definitions of analyst forecast errors (used in research question 2) and earnings
surprises (used in research question 3) are noteworthy. For consistency with Doukas et
al. (2002), earnings forecasts used for both variables are selected with an eight month
horizon (in other words, the forecasts are those that were current eight months prior to
fiscal year end). The forecast error is defined as the price-deflated difference between
the consensus forecast and actual earnings-per-share (EPS), and as per Doukas et al.
(2002) is positive if the forecast is higher than the actual EPS (and thus increasing with
ex-ante optimism). The earnings surprise is also the price-deflated difference between
the consensus forecast and actual EPS, but in contrast to forecast error and consistent
with the related literature, is negative if the forecast is higher than the actual EPS. Thus,
the forecast error and earnings surprise have the opposite sign but are otherwise
identical.

The market reaction to earnings surprise is computed in terms of both the slope and
intercept from a regression of unexpected returns on earnings surprises. The slope term
from a regression of unexpected returns on earnings surprises is the earnings response
coefficient, or the unexpected return per unit of unexpected earnings. However, the
related studies in the value premium literature (for example Skinner and Sloan, 2002;
Chan et al., 2006a) are less concerned with the slope of the relationship than with
differences in the intercept term that occur across value and growth stocks and across
positive and negative surprises. Asymmetric intercept terms are used to model
differences in average returns following positive and negative earnings surprises,
regardless of the magnitude of the surprise. Prior to conducting the analysis, it is not
known whether the omission of either parameter is appropriate from a modelling
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perspective and therefore, for consistency with both the ERC literature and the value
premium literature, the analysis allows for variation in both the intercept and slope
terms.

Finally, the market reaction to earnings surprise is assessed in research question 3 over a
relatively long window (240 trading days) compared with some previous studies. The
long window is chosen for consistency with the returns from annually-rebalanced
portfolios used to answer research question 1 and the eight-month analysts’ forecast
errors used to answer research question 2 (the length of time between the issuance of
eight-month forecasts and the date of earnings announcement is usually close to one
year). Announcement period returns, that is returns within one or two days of the date of
earnings announcement, are not considered because recent studies demonstrate the
complete market reaction is spread over a substantially longer period, attributable to
post-earnings announcement drift and to the fact that earnings news is often released
substantially earlier than the announcement date (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Chan et al.,
2006a).

1.5 Contributions
Each of the three empirical studies in this thesis makes contributions to the relevant
literature. The first study extends the ‘stock-picking’ literature, notably the literature
concerned with the identification of undervalued value stocks and overvalued growth
stocks, to the Australian market. More importantly, it extends the academic value
premium literature in Australia by explicitly studying mispricing and by its emphasis on
large capitalisation stocks. The second study contributes to our understanding of the
determinants of analysts’ forecast errors, and therefore contributes to the literature on
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analyst efficiency as well as the empirical literature on the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis. In particular, the findings represent new evidence of the role of default risk
in tests of this hypothesis based on analysts’ earnings forecasts. The third study makes
contributions to the literature on earnings response coefficients as well to the literature
of the value premium. It provides Australian evidence on the determinants of the ERC
and on the importance of earnings torpedoes for value-minus-growth return
differentials; furthermore it adds to our understanding of the economic significance of
variation in analysts’ forecast errors across value and growth stocks.

In addition, this thesis makes a number of contributions to other areas of interest in the
asset-pricing and behavioural finance literatures. It provides further evidence on the
question of whether or not default risk is priced in equity markets; this evidence is based
both on stock returns and on the market reactions to earnings surprises. Other findings
have implications for our understanding of the momentum life cycle proposed by Lee
and Swaminathan (2000), and for the validity of various assumptions made in
behavioural models such as Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel et al. (1998),
Hong and Stein (1999), and Barberis and Shleifer (2003). These assumptions include
the slow diffusion of information, the relative importance of underreaction and
overreaction to describe investor behaviour, and the various cognitive biases (such as
representativeness and conservatism) used to generate such behaviour.

1.6 Thesis Structure
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed
discussion of the related literature. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 contain the empirical studies,
each of which corresponds to one of the three issues/research questions outlined above.
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Chapter 3 investigates mispricing in the Australian market as a function of value/growth
characteristics and distress; Chapter 4 investigates analyst optimism conditional on
value/growth characteristics and distress; and Chapter 5 investigates the market reaction
to earnings surprises conditional on value/growth characteristics, distress and analyst
disagreement. Chapter 6 then concludes by summarising the salient findings of all three
empirical chapters, discussing in detail the contributions of the thesis to the literature,
and then commenting on the limitations and potential future extensions of the research.
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
PERTAINING TO THE VALUE PREMIUM,
ANALYST EFFICIENCY AND MARKET
REACTIONS TO EARNINGS SURPRISES

2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature behind the identification of the value premium, its
explanations in terms of both rational pricing and behavioural finance, and the evidence
cited in support of the various explanations. As is the case for the thesis in general, the
emphasis of the chapter is upon behavioural explanations. The chapter also covers the
literature on two subject areas which are of importance to this thesis, which overlap
with but are difficult to categorise specifically as belonging to the value premium
literature. These two subject areas deal with the issues of analyst efficiency and the
market reaction to earnings surprises (including earnings response coefficients).

The chapter begins (Section 2.2) with a review of the evidence for the existence of a
value premium, along with similar evidence for the size effect and momentum. All of
these empirical phenomena are referred to as asset pricing anomalies because they are
inconsistent with standard asset pricing models, such as the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM). The value premium and size effect are related and difficult to discuss in
isolation because market capitalisation, which is commonly used to measure size,
appears as a denominator in valuation ratios which are commonly used to measure
value. Unlike the value premium, the size effect has been argued by some authors to
have either disappeared or reversed in sign (Black, 1993a; Roll, 1995; Dimson and
Marsh, 1999). Therefore, the emphasis of the remainder of the chapter and of the thesis
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in general is on the value premium, and not on the size effect. The issue of whether or
not the size effect has vanished is largely irrelevant to the rest of this thesis, although it
enters the discussion of a number of the risk-based explanations for the value premium.
Similarly, momentum is not the main focus of the chapter or of the thesis; however it is
mentioned because it enters the discussion of behavioural finance and mispricing-based
explanations for the value premium.

The most prominent current explanations for the value premium are discussed in
Section 2.3. These explanations generally fall into one of two camps: those based on a
rational asset pricing framework where the high returns of value stocks are viewed as
compensation for risk, and those based on mispricing and various behavioural
assumptions. The explanations based on rational asset pricing include the Fama-French
three-factor model and conditional versions of the CAPM and consumption-based
models. The empirical basis of the links between size, value and financial distress is
discussed in Section 2.3.2; the relationship between value and distress has been used as
a basis for the assumption that HML represents a risk factor and therefore to justify its
inclusion in rational asset pricing models. However, the same relationship is particularly
important for this thesis because financial distress is used as a control variable; the
justification for doing so will be made apparent in subsequent sections.

In contrast to the rational asset pricing framework, behavioural finance seeks theoretical
explanations for a wide variety of financial market phenomena, based on the assumption
that not all agents are fully rational. These phenomena include the equity premium
puzzle, time-series and cross-sectional predictability of returns, post-earnings
announcement drift, abnormal returns following corporate actions, and irrational trading
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behaviour by investors (Barberis and Thaler, 2005). In the context of cross-sectional
return predictability, behavioural finance is primarily concerned with two seemingly
disparate effects, namely the value premium and momentum. The behavioural finance
explanations that are relevant for the value premium are discussed in Section 2.3.4; the
most important being models by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001a), and Hong and Stein (1999). The models differ
markedly in the overreaction and underreaction mechanisms proposed to explain both
the value premium and momentum, and also differ markedly in the psychological biases
and other assumptions they employ to generate these mechanisms. The findings of this
thesis have implications for behavioural finance theories and the assumptions
underlying these theories.

One behavioural explanation for the value premium that is particularly relevant to this
thesis is the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, discussed in Section 2.3.5. This
hypothesis states that investors are overly optimistic regarding the future prospects of,
and pay prices that are too high for, growth stocks. The errors in initial growth
expectations are realised upon subsequent earnings announcements, resulting in price
corrections which ultimately translate into the value premium. The errors-inexpectations hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence based on historical and
forecast growth rates (for example, Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 1996; Dechow
and Sloan, 1997, and Chan et al., 2003) and market reactions to earnings surprises (for
example Skinner and Sloan, 2002 and Chan et al., 2006a). However, the errors-inexpectations hypothesis is not supported by empirical evidence from analysts’ earnings
forecasts, which are found to be more optimistic for high book-to-market (B/M) stocks
than for low B/M stocks (Bauman and Miller, 1997; Doukas et al., 2002; Mian and Teo,
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2004), the direct opposite of the relationship predicted by this hypothesis. One of the
major contributions of this thesis is a critical re-examination of the relationship between
analyst optimism and B/M, focusing on an important control variable not considered in
previous studies: financial distress. There are two reasons why the failure to adequately
control for distress might be a critical oversight in this context: (a) because mispricing is
arguably a function of distress as well as value and (b) because of analyst inefficiency
considerations. Consequently, the chapter moves on to a discussion of the literature that
supports these two reasons.

Some relatively recent studies (discussed in Section 2.3.6) identify mispriced stocks as a
function of value/growth and of each firm’s relative state of financial health or distress,
a concept which is central to this thesis. For example, Piotroski (2000), Griffin and
Lemmon (2002), and Mohanram (2005) all identify overpriced growth stocks as those
with low B/M and poor financial health and underpriced value stocks as those with high
B/M and good financial health. A similar scheme is used in Bird and Casavecchia
(2007a), with value/growth defined in terms of sales-to-price rather than B/M. Research
question 1 and the first empirical study in this thesis follows the overall theme of these
studies by testing whether Australian stocks with low valuation ratios and high default
risk are overpriced, and those with high valuation ratios and low default risk are
underpriced.

Research questions 2 and 3 are based to some extent upon subject areas that are not
wholly within the value premium literature. One such subject area is analyst efficiency
(or inefficiency), alluded to in the discussion of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis
above and to which Section 2.4 is devoted. The literature on analyst efficiency suggests
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that analysts’ forecasts are inefficient with regard to the incorporation of relevant public
information, as forecast errors have been shown to be correlated with variables such as
prior changes in earnings-per-share and prior returns (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992;
Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Cohen and Lys, 2003).
Analyst inefficiency makes it highly plausible that analysts’ forecasts do not adequately
reflect a firm’s state of financial distress, and that forecast errors are correlated with
distress-risk. Consequently, the relationship between forecast errors and B/M reported
in Doukas et al. (2002) might arise because of analyst inefficiency in recognising
financial distress and because of the relationship between B/M and financial distress.
Research question 2 and the second empirical study in this thesis test this hypothesis by
examining the variation in analysts’ forecast errors with valuation ratios (including
B/M) and financial distress.

The final body of literature of relevance to this thesis pertains to the market reactions to
earnings surprises, the subject of Section 2.5. This literature includes some of the
studies that deal with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis and which are therefore
discussed in Section 2.3.5, as well as studies of earnings response coefficients. Research
question 3 and the final empirical study in this thesis draw upon both areas of the
literature in an attempt to explain another anomalous feature of the results of Doukas et
al. (2002). The findings of Doukas et al. (2002) are anomalous in that they imply value
stocks have large negative earnings surprises relative to growth stocks despite the
existence of the value premium; in effect the value premium itself implies that the large
negative surprises of value stocks must escape largely unpunished by the market. Whilst
it is acknowledged that a previously documented result pertaining to the asymmetric
responses of value and growth stocks to negative earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan,
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2002; Chan et al., 2006a) might fully explain this anomaly, there are a number of other
factors suggested by the literature that might also be relevant. These additional factors
are elaborated upon in Section 2.5 and include the functional form of the relationship
between returns and earnings surprises, and the relative importance of B/M, financial
distress and analyst forecast dispersion to this relationship.

2.2 Asset Pricing Anomalies
Asset pricing anomalies are empirical results that historically proved difficult to
reconcile with the traditional rational pricing paradigm; a paradigm that includes the
efficient market hypothesis and an asset pricing model. The efficient market hypothesis
states that security prices reflect all available information; a consequence of which is
that abnormal returns are not achievable through the analysis of information related to
securities. Abnormal returns are defined in terms of risk-adjusted returns, for which an
asset-pricing model is required (Shleifer, 2000, pp.5-6). The most widely used assetpricing model is the CAPM, which states that investors are only concerned with
systematic risk, measured by a security’s beta.

Under the CAPM, expected returns are a linear and increasing function of beta, and
abnormal returns are measured as the difference between the actual returns of a security
and the expected return of the security. Empirical evidence that demonstrates persistent
abnormal returns from a specific trading strategy is thus termed an asset-pricing
anomaly. For example, the size effect (Banz, 1981) and price-to-earnings (P/E) effect
(Basu, 1977) were initially identified by the abnormal returns of portfolios sorted
respectively by market capitalisation and P/E ratios. The detection of anomalies such as
the size effect and price-to-earnings effect has historically been interpreted either as
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evidence that the CAPM is an imperfect model of asset prices or as evidence of market
inefficiency 5.

Whilst the CAPM remains the dominant asset pricing model due to its simplicity and
theoretical soundness, other asset pricing models have either been confronted by
anomalies detected in the context of the CAPM, or indeed proposed as a consequence of
these anomalies. The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) was employed with limited success
in an attempt to explain the size effect; where the model factors consist either of purely
statistical factors (for example Lehmann and Modest, 1988; Connor and Korajczyk,
1988) or of pre-specified economic variables (for example Chan, Chen and Hsieh, 1985;
Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986; He and Ng, 1994). Similarly, APT-style pricing models
with economic factors (He and Ng, 1994) and statistical factors (Brennan, Chordia and
Subrahmanyam, 1998) proved inadequate in explaining B/M effects in stock returns.
The Fama-French three-factor model was proposed by Fama and French (1993) as an
alternative to the CAPM to explain the existence of the size and B/M effects, with
factors determined empirically as the returns of portfolios constructed specifically to
capture these effects. This model has been justified as a form of the intertemporal
capital asset pricing model (ICAPM), with the factors representing size and B/M effects
argued to be the returns of portfolios that investors use to hedge against economic state
variables (Fama and French, 1996; Petkova, 2006). Yet another asset pricing model, the
Carhart four-factor model, was proposed in Carhart (1997) and augments the FamaFrench three-factor model with a fourth factor designed to capture another major CAPM
anomaly, namely momentum.
5

All tests of asset pricing anomalies are thus subject to the critique of Fama (1970), which states that
such tests are joint tests of the efficient markets hypothesis and of the asset pricing model used to define
abnormal returns. As Shleifer (2000), points out, this critique can be applied to argue that asset pricing
anomalies are evidence only of the inadequacy of models such as the CAPM, and not of market
efficiency.
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The anomalies that are of most relevance to this thesis are the size effect, the value
premium and momentum, to which Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 are devoted. Other notable
anomalies include the weekend effect, January effect, equity premium puzzle, and
evidence of abnormal returns following earnings and dividend announcements and share
issuance (Barberis and Thaler, 2005). As these anomalies are largely irrelevant to this
thesis they will not be discussed further in this chapter.

2.2.1 The Size Effect and Value Premium
The size effect is the observation that small (low market capitalisation) companies have
higher risk-adjusted returns than large companies. The value premium is the observation
that value stocks (companies with low market value relative to an accounting variable
such as earnings or book-value of equity) have higher risk-adjusted returns than growth
stocks (companies with high market value relative to an accounting variable such as
earnings or book-value of equity). As size (market capitalisation) enters the calculation
of value, the size effect and value premium are related. It is therefore difficult to discuss
the value premium literature without a concurrent discussion of the literature on the size
effect.

The first important study in this area was that of Basu (1977) which confirms the P/E
effect, the inverse relationship between abnormal returns and P/E ratios. This
relationship is also confirmed in subsequent studies by Basu (1983), Cook and Rozeff
(1984), Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989) and Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991).
The ‘size-effect’ is credited to Banz (1981), with later studies arguing that the size
effect completely subsumes the P/E effect (Reinganum, 1981). To this end, Banz and
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Breen (1986) argue that the evidence of a P/E effect is heavily influenced by ‘ex-postselection bias’ (also referred to as ‘survivorship bias’) and ‘look-ahead bias’ (the
assumption that accounting data are available to investors at the end of the firm’s fiscal
year, even though the data are not actually reported until several months later).
However, Jaffe et al. (1989) find a P/E effect in a study free of both forms of bias, and a
size effect that limited to the month of January only, consistent with previous evidence
by Keim (1983) that the size effect is concentrated in January.

Value stocks, and by implication the value premium, have been defined by a number of
ratios besides P/E 6. The most frequently used ratio for this purpose in the academic
literature is B/M with innumerable studies documenting a direct relationship between
this ratio and stock returns, for example Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985), Chan et
al. (1991), Fama and French (1992) and others. Other value-related ratios documented
to have a direct relationship with stock returns include cashflow-to-price or C/P (for
example Chan et al., 1991; Lakonishok et al., 1994), sales-to-price (Bird and Whitaker,
2003; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007a) and composite variables based on B/M and C/P
and on C/P and past sales growth (Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Numerous other studies have since demonstrated that value
stocks earn higher returns than growth stocks over the long term including La Porta et
al. (1997), Daniel and Titman (1997), Dechow and Sloan (1997), and Chan, Karceski
and Lakonishok (1998).

6

For consistency with other ratios such as B/M which have price or market capitalisation in the
denominator, extensive use will be made in this thesis of the inverse of P/E, in other words earnings-toprice or E/P for short. Thus the P/E effect, or inverse relationship between returns and P/E, becomes a
direct relationship between returns and E/P.
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Evidence of the existence of the value premium in markets outside of the United States
is provided by Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993), Arshanapalli, Coggin, Doukas and
Shea (1998) and Fama and French (1998). Evidence of a value in premium in Australia
is provided in Arshanapalli et al. (1998), Fama and French (1998), Halliwell et al.
(1999), Faff (2001), Gaunt (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2009). The studies by Halliwell
et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) are noteworthy in that neither study unequivocally
concludes that a value premium exists in Australia, despite the presentation of results
that support this conclusion 7. The two-way sorts on size and B/M in both studies show
returns increasing with B/M in at least the three largest size quintiles, and therefore
support the existence of a value premium, at least amongst the largest 60% of stocks by
market capitalisation. Furthermore, Halliwell et al. (1999) state that “The mean B/M
premium is substantially larger than either the market or the size premium with an
average premium of 14.57% per year” (p.129). Therefore, the overall evidence supports
the existence of a value premium in Australia.

The value premium is closely related to the return reversal effect of De Bondt and
Thaler (1985), whereby stocks with low returns measured over prior five-year periods
(losers) tended to have higher future returns than stocks with high five-year returns
(winners). De Bondt and Thaler (1987) showed that both value stocks and losers tend to
be characterised by high B/M, poor prior performance in earnings and low prior returns,
leading to depressed stock prices. Strategies that invest in either value stocks or loser
stocks are often referred to as ‘contrarian’ strategies because they are contrary to the

7

For example, Halliwell et al. (1999) state “There is little evidence of a statistically significant B/M effect
though the magnitude of the B/M parameters are similar to those observed in Fama and French (1993)”
(Halliwell et al. (1999), p.136). Similarly, Gaunt (2004) states “There is some weak evidence of a BM
effect in the raw returns with three of the high BM portfolios possessing a statistically significant higher
raw return than the corresponding low BM portfolios” (italics added, p.34).
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sentiment expressed by the market, and emphasise out-of-favour stocks (Lakonishok et
al., 1994).

A major argument against the findings of a value premium is that the result is due to the
ex-post selection (or survivorship) bias first discussed by Banz and Breen (1986).
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) point out this bias is particularly severe in the
COMPUSTAT data typically used in value premium studies, because of the underrepresentation of delisted firms. They also point out that value stocks are generally more
financially distressed than growth stocks and therefore more likely to be delisted,
inducing an upward bias in estimates of the value premium. However, other studies
have demonstrated either that the value premium exists in databases free from
survivorship bias (Davis, 1994) or that the effect of the bias in the COMPUSTAT data
is insufficient to alter inferences regarding the value premium (Chan, Jegadeesh and
Lakonishok, 1995; Kim, 1997).

Another argument against the existence of both the size effect and value premium is that
the results are spurious and simply due to a collective data mining effort by many
researchers using the same data, following the initial publication of an anomaly. The
main advocates of this argument, Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and Black (1993a, 1993b)
cite the absence of a theory linking stock returns to the characteristics in question
(market capitalisation and scaled-price ratios). This argument has empirical support
with regard to the size effect, which is documented to have either diminished, vanished
or reversed in sign since it was first announced in 1981 (for example Black, 1993a;
Roll, 1995; Dimson and Marsh, 1999). However, the argument has been progressively
weakened with regard to the value premium, which has proved robust over long periods
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of time and in other markets besides the US (for example, Chan et al., 1991; Capaul et
al., 1993; Arshanapalli et al., 1998; Fama and French, 1998). Furthermore, theory has
been extended to accommodate the value premium, in terms of both rational asset
pricing and behavioural finance. These explanations will be discussed in more detail in
Section 2.3.

2.2.2 Momentum
Momentum is a phenomenon that has been observed in stock prices, whereby portfolios
of stocks with recent high returns (winners) tend to exhibit higher returns than portfolios
of stocks with recent low returns (losers). In other words, momentum describes short
term return continuation, as opposed to the long-term return reversals documented by
De Bondt and Thaler (1985). The existence of a momentum effect is generally credited
to Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who found that stocks with high (low) six-month
returns tend to continue to exhibit high (low) returns around earnings announcement
dates in the following six months, although consistent with the effect documented by De
Bondt and Thaler (1985) this trend reverses after eight months.

Evidence of a momentum effect in Europe was provided by Rouwenhorst (1998) and
internationally by Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003). Momentum has also been documented
at the industry level by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), and at the country level by
Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) and Scowcroft and Sefton (2005). In other words,
industries within national markets with recent high returns as well as national equity
markets with recent high returns are expected, on average, to continue to have high
returns. It is significant that momentum is not explainable by the Fama-French threefactor model (Fama and French, 1996); the consequence being the four-factor model
30

proposed by Carhart (1997) which augments the three-factor model with a momentum
factor.

An important link between momentum and value strategies was established by Lee and
Swaminathan (2000), and which will subsequently be shown to be consistent with the
findings of this thesis. They document that a simple momentum strategy can be
improved by buying winners with low trading volume and selling losers with high
trading volume. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) observed that

stocks

with

high

trading volume possessed many attributes of growth stocks (high analyst coverage,
higher long-term growth forecasts and higher profitability), whereas stocks with low
trading volume possessed many attributes of value stocks. Given the relationship
between trading volume and value/growth, the strategy advocated by Lee and
Swaminathan (2000) is similar to a strategy that buys high momentum value stocks and
sells low momentum growth stocks, which others have been found to be highly
profitable (Bird and Whitaker, 2004; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007b).

2.3 Alternative Explanations for Size and Value Effects

2.3.1 The Fama-French Three-Factor Model
The study by Fama and French (1992) argues that in contradiction to the CAPM, beta
appears to play little, if any, role in determining return variation in the cross-section of
stock returns. Any relationship between beta and returns, for example the findings of
well-known studies such as Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Fama and Macbeth
(1973), is due to the correlation between size and beta, and the strong inverse
relationship between size and returns. Furthermore, Fama and French (1992) argued that
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stock returns are parsimoniously explained by two variables, size (market capitalisation)
and B/M, with no role for beta.

Both size and B/M appeared to be jointly and

independently related to returns, with returns increasing monotonically with both B/M
and decreasing size. In cross-sectional regressions, Fama and French (1992) found that
the slope coefficients on B/M were much larger (in absolute value) and had more
statistically significant t-statistics, and therefore concluded that B/M is more important
in explaining returns than size.

As an extension of the results reported in Fama and French (1992), the Fama-French
three-factor model was developed in Fama and French (1993) and includes as factors
the returns of a market portfolio and two hedge portfolios constructed to capture the
effects of size and B/M on stock returns. The Fama-French three-factor model is given
by the regression equation (2.1), wherein SMB is the expected return on a portfolio of
small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of large (‘big’) stocks; HML the expected
return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks minus the return on a portfolio of low B/M
stocks; and rm − rf the market return in excess of the risk-free rate. The terms s j , h j and
b j are the loadings of security j on the respective risk factors, with b j analogous to beta

in the CAPM, while the a j term is the pricing error of the model, or simply the intercept
term from time-series regressions.

rj − rf = a j + b jE[rm − rf ] + s jSMB + h jHML + ei

(2.1)

Fama and French (1993) test the three-factor model using time series-regressions on a
set of 25 portfolios constructed by sorting stocks simultaneously on size and B/M (a
five-by-five, two-way sort). Not surprisingly, the portfolios containing high (low) B/M
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possessed high (low) regression slopes h on HML, and the portfolios containing small
(large) stocks possessed high (low) regression slopes s on SMB.

Without the market factor included, the intercept term a j in the time-series regressions
was found to be large and similar for all 25 portfolios; by including the market factor,
the intercept term is effectively pushed to zero, indicating that the market return is
needed to explain total stock returns. However the loading on the market factor, b j , was
close to unity for all 25 portfolios, indicating that beta does not explain variation in the
cross-section of stock returns, consistent with the results of Fama and French (1992).
Fama and French (1993) also successfully used the three-factor model to explain the
anomalous returns of low price-to-earnings stocks and high dividend-yield stocks.
Subsequently, Fama and French (1996) claimed the model is able explain the returns of
a variety of contrarian strategies, including those based on P/E, C/P, past sales growth
(Lakonishok et al., 1994) and long-term return reversals (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985,
1987), but not however the returns of momentum strategies expounded in Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993).

Fama and French (1993) interpreted the SMB and HML factors as proxies for
underlying sources of economic risk, on the premise that assets are priced rationally and
therefore variables (such as size and B/M) associated with returns must proxy for
common, undiversifiable sources of risk. They argued that both small firms and high
B/M (value) firms tend to be unprofitable, and therefore SMB and HML are related to
earnings-risk factors. Fama and French (1995) were able to confirm that size and B/M
are indeed related to profitability. A high B/M ratio tends not only to be indicative of
recent poor earnings performance, but also to signal continued poor performance. In
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two-way sorts on size and B/M, the high B/M portfolios were characterised by firms
that had demonstrated consistently low profitability up to five years prior to portfolio
formation, and that would continue to be unprofitable for up to five years after portfolio
formation. A similar, but weaker result obtained for the small-size portfolios, but this
result was conditional upon B/M: given a level of B/M, small firms are consistently less
profitable than larger firms, however small, low B/M firms tend to be consistently more
profitable than large, high B/M firms.

Fama and French (1996) finalised their exposition of why the three-factor model
explains returns in a rational asset pricing framework. They interpreted the ability of the
model to explain value-related CAPM anomalies as evidence that SMB and HML
capture the effects of economic state variables that investors wish to hedge against, in
the spirit of the ICAPM. In particular, they argued that HML is likely to be a risk factor
that relates to relative distress: companies, industries and portfolios have high loadings
on HML when they are distressed, and relatively lower loadings on HML at times when
they are strong. The high average returns of the HML factor, and of assets that load
highly on this factor, are therefore argued to be compensation for bearing distress risk.
The concept of relative distress in asset pricing is generally attributable to a study by
Chan and Chen (1991) (see Section 2.3.2), who argued that distressed firms are more
susceptible to adverse economic conditions. However, Fama and French (1996) do not
claim to have identified the precise nature of the economic risk factors proxied by SMB
and HML (Fama and French, 1996, p.76):

One can argue that all of this still falls within a minimalist interpretation of the
three-factor model; we have simply found three portfolios that provide a
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parsimonious description or returns and average returns, and so can absorb
most of the anomalies of the CAPM…We have not identified the two state
variables of special hedging concern to investors that lead to three-factor asset
pricing.

The Fama-French three-factor model is an important but controversial contribution to
asset pricing. It has become important because researchers now routinely apply the
model in portfolio performance measurement to control for size and B/M effects.
However, the model is controversial because the theoretical justification for the SMB
and HML factors is not universally accepted. Black (1993a) cited data-mining concerns
and pointed to the fact that the premium for SMB had disappeared since the early
1980’s. Ferson et al. (1999) also argued that size and B/M effects in returns might be
spurious relationships, and hence SMB and HML might take on the appearance of risk
factors when in fact there is no theoretical basis for the argument that they are indeed
risk factors. Chan and Lakonishok (2004) argue that an equally valid interpretation of
HML is as a factor that captures returns due to mispricing, rather than risk-based
expected returns. These criticisms apply equally to the Carhart four-factor model, which
augments the three-factor model with a winner-minus-loser factor to explain away the
momentum effect; momentum being a major anomaly that Fama and French (1996)
were not able to explain using the three-factor model.

Others have debated whether or not SMB and HML, as risk factors, can even explain
the cross-section of stock returns which they were designed to capture. In particular,
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the value premium is due to errors of judgment and
to pressures on institutional investors to avoid value stocks. Daniel and Titman (1997)
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argue that returns are more closely associated with size and B/M characteristics than
with loadings on the SMB and HML factors; therefore the cross-sectional variation in
returns arises because of mispricing associated with the size and B/M characteristics and
not because of sensitivity to priced risk factors represented by SMB and HML. A
similar conclusion was reached for the Japanese stock market by Daniel, Titman and
Wei (2001b).

A number of studies reached different conclusions to Daniel and Titman (1997) and
Daniel et al. (2001b). Lewellen (1999) tested a conditional version of the Fama-French
three-factor model where factor loadings as well as the intercept term (alpha) of
portfolios are allowed to vary over time with each portfolio’s B/M ratio. Similarly to
Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall (1998), Lewellen (1999) found that
the B/M ratio of a portfolio predicts its return. However, he argues this predictability
occurs because B/M captures time-variation in the loadings on SMB and HML, and
therefore concurs with the risk-based, rather than mispricing-based interpretation of
HML. Davis, Fama and French (2000) repeated the Daniel and Titman (1997) study
using a longer sample, 1929-1997, and also disagree with their results. They found that
the results of Daniel and Titman (1997) are special to the period they consider, i.e.
1973-1993, while the longer 1929-1997 period supports the three-factor model.
Gharghori et al. (2006a) also find that loadings on the SMB and HML factors explain
Australian stock returns better than the size and B/M characteristics.

Ferson and Harvey (1999) disputed the ability of the Fama-French three-factor model to
explain the cross-section of stock returns, because it omitted important economic
variables known to be able to predict stock returns. These variables include interest rate
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variables and aggregate dividend yields previously studied by Campbell (1987),
Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama and French (1989) and others. Ferson and Harvey
(1999) showed that the three-factor alphas of the 25 portfolios originally studied by
Fama and French (1993) are in fact time-varying and conditional upon the economic
variables, and not close to zero as previously claimed.

Some studies have, however, revealed a link between the Fama-French factors and
economic variables. Liew and Vassalou (2000) demonstrated that HML and SMB have
some ability to predict future economic growth, even in the presence of popular
business cycle variables. They showed that in seven out of the ten countries they
investigated, high returns on HML preceded high economic growth (Australia was one
of the three countries where the opposite effect was observed). Regression analysis
revealed a statistically significant relation between future GDP growth and HML in
seven out of ten countries, and between GDP growth and SMB in eight out of ten
countries. Petkova (2006) compared the three-factor model with an ICAPM
specification that includes as factors changes in market dividend yield, term spread,
default spread and one-month T-bill yield. She found that HML is related to changes in
the aggregate dividend yield, term spread and default spread, while SMB is related to
the default spread. An ICAPM that included these variables outperformed the threefactor model in explaining the cross-section of stock returns, and HML and SMB added
no incremental explanatory power to the ICAPM.
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2.3.2 The Link between Size, Value and Distress Risk
The relationship between the value premium and financial distress is fundamentally
important to this thesis. Although there is evidence that small and value stocks are in
general relatively distressed, it has proved difficult to isolate a distress factor that is
priced in the equity market and which therefore explains size and value effects in a
rational pricing context. Furthermore, deviations in the relationship between distress
and B/M have been investigated as a potential source of abnormal trading profits (for
example, Piotroski, 2000; Mohanram, 2005) and as evidence of mispricing (Griffin and
Lemmon, 2002). An attempt will be made in this thesis to replicate these findings using
Australian data and subsequently to use them to explain the findings of Doukas et al.
(2002), which are contrary to the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.

Early attempts at risk-based explanations for the size effect primarily used an APT
framework to show that small firms possess higher sensitivities to pervasive risk factors
(for example, Chan et al., 1985; Chen et al., 1986; Connor and Korajczyk, 1988;
Lehmann and Modest, 1988). However, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) objected to the use
of returns of size-based portfolios to test asset pricing models, arguing that the sizereturn relationship is possibly spurious and leads to rejection of the null hypothesis (of
asset-pricing model inadequacy) far too often, given that the same data that was used to
uncover the size effect is also generally used to test asset pricing models. Similarly,
Chan and Chen (1991) argued that attempts to model the risk of small stocks should
offer an explanation as to why size should be important in asset pricing at all. To this
end, Chan and Chen (1991) focused on identifying the characteristics of small firms that
make them more sensitive than larger firms to priced sources of risk in the economy.
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The study by Chan and Chen (1991) demonstrated a number of important points about
small firms that helped to clarify exactly why they are riskier, in general, than larger
firms. One tenet argued forcibly is that small stocks, as a group, contain many stocks
that were once much larger, but had suffered declines in market value. Chan and Chen
(1991) also directly verified that small firms typically faced much greater financial
distress and operational difficulties than larger firms. Smaller firms in general were less
profitable, had lower interest expense coverage, higher financial leverage and a greater
propensity to cut dividends than larger firms. Chan and Chen (1991) argued that the
relative distress suffered by small firms on average makes them less likely to survive
adverse economic conditions than larger firms, and this fact explains the sensitivity of
small firms to economic risk factors. They support this argument by observing that
during regressions, firms with high financial leverage and poor recent operating
performance may have restricted access to credit markets. This latter point is confirmed
in studies by Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), and Perez-Quiros and
Timmermann (2000).

Fama and French (1992) suggest that the Chan and Chen (1991) distress factor may be
responsible for the value premium, and indeed value stocks in general have been shown
to possess many characteristics of financial distress. To this end, Fama and French
(1995) examined the average profitability of stocks in portfolios based on size and B/M.
They measured profitability by return on equity and performed the calculation for each
of the five years prior to and five years after portfolio formation. Small firms were
observed to have lower profitability than large firms both before and after portfolio
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formation; however this observation is conditional on B/M. The stronger result was that
high B/M firms had lower profitability than low B/M firms before and after portfolio
formation, and this result is not conditional upon size. Thus, Fama and French (1995)
argue that high B/M, and to a lesser extent small size, are signs of distressed firms that
have suffered low profitability in the past and will continue to suffer low earnings in the
future. Chen and Zhang (1998) also present findings from six countries that suggest
value stocks are more distressed than growth stocks. They examined various measures
of risk in order to compare value and growth stocks in six countries. These findings
demonstrate that value stocks have higher leverage, higher incidence of cutting
dividends and higher time-series variability in earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios (interpreted
as earnings uncertainty) than growth stocks.

Studies by Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also explore and confirm the
relationship between size, B/M and financial distress; unlike previous studies however,
they reject the rational pricing of a distress factor. Dichev (1998) measured distress
using numerical bankruptcy prediction models (Altman’s Z-score and Ohlson’s Oscore) and then sorted stocks into decile portfolios based upon their level of bankruptcy
risk. In accordance with Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1995), Dichev
(1998) found an inverse relationship between size and bankruptcy risk, confirming that
the stocks of firms with a high risk of bankruptcy tend to be small stocks. With the
exception of the ten percent of stocks with the highest risk of bankruptcy, B/M also
increases with bankruptcy risk, confirming the link between value and distress reported
in Fama and French (1995). Dichev (1998) also found, however, that there was no
positive relationship between distress risk and subsequent stock returns, and concluded
that bankruptcy risk is not compensated by higher returns and therefore cannot explain
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size and value effects in returns. On the contrary, Dichev (1998) reported substantial
return advantages to investment strategies that avoid stocks with a high probability of
bankruptcy.

Similarly, Griffin and Lemmon (2002) found an inverse relationship between the Oscore measure of default risk and firm size; however their results indicate that the
relationship between distress and B/M is far more complicated than suggested by Fama
and French (1995) and Chen and Zhang (1998). In particular, stocks with high default
risk (high O-score) include both high B/M and low B/M stocks. Griffin and Lemmon
(2002) found that the value premium, although present in all O-score quintiles,
increases with O-score and is most prominent in the quintile of stocks with the highest
risk of bankruptcy (O-score). They confirmed the earlier result of Fama and French
(1995) that in general; high B/M stocks have lower profitability than low B/M stocks;
however this relationship is reversed for the quintile of stocks with the highest O-score:
high O-score, low B/M stocks were found to have the lowest profitability of all stocks
in their sample.

Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also compared the announcement period returns of high
and low B/M stocks, and further differentiated the results by O-score. In agreement with
La Porta et al. (1997), they found a significant return differential between value and
growth stocks in the three-day window surrounding announcement dates (with value
outperforming growth), however once again the effect was more pronounced for high
O-score stocks. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) argued that their results are consistent with
a mispricing explanation for the value premium which is greatest in distressed stocks, a
group of stocks which tends to consist of small stocks with low analyst following. In
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particular, they argued that the low returns of growth stocks are driven primarily by the
very low returns of high O-score (distressed) growth stocks, and which are therefore not
explainable in terms of a priced distress factor.

Vassalou and Xing (2004) also investigated the relationship between size, B/M and
default risk; however they measured default risk in terms of distance-to-default (DD).
The distance-to-default methodology was developed by Moody’s KMV and is discussed
in detail in Crosbie and Bohn (2003); it is based upon the bond-pricing framework of
Merton (1974), which models a firm’s equity as a call option on the firm’s assets with
an exercise price equal to the value of the firm’s debt. Unlike Dichev (1998) and Griffin
and Lemmon (2002), Vassalou and Xing (2004) found that default risk was indeed
priced in equity markets and is related to both the size and B/M effects. The size effect
was only present in the quintile of stocks with the highest default risk, and the SMB
factor lost its significance in cross-sectional asset pricing tests once an aggregate default
risk factor was included. Similarly, the value premium was found to be statistically
significant only in the two highest default risk quintiles, but did however retain its
significance in cross-sectional asset pricing tests that included an aggregate default risk
factor. Vassalou and Xing (2004) conclude that default risk is priced in equity returns,
that it completely explains the size effect, and that it partially explains the value
premium.

Findings in subsequent studies, however, are inconsistent with those of Vassalou and
Xing (2004). Gharghori et al. (2007) perform a similar analysis using DD on Australian
data; they find that default risk is not priced in equity returns and that neither SMB nor
HML contain any default-related information. Furthermore, a major discrepancy was
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uncovered by Da and Gao (2010), in that the returns of high default risk stocks in
Vassalou and Xing (2004) are attributable to the first month after portfolio formation;
however the distress premium is negative and statistically significant for the remainder
of the year following portfolio formation. Moreover, Da and Gao (2010) are able to
explain nearly all of the first-month returns in terms of short term return reversals,
which they attribute to institutional selling and illiquidity and not to a default risk
premium. Since Vassalou and Xing (2004) rebalance their portfolios on a monthly
basis, their average portfolio returns for distressed stocks miss the negative returns that
accrue to these stocks later in the year, and are hence biased upwards. This conclusion is
supported by Campbell et al. (2008) who repeat the Vassalou and Xing (2004) analysis
with DD and annual rather than monthly portfolio rebalancing, and claim to have
refuted the Vassalou and Xing (2004) finding of a positive distress premium. Campbell
et al. (2008) also use an alternative distress measure estimated from accounting and
equity market variables to demonstrate the existence of a negative distress premium in
all size and B/M quintiles.

In summary, financial distress is related to size and B/M characteristics in firms.
However, most studies (with the exception of Vassalou and Xing, 2004) argue that
financial distress is not a priced risk factor in equity markets and therefore a distress
premium by itself does not appear to be a satisfactory rational pricing explanation for
the value premium. Furthermore, profitable trading strategies have been identified that
appear to exploit mispricing of financially healthy value stocks and financially
distressed growth stocks, the subject of Section 2.3.6. However, the distress factor has
been interpreted by some authors as a recession risk factor, because distressed firms
tend to perform particularly poorly in recessions. This recession (or downside) risk is
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modelled in conditional asset pricing models as time variable systematic risk (Cochrane,
2005). The next section reviews the explanations for the size and value effects based on
conditional asset pricing models.

2.3.3 Conditional Asset Pricing
Another range of asset pricing models makes allowance for time variability in risk.
Variation in beta over the business cycle seems plausible because distressed and
leveraged firms might fare relatively worse during recessions than healthier firms, and
hence their leverage and beta risk increase during these times (Jagannathan and Wang,
1996). Time variation in asset covariance has been studied by Bollerslev, Engle and
Wooldridge (1988), Harvey (1989) and Ferson and Harvey (1991); in general these
studies make the assumption that asset covariances are conditional upon variables such
as past covariance, market returns, market dividend yields and spreads in the term
structure of interest rates. Similarly, the market risk premium is also expected to vary
with the business cycle, as investors require lower prices to invest in risky assets during
recessions, when marginal utility is high (Fama and French, 1989).

A relatively important contribution in this area is by Jagannathan and Wang (1996),
who use a conditional version of the CAPM, where both beta and expected market
returns vary through time, to derive an expression for unconditional expected returns.
They are able to show that when beta covaries with expected market returns,
(unconditional) expected asset returns are a linear function of expected (unconditional)
beta and the sensitivity of beta to the market risk premium (a term which they refer to as
the ‘beta-prem sensitivity’, and others refer to as ‘beta-premium sensitivity’). In
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essence, the model shows that time variation in beta is another source of risk that
increases expected returns.

Jagannathan and Wang (1996) attempt to explain the anomalous relationship between
average stock returns, market capitalisation and beta reported in Fama and French
(1992) using their conditional CAPM. Their main motivation was to explain the size
effect, as the distressed and leveraged firms mentioned above are most likely to be small
firms (Chan and Chen, 1991), and hence it is expected that the betas of small firms will
covary with the market risk premium more than those of large firms. By incorporating
time variation in beta related to the market risk premium, Jagannathan and Wang (1996)
claimed the percentage of variation in the returns of portfolio sorted by size and beta
increases from 1% in the static CAPM to 30% in the conditional CAPM. When human
capital is included in the market portfolio, the percentage explained rises to 50%, with
size and B/M unable to explain what is left. Their study was replicated on Australian
data by Durack, Durand and Maller (2004), whose results were generally supportive of
the role of beta-prem sensitivity, but not of the human capital component of the market
portfolio.

Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) examined conditional versions of both the CAPM and
consumption-oriented CAPM, where systematic risk is allowed to vary with a single
variable designed to capture investors’ expectations of future returns and consumption.
The conditioning variable employed, referred to as cay, is defined in terms of a
cointegrating relationship between log consumption (c), log nonhuman wealth (a,
defined as household net worth), and log human wealth (y, labour income). The
intuition behind this choice of variable is that the consumption to wealth ratio contains
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information about investors’ expectations of future returns. If consumption is high
relative to wealth, investors must be expecting either high future returns on wealth or
low growth in consumption. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) tested the ability of
conditional versions of the CAPM and consumption CAPM, using cay as a scaling
variable, to explain the anomalous returns of size and B/M sorted portfolios used as test
assets by Fama and French (1993). They found that conditional versions of the CAPM
and consumption CAPM have much higher explanatory power (R2) than unconditional
versions of these models. The conditional consumption CAPM had a similar R2 to that
of the Fama-French three-factor model, which contains factors constructed specifically
for the purpose of explaining size and B/M effects.

Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) attributed the improved performance of conditional asset
pricing models over unconditional models to the fact that the conditional models
capture time-variation in the systematic risk of small and value stocks. Their results
indicate that value portfolios have betas that are more highly correlated with
consumption growth (as well as market portfolio returns) when the scaling variable,
cay, is high. The cay variable is high when risk aversion is high, in other words in bad
economic states, when expected returns are high and asset prices are low. The results of
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) are somewhat consistent with those of Jagannathan and
Wang (1996), in that time-variation of systematic risk is compensated by higher
(unconditional) required returns, particularly so for assets whose systematic risk
increases in bad times.

A number of studies, however, question whether the unconditional returns implied by
conditional asset pricing models are high enough to explain the observed cross-section
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of stock returns. Lewellen and Nagel (2004) supported claims that systematic risk is
time-varying, however they argued that the covariance between conditional betas and
the market risk premium is far too small to be able to totally explain the magnitude of
returns observable for value and momentum strategies (the size effect was absent from
their sample). They also argued that the cay variable of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)
loses its ability to explain conditional betas in the presence of other state variables; the
betas of value and small stocks were found to be more closely related to market
dividend yields and interest rate variables. Petkova and Zhang (2005) estimated a
conditional CAPM that utilises an expected (rather than actual) market risk premium,
conditioned on lagged values of the market dividend yield and a number of interest rate
variables. They concurred with Lewellen and Nagel (2004) that the magnitude of the
covariance between conditional betas and the market risk premium is insufficient to
explain the value premium.

2.3.4 Explanations for the Value Premium based on Behavioural
Finance
In contrast to the rational asset pricing framework, behavioural finance deals with
theoretical explanations for anomalies, based on the assumption that not all agents are
fully rational (Barberis and Thaler, 2005). There are two basic concepts inherent in this
paradigm: (i) a rebuttal of the efficient market hypothesis and (ii) the existence of
psychological traits that induce investors to act irrationally and that can explain the
anomalies being studied.

A rebuttal of the efficient market hypothesis is required in order for irrationalityinduced anomalies to survive in the presence of fully rational arbitrageurs. Shleifer and
Vishny (1997) argue that anomalies such as the value premium persist in the market
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because it is too costly and too risky for arbitrageurs to take advantage of them and
drive prices back to fundamental values. In particular, they maintain that arbitrageurs
tend to be inadequately diversified and hence are sensitive to, and avoid taking positions
in securities with a high degree of, unsystematic risk. Consistent with this view, Ali,
Hwang and Trombley (2003) present evidence to the effect that the B/M effect exists
only amongst stocks with a high degree of residual volatility. Similarly, Griffin and
Lemmon (2002) argue that it is another cost that prevents the value premium from being
arbitraged away: the cost of obtaining information. They postulate that high distress
firms tend to be smaller companies with low analyst coverage, and consequently when
such a firm happens to exist in a growth industry, uninformed investors mistakenly
ascribe the industry’s valuation multiple to the distressed firm.

Behavioural finance also relies on psychological traits to justify the assumption that not
all agents are fully rational, and which can generate behaviour consistent with the
anomalies being studied. In the context of cross-sectional return predictability these
anomalies include two seemingly disparate effects, namely the value premium and
momentum. In general, behavioural finance characterises these two effects in terms of
investor overreaction as well as underreaction, and draws upon a number of
psychological traits (including representativeness, conservatism, overconfidence, selfattribution bias, loss aversion and narrow framing) to explain why prices overreact in
some cases and underreact in others. This reliance on both overreaction in some cases
and underreaction in others to explain anomalies is argued by Fama (1998) to be a
substantial weakness of behavioural finance. This view has not been contested by the
leading proponents of behavioural finance: Barberis and Thaler (2005) highlight the
latitude afforded by the plethora of psychological biases, such that “anything can be

48

explained” (p.64), and the absence of a single, unifying behavioural theory of asset
pricing.

A number of behavioural theories have been proposed to explain momentum and longterm reversals, where the term ‘long-term reversals’ is used to also include the value
premium. The most important of these are Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998)
and Hong and Stein (1999). Barberis et al. (1998) rely on two cognitive biases in order
to explain, on the one hand, the value premium and reversals in terms of overreaction
and, on the other hand, momentum in terms of underreaction. Appealing to the
representativeness bias, investors who observe a series of earnings increases make the
mistake of assuming that earnings changes follow a trend, when in fact the earnings
changes are random. Appealing to the conservatism bias, investors who observe a single
earnings change make the mistake of assuming that earnings are mean reverting, and
update their priors insufficiently. Thus, under the Barberis et al. (1998) model, investors
tend to overreact to consistently good performance, causing prices to overshoot their
fundamental values, and underreact to changes in performance, resulting in momentum.
This model is somewhat consistent with the form of the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis (discussed in the next sub-section) originally expounded in Lakonishok et al.
(1994), where investors extrapolate previous good performance too far into the future.

There is empirical evidence inconsistent with the representativeness bias interpretation
of the value premium. Dechow and Sloan (1997) argue that the value premium appears
unrelated to investors’ extrapolation of past trends in earnings, arguing instead that it
bears a very strong relationship to the biased growth forecasts of analysts. Chan,
Frankel and Kothari (2004) find that neither the consistency nor the trends in earnings
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performance are related to future stock returns. They do, however, find evidence of an
underreaction to recent accounting performance, consistent with a conservatism bias. It
must be borne in mind that evidence against the representativeness bias does not
necessarily invalidate all behavioural finance models (Daniel, 2004) or other mispricing
explanations such as the errors-in-hypothesis, to be discussed in more detail in Section
2.3.5. As Dechow and Sloan (1997) point out, investors’ relative optimism about
growth stocks may originate from analysts’ forecasts which are not necessarily based
upon extrapolation of past trends.

Daniel et al. (1998) rely on two different cognitive biases, overconfidence and biased
self attribution, in order to generate value and momentum effects. Appealing to
overconfidence, investors place greater weight on private information and less weight
on public information. Appealing to biased self attribution, the investor’s confidence
increases when public information arrives that confirms their private information, but
decreases only slightly when public information disconfirms their private information.
The net effect is that public information on average increases investor confidence –
biased self attribution means that when their private information accords with public
information, they attribute the confirmation to skill, but when their private information
is inconsistent with public information, they attribute the discrepancy to bad luck. Thus,
investors overreact to private information and underreact to public information.
Momentum is seen as a result of the overreaction to private information, causing prices
to deviate from fundamental values. On the other hand, the arrival of public information
causes a gradual correction of prices, and hence long-term reversals (including the value
premium) are seen as a result of the underreaction to public information.
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Finally, Hong and Stein (1999) develop a model based upon two types of investors,
‘newswatchers’ and ‘momentum traders’, and the assumption that information diffuses
slowly throughout the market.

Newswatchers make forecasts based on private

information; momentum traders make forecasts based only upon price changes. As
information diffuses only gradually, the activity of newswatchers causes prices to
underreact. However, the price changes catch the attention of momentum traders, who
then trade and cause prices to move closer to their fundamental value, and then
ultimately to overshoot their fundamental value. Thus, momentum traders are seen as
causing an overreaction in prices. Hong and Stein (1999) argue that this overreaction
explains long-term reversals, including the value premium. Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)
provide support for the assumption of slow information diffusion, finding that
momentum is most profitable amongst small stocks and stocks with low analyst
coverage.

An interesting study which conflicts to some extent with all of the behavioural models
discussed above is that of Lee and Swaminathan (2000); who focus on the interaction of
trading volume and momentum, but do however draw analogies between trading
volume and value-growth measures. They find that momentum appears to be strongest
amongst high volume losers, which continue to perform poorly, and amongst low
volume winners, which continue to exhibit high returns. Lee and Swaminathan (2000)
argue that none of the existing behavioural models allow for the effect of trading
volume on momentum, and consequently find inconsistencies between their results and
the predictions of these models. For example, the Hong and Stein (1999) model predicts
that momentum is greater for stocks with low trading volume on the proviso that
information diffusion is directly related to trading volume. The findings of Lee and
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Swaminathan (2000) are consistent with this prediction for (low volume) winners but
not, however, for losers. In contrast, the Daniel et al. (1998) model predicts that
momentum is greater for stocks with high trading volume, which is consistent with the
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) results for losers but not for winners. Therefore, the
findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) demonstrates that existing behavioural models
face similar difficulties to rational asset pricing models in explaining the observed
behaviour of stock prices.

Lee and Swaminathan (2000) offer a promising and as yet under-researched explanation
of stock price behaviour based upon their results, which they refer to as the momentum
life cycle. The findings of this thesis will be shown in subsequent chapters to be
consistent with the momentum life cycle, as are those of Bird and Casavecchia (2007a)
who study the interaction of value/growth trading strategies with momentum and
financial health indicators. According to the momentum life cycle, stocks go through
periods of favouritism and neglect. High momentum stocks are argued to be
experiencing a period of favouritism in their life cycle, beginning with a phase of low
trading volume (‘low volume winners’). Low volume winners are the most likely stocks
to continue to deliver high returns. As sentiment towards a low volume winner
increases, accompanied by high returns, trading volume increases. Eventually, the low
volume winners become expensive growth stocks characterised by high trading volume
and the tendency to subsequently disappoint investors with return reversals (‘high
volume winners’). From here, stocks become ‘high volume losers’, companies with
poor recent returns and high trading volume. High volume losers are the most likely
companies to continue to deliver poor returns. Stocks in this stage of their momentum
life cycle become increasingly unpopular and neglected, resulting in falling trading
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volume. Finally, the stocks become ‘low volume losers’, in other words companies that
have had extended periods of poor returns accompanied by diminishing trading volume.

2.3.5 The Errors-in-Expectations Hypothesis
The errors-in-expectations hypothesis states that investors are overly optimistic
regarding the future prospects of and consequently pay prices that are too high for
growth stocks. Indeed growth stocks are most commonly identified in terms of high
market value relative to variables such as earnings, book-value of equity or sales, under
the assumption that the high market values reflect expected future growth in these
variables. This hypothesis is grounded in a number of principles. First, the expected
future growth rates implied by valuation multiples are not only unrealistic, but they bear
little resemblance to actual growth rates realised after the measurement of the multiples
(Lakonishok et al., 1994). Second, earnings growth itself is extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to forecast (La Porta, 1996; Chan et al., 2003). Finally, a substantial
proportion of the value premium occurs close to company announcement dates,
consistent with the idea that investors are informed by earnings surprises that their
initial growth expectations might be too optimistic (La Porta et al., 1997; Skinner and
Sloan, 2002). Empirical research has supported most of these principles; although some
conflicting evidence has emerged regarding the information content of earnings
surprises. Specifically, the errors-in-expectations hypothesis predicts that analysts’
earnings forecasts should be more optimistic for growth stocks than for value stocks,
but the data from analysts’ forecasts contradicts this prediction (Doukas et al., 2002;
Mian and Teo, 2004). The contradiction regarding analyst forecast optimism forms the
basis of much of the investigation in this thesis.
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2.3.5.1 Evidence linking valuation multiples to erroneous growth expectations

Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the valuation multiples used to distinguish between
value and growth firms imply an unfeasibly high growth rate differential between value
and growth stocks and an unfeasibly long duration of this growth rate differential. The
evidence they offer in support of this argument essentially shows that the cash flow per
dollar invested in a portfolio of growth stocks takes an inordinate length of time to grow
to a level comparable with the cash flow per dollar invested in a portfolio of value
stocks. Whilst value stocks have a higher cash C/P ratio than growth stocks, growth
stocks have a much higher historical growth rate of cash flow. Based on historical
growth rates of cash flow, portfolios of growth and value stocks could be expected to
have equivalent cash flow per dollar of initial investment after 11 years. However,
subsequent growth rates fail to match the historical difference between value and
growth stocks; in fact the growth rate differential between growth and value stocks
largely disappears only two years after portfolio formation. Hence, the main argument
of Lakonishok et al. (1994) is that whilst the higher prices of growth stocks relative to
value stocks might be justified by higher expected future growth, the expected growth
rates largely fail to materialise or last as long as investors initially anticipate.

Based primarily on the evidence described above, Lakonishok et al. (1994) propose that
the value premium is due to “a systematic pattern of expectational errors on the part of
investors” (p.1575), in other words, mispricing. They rule out potential risk-based
explanations for three main reasons. First, the consistency with which value strategies
outperformed growth strategies in their sample, both on a year-by-year and rolling fiveyear basis, implied very little risk to an investor following such strategies. Second, the
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small number of years when growth did outperform value did not appear to correspond
to economic recessions; evidence which is inconsistent with the view that the value
premium represents a form of priced risk associated with distress and/or recessions.
Finally, the magnitude of the value premium, which they estimate to be over 10%
annually, is too great to be accounted for by traditional risk measures such as beta or
return volatility.

Further evidence that valuation multiples do not reflect reasonable growth expectations
can be found in Chan et al. (2003). Their results demonstrate that B/M ratios adjust to
reflect historical growth; stocks which experience high growth over a five-year period
subsequently tend to have low B/M, while stocks which experience low growth
subsequently tend to have high B/M. However, the relationship between B/M and
growth is reversed when B/M ratios are measured at the start of each five-year growth
period; stocks which experience the highest growth over a five-year period were
actually found to have had the highest B/M ratio at the start of the period. Put
differently B/M reflects historical rather than future growth, and future growth
expectations impounded in B/M ratios are erroneous.
2.3.5.2 Evidence that future growth is unpredictable

There is evidence that not only is future earnings growth extremely difficult to predict,
but that the growth forecasts of professional analysts are often too extreme. First,
Bauman and Dowen (1988) and La Porta (1996) demonstrate contrarian strategies that
bet against analysts’ long term growth forecasts to be highly profitable, consistent with
an argument that actual earnings performance (and hence stock price) is completely
unrelated to these forecasts. These contrarian strategies essentially buy stocks with the
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lowest long-term growth forecasts and sell stocks with the highest long-term growth
forecasts. More importantly however, La Porta (1996) showed that stocks with
relatively high growth forecasts were subject to lower actual (subsequent) earnings
growth, larger downward revisions to forecasts and larger forecast errors than stocks
with low growth forecasts. Given the extreme biases evident in analysts’ growth
forecasts and the strong correlation between these forecasts and B/M, La Porta (1996)
argues that B/M explains stock returns because investors in growth (low B/M) stocks
are systematically disappointed by growth rates that fall short of expectations.

The most compelling evidence of the unpredictability of future growth is Chan et al.
(2003). They test the predictability of future growth on the basis of persistence of past
growth, industry affiliation, valuation ratios such as B/M, E/P and sales-to-price, and
I/B/E/S long term growth forecasts. Although Chan et al. (2003) find evidence of a
slight degree of persistence in sales growth they find no evidence of persistence for
bottom-line earnings growth beyond what is expected by chance; hence it is doubtful
that historical growth can be used to forecast future growth. Chan et al. (2003) also
demonstrate that although actual growth rates tend to increase with I/B/E/S long-term
forecasts, the actual growth rates for the high forecast growth stocks fall far short of the
forecast growth rate. Once differences in survival rate and dividend yield are taken into
account, I/B/E/S long-term growth forecasts appear completely unrelated to actual
subsequent growth rates. Regression models which include I/B/E/S long term growth
forecasts, past sales growth and other variables conjectured to predict growth
(sustainable growth rate, dividend yield and research and development intensity)
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similarly had low explanatory power over future growth in earnings and sales 8. In
summary, the overall evidence suggests that long-term earnings growth is almost
impossible to predict, and price multiples which reflect expected future growth are thus
based on expectations which are likely to be erroneous.
2.3.5.3 Extrapolation, Growth Expectations and the Value Premium

Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the source of erroneous growth expectations is the
tendency of investors to extrapolate past performance into the future. The extrapolation
argument is based on studies of long-term return reversals by De Bondt and Thaler
(1985, 1987) which show that stocks with poor price and earnings performance in the
previous three-to-five years subsequently outperformed stocks that had performed well
over the previous three-to-five years. They postulated that investors overreact to
earnings news, placing too much emphasis on short-term earnings movements and
failing to take into account the mean-reversion of earnings. Therefore, stocks that had
performed well in the past are priced too high by the market and consequently become
more unattractive investments than stocks that have done poorly in the past. This view
is supported by Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992), who extended the De Bondt and
Thaler results by demonstrating that reversals are more pronounced around earnings
announcement periods. They interpret this as evidence that the market overreacts to
previous earnings results, and subsequently is systematically surprised by earnings
announcements that reveal the groundless nature of the overreaction.

8

Chan et al. (2003) report adjusted R2 values of 3% or less for regressions in which earnings growth is
the dependent variable; however in regressions where sales growth is the dependent variable, they report
somewhat higher R2 values of up to 12%.
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Extrapolation of past performance seems a plausible explanation for erroneous growth
expectations; however it has not been straightforward to explain the value premium in
terms of errors-in-expectations caused by extrapolation. La Porta (1996) examined this
issue by differentiating between two categories of stocks with high expected future
growth, ‘glamour stocks’ and ‘temporary losers’. Glamour stocks have high forecast
earnings growth and high historical sales growth while temporary losers also have high
forecast earnings growth but low historical sales growth. Consistent with the
extrapolation argument, La Porta’s results demonstrate that glamour stocks have lower
future returns than temporary losers. Similarly, La Porta (1996) differentiates between
two categories of stocks with low expected future growth, ‘value stocks’ and ‘temporary
winners’. Value stocks have low forecast earnings growth and low historical sales
growth, and temporary winners also have low forecast earnings growth but high
historical sales growth. In this case however, La Porta’s results are inconsistent with
extrapolation: value stocks have lower future returns than temporary winners. Levis and
Liodakis (2001) adopt a similar methodology to test for extrapolation in the UK
market 9. Unlike La Porta (1996) who reports mixed results, Levis and Liodakis (2001)
find no evidence of extrapolation.

Other studies have also provided mixed evidence regarding extrapolation. When value
and growth stocks are defined by E/P and C/P, Dechow and Sloan (1997) find no
evidence of reversals of growth rates to suggest extrapolation. They do however find
evidence that the B/M ratio itself is related to the extrapolation of past earnings growth.
Dechow and Sloan (1997) also report mixed evidence from an analysis of contrarian
strategies based upon past growth in sales and earnings. Consistent with extrapolation,
9

Levis and Liodakis (2001) use past earnings growth valuation ratios such as book-to-market to define
temporary winners and temporary losers, unlike La Porta (1996) who uses past sales growth and I/B/E/S
forecast growth.
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they find that firms with high past growth subsequently revert to average growth rates
and earn poor future returns. However, stocks with low past earnings growth
subsequently earn only average returns despite abnormally high future earnings growth,
inconsistent with extrapolation. Chan et al. (2004) test for evidence of the
representativeness bias using measures of past performance such as sales growth and
trends in earnings and operating income; the representativeness bias is used in the
behavioural model of Barberis et al. (1998) to generate overreaction to trends in past
earnings growth. Chan et al. (2004) find that neither past performance nor year-to-year
consistency of past performance is related to future stock returns, results that are
inconsistent with extrapolation.

Despite the mixed evidence linking the value premium to extrapolation, the evidence
from analysts’ growth forecasts is broadly consistent with the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis, in that such forecasts tend to be overly optimistic for growth stocks and that
stock returns can be linked to this optimism. Both La Porta (1996) and Dechow and
Sloan (1997) find that whilst growth forecasts appear uniformly too optimistic, the error
in forecast growth rates increases systematically from low forecast growth firms to high
forecast growth firms. Both studies also report a systematic decline in returns as
forecast growth increases, however Dechow and Sloan (1997) draw a distinction
between this contrarian return pattern and that associated with past growth, where return
differences are confined solely to the ten percent of stocks with the highest past growth.
Thus, contrarian strategies based upon forecast growth display a stronger, more uniform
pattern than those based upon past growth.
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Dechow and Sloan (1997) also present regression evidence demonstrating the
importance of analysts’ growth forecasts to the value premium. Their results indicate
that when compared with actual growth, growth forecasts are too high by a factor of
about three; however investors form growth expectations as if there is no bias in the
forecasts 10. In other regressions, they demonstrate that forecast growth has more
explanatory power over stock returns than B/M, E/P or C/P. Dechow and Sloan (1997)
thus argue that a naïve reliance on analysts’ growth forecasts explains a substantial
proportion of the returns to contrarian strategies. This conclusion is consistent with the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis in that stock returns can be attributable to overoptimistic growth expectations; however the source of optimism does not appear to be
extrapolation.
2.3.5.4 Evidence from Announcement Period Returns and Earnings Surprises

Regardless of the source of information, investors with growth expectations that are too
optimistic are likely to be disappointed on the dates that companies announce earnings;
hence the errors-in-expectations hypothesis predicts that a substantial amount of the
value premium is earned on company announcement dates. An important study that
tests this prediction is La Porta et al. (1997), who examined the stock returns in a threeday window around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with the errors-inexpectations hypothesis, they found that a disproportionate amount (29%) of the annual
value premium is earned over the four three-day periods. Their regression tests confirm
that announcement-period returns are significantly large and negative for growth stocks,

10

Dechow and Sloan (1997) also estimate the same system of equations using past growth instead of
forecast growth. Their results indicate that although earnings growth is autocorrelated investors recognise
the autocorrelation and price stocks accordingly. They interpret this result, in conjunction with their
results for forecast growth, as evidence that analysts’ growth forecasts are more important determinants of
contrarian returns than (extrapolation of) past growth.
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and significantly large and positive for value stocks. La Porta et al. (1997) interpret
these findings as evidence of systematically negative earnings surprises for growth
stocks and systematically positive earnings surprises for value stocks, whereby errors in
growth expectations are resolved. La Porta et al. (1997) reject a risk-based explanation
for their results which argues that it is a disproportionate amount of a risk premium that
is earned over the 12-day period. They point to the fact that the average announcement
period return for growth stocks is negative, and thus can be consistent with only a
negative ex-ante risk premium.

The manner in which prices respond to earnings surprises has also been studied in an
effort to understand how differences in optimism can generate a value premium. To this
end, Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and Liodakis (2001) document an asymmetric
response of value and growth stocks to earnings surprises of different sign: value stocks
appear to have much larger positive abnormal returns than growth stocks as a
consequence of positive earnings surprises, while growth stocks appear to have much
larger negative abnormal returns than value stocks as a consequence of negative
earnings surprises. However, these results are argued by Skinner and Sloan (2002) to be
unremarkable, as the return differences are to be expected (that is, they are just
indicative of the value premium in general) even if the market reaction to earnings
surprises does not depend upon value/growth orientation.

Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that the difference in price response to bad news
between value and growth stocks is the most important determinant of the value
premium. The value premium is thus attributable to an ‘earnings torpedo effect’ that is
greater for growth stocks than for value stocks, whereby the act of missing analysts’
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forecasts by even a small margin is more important to investors than the size of the
earnings surprise. This is interpreted as evidence that, consistent with the errors-inexpectations hypothesis, the value premium is due to the downward revision of
“overoptimistic expectations for growth stocks in response to subsequent negative
earnings surprises” (p.291). The market reactions of value and growth stocks to positive
surprises are shown by Skinner and Sloan (2002) to be statistically indistinguishable,
and therefore not instrumental in explaining the value premium. This finding is in direct
contrast with the results of Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and Liodakis (2001),
and inconsistent with La Porta et al. (1997) who report significantly above-average
announcement period returns for value stocks. The contrasting findings are attributed by
Skinner and Sloan (2002) to the longer announcement period they use. The three-day
announcement period window used by La Porta et al. (1997) is argued by Skinner and
Sloan (2002) to be inadequate in capturing the asymmetry in price response to bad
news, because bad earnings news tends to be announced before this period.

However, Payne and Thomas (2003) argue that the Skinner and Sloan (2002) results are
biased due to the rounding errors in stock-split adjusted I/B/E/S data. After repeating
the study using unadjusted I/B/E/S data purportedly free of bias, Payne and Thomas
(2003) find no evidence that asymmetric market responses to negative earnings
surprises (the earnings torpedo effect) explains the value premium. Nevertheless, a
related study was carried out by Chan et al. (2006a) who employed the management
earnings forecasts of Australian listed companies, in a similar manner to the
preannouncements in the Skinner and Sloan (2002) data. Consistent with Skinner and
Sloan (2002), Chan et al. (2006a) find that growth stocks have a larger immediate
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response than value stocks to bad news, but no difference in response between value
and growth stocks when the forecast contains good news.

Another approach in tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis has been to compare
value and growth stocks with regard to the optimism in analysts’ earnings forecasts. The
errors-in-expectations hypothesis predicts that these forecasts will be more optimistic
for growth stocks than for value stocks, in other words growth stocks will have more
negative earnings surprises than value stocks. However, this prediction has generally
not been verified in empirical studies. For example, Bauman and Miller (1997)
investigated the actual frequency and size of earnings surprises as a function of
value/growth classification according to E/P, C/P, B/M and past earnings growth.
Although larger negative surprises were observed for growth stocks classified according
to E/P, C/P, B/M and past earnings growth, Bauman and Miller (1997) reported the
opposite result when growth stocks are defined by B/M: low B/M (growth) stocks were
actually found to have less disappointing surprises than high B/M (value) stocks. This
latter result is confirmed in a later study by Doukas et al. (2002), which is arguably the
most convincing study to challenge the errors-in-expectations hypothesis to date.

Doukas et al. (2002) disputed the conclusions of both La Porta (1996) and La Porta et
al. (1997), that excessive optimism on the part of growth investors explains the value
premium, citing methodological concerns with both papers. They argued that La Porta’s
use of forecast growth rates, rather than B/M, to classify value and growth stocks means
he has not explained the value premium, which has been conventionally defined in
terms of B/M. Similarly, they argue that the La Porta et al. (1997) evidence that a
disproportionate amount of the value premium is realised around earnings
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announcement dates might be consistent with explanations other than over-optimistic
growth forecasts. For example, Doukas et al. (2002) argued that growth forecasts might
be equally optimistic for both value and growth stocks, but as growth stocks react more
strongly to negative surprises (as in Skinner and Sloan, 2002) the extreme
announcement period returns documented in La Porta et al. (1997) might be due to a
small number of negative earnings surprises in growth stocks. However, it should be
noted that this argument does not explain the large positive abnormal returns of value
stocks in the announcement period reported by La Porta et al. (1997).

Furthermore, Doukas et al. (2002) maintain that the announcement period returns
examined by La Porta et al. (1997) are not necessarily indicative of the relative
optimism of investors at the time that stocks are classified as value or growth. For
example, abnormal announcement period returns may be due to earnings surprises
measured relative to forecasts issued just prior to actual earnings announcements, rather
than as a consequence of initial expectations. Doukas et al. (2002) argue that in order to
test the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, relative optimism must be measured at the
time stocks are classified as value or growth, rather than purely as a function of
announcement period returns that may be unrelated to initial expectations. To address
this concern, Doukas et al. (2002) measured optimism as a function of analysts’ currentyear earnings forecasts made immediately after classifying stocks into value and growth
portfolios. Therefore, a major difference between Doukas et al. (2002) and earlier
comparable studies (Dreman and Berry, 1995; Bauman and Miller, 1997; Levis and
Liodakis, 2001) is the importance attached to the timing of the relevant forecasts.
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The results obtained by Doukas et al. (2002) are troublesome for proponents of the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis. In their study, optimism is measured as the pricedeflated error in the consensus analyst earnings forecast. This measure of forecast
optimism increases almost monotonically with B/M in direct contradiction of the errorsin-the-expectations hypothesis; a result that is highly statistically significant and robust
to exchange of listing, alternative forecast error deflators and firm size. Therefore,
Doukas et al. (2002) provide fairly strong evidence that analysts are actually more
optimistic about value stocks than they are about growth stocks, at least in terms of their
short-term earnings forecasts.

A similar study by Mian and Teo (2004) examines analysts’ forecast errors in Japan,
and also fails to support the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. They compared the
average forecast errors of value and growth stocks, and consistent with the results of
Doukas et al. (2002), find that analyst optimism increases with both B/M and E/P when
forecast errors are deflated by stock price 11; although this relationship disappears if
forecast errors are deflated by the absolute value of actual earnings rather than by stock
price. When optimism is determined as either the proportion of forecasts exceeding
actual earnings, or the proportion of forecasts subject to downward revisions, Mian and
Teo (2004) once again report that analysts’ forecasts appear to more optimistic for value
stocks than for growth stocks. Thus, there appears to be consistent evidence that
analysts’ short-term earnings forecasts are systematically more optimistic for value
stocks than for growth stocks, evidence that is inconsistent with the errors-inexpectations hypothesis.

11

Doukas et al. (2002) employ B/M but not E/P to define value and growth stocks.
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In summary, evidence from actual growth rates and the errors in analysts’ growth
forecasts appear to be consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, as is the
fact that a disproportionate amount of the value premium is realised in the vicinity of
company announcement dates. However, evidence from (the errors in) analysts’
earnings forecasts is not consistent with the hypothesis. Analysts’ earnings forecasts
appear to be systematically more optimistic for value stocks than for growth stocks, a
direct contradiction of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. On closer inspection this
result is counterintuitive because both returns and analyst forecast optimism increase
with B/M, and analyst forecast optimism implies negative earnings surprises which are
usually punished by the market with negative, not positive, returns. Consequently, two
major objectives of this thesis are to attempt an explanation for why the optimism of
analysts’ earnings forecasts increases with B/M, and to investigate why high B/M stocks
can simultaneously have high returns and overly-optimistic analyst earnings forecasts
(i.e. negative earnings surprises).

2.3.6 Mispricing as a function of Valuation Ratios and Financial
Distress
It is common practice in studies of the value premium to classify stocks as value or
growth based upon their ranking on a single variable, which is usually B/M. However,
behavioural studies of the value premium do not necessarily make the assumption that
all high B/M firms are underpriced and all low B/M firms are overpriced. The
mispricing explanation favoured by Lakonishok et al. (1994), La Porta (1996), and La
Porta et al. (1997) relies on a definition of “out-of-favour” value stocks as those which
performed poorly in the past and are expected to continue to perform poorly, and a
definition of “overpriced growth” (or “glamour”) stocks as those which performed
poorly in the past and are expected to continue to perform poorly. These definitions
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have been operationalised by the use of a two-way classification system which relies
upon a measure of past performance (usually sales growth) as well as a measure of
expected future growth (which is measured either by a valuation ratio such as C/P or by
analysts’ long-term growth forecasts). Other studies have focused on a combination of
characteristics related to value and momentum to identify underpriced and overpriced
stocks (for example Asness, 1997; Lee and Swaminathan, 2000; Bird and Whitaker,
2003; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007b), while Bartov and Kim (2004) argue that the use of
accruals can differentiate high or low B/M firms that are indeed mispriced from those
that are rationally priced. Thus, a central idea in the behavioural value premium
literature is that simple one-way sorts on B/M or other valuation ratios do not
necessarily identify value stocks that are underpriced or growth stocks that are
overpriced.

As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the fact that financial distress does not appear to be
rationally priced in equity markets suggests the possibility of mispricing and/or
profitable trading strategies when value and growth stocks are further differentiated by
distress or financial health. Dichev (1998) demonstrates that a strategy that avoids
financially distressed firms and buys financially strong firms earns abnormal positive
trading profits. Moreover, he demonstrates that the ability of the financial
distress/strength measures he uses (Altman’s z-score and Ohlson’s O-score) to explain
returns in cross-sectional regressions actually increases when B/M is added as an
explanatory variable. A number of subsequent studies confirm results that are consistent
with Dichev (1998), in that financially distressed growth stocks earn abnormally low
returns while financially strong value stocks earn abnormally high returns (Piotroski,
2000; Mohanram, 2005; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007a). Whilst the distress measures
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differ amongst these studies, a common theme is that firms where B/M (or, in the case
of Bird and Casavecchia (2007a), sales-to-price) is either too high or low relative to
financial distress are likely to be mispriced.

Piotroski (2000) uses financial statement analysis to differentiate financially strong
firms from weaker firms amongst high B/M stocks, with the aim of demonstrating that
financially strong value stocks are underpriced relative to other value stocks. He
identifies nine variables related to a number of specific characteristics he argues are
relevant to the valuation of value stocks. These characteristics are profitability, leverage,
liquidity, the source of funds (equity issuance) and operating efficiency. His measure of
financial health (“F-score”) is a simple addition of binary (0, 1) values of the nine
variables. Based on this relatively simple measure, Piotroski (2000) finds that an
investment strategy that selects only financially healthy value firms greatly outperforms
a simple value strategy without other constraints. Put differently, the Piotroski (2000)
results are consistent with the underpricing of financially strong value stocks, identified
with a relatively simple measure derived from accounting variables.

A similar procedure was adopted by Mohanram (2005) for use on low B/M stocks. He
creates a measure of financial health (“G-score”) based on eight variables selected to
capture characteristics relevant to the valuation of growth firms, with emphasis upon
characteristics indicative of profitability, naïve extrapolation and accounting
conservatism. Following Piotroski’s F-score, G-score is a simple addition of binary (0,
1) values of the eight variables. Mohanram (2005) is able to demonstrate a highly
profitable strategy of buying high G-score stocks and selling low G-score stocks from a
universe of low B/M stocks, with most of the abnormal returns attributable to the large
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negative returns of low G-score stocks. Put differently, Mohanram’s results are
consistent with the overpricing of financially distressed growth stocks; as was the case
with Piotroski (2000) mispriced stocks are identified with a relatively simple measure
derived from accounting variables.

The results of Mohanram (2005) are consistent with Griffin and Lemmon (2002) who
find evidence of overvaluation amongst financially distressed growth stocks, defined in
terms of Ohlson’s O-score (as a measure of financial distress) and B/M. In the sample
examined by Griffin and Lemmon (2002), stocks with low B/M and high O-score have
average annual returns smaller than the risk-free rate and significantly negative threefactor alphas (that is, alphas based on the Fama-French three-factor model),
observations which effectively rule out risk-based or rational pricing explanations for
their results. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find evidence consistent with the existence of
a value premium in all five financial distress (O-score) quintiles, with the magnitude
and statistical significance of the value premium increasing with distress. They do not,
however, find that financially strong value firms earn higher returns than other value
stocks. This particular observation differs somewhat from the findings in Campbell et
al. (2008), who use an alternative distress measure estimated from accounting and
equity market variables. They observe a negative distress premium in all B/M quintiles;
a result which is consistent with outperformance and undervaluation of financially
strong value stocks relative to other value stocks.

Finally, in a study of European stocks, Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) find that the best
performing value stocks are those with strong financial health whilst the worst
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performing growth stocks are those with poor financial health 12. They define value and
growth stocks in terms of their sales-to-price ratio and financial health in terms of a
PROBIT model that forecasts the probability of an earnings increase, based on 24
accounting variables. In their sample, Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) show that
financially healthy value stocks outperform other value stocks and that financially weak
growth stocks underperform other growth stocks.

The studies discussed above provide evidence of overpricing amongst financially
distressed growth stocks and of underpricing amongst financially strong value stocks;
however this general finding is contradicted to some extent by the findings in Vassalou
and Xing (2004). Unlike the majority of related studies they find that financial distress,
measured using DD, carries a positive return premium; and their results specifically
show that value stocks with high, rather than low, default risk earn returns higher than
any other classification of stocks by B/M and distress. As discussed in Section 2.3.2
however, Da and Gao (2010) show these results to be heavily affected by short-term
return reversals and dependent upon the use of monthly portfolio rebalancing, and
Campbell et al. (2008) claim to have reversed the Vassalou and Xing (2004) findings of
a positive distress premium using DD and annual portfolio rebalancing.

The form of mispricing discussed above, whereby financially distressed growth stocks
are overpriced while financially strong value stocks are underpriced, is the basis for
much of the research in this thesis, and in particular for research question 1. Research
question 1 directly examines whether mispricing, as specified above, exists amongst
12

Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) also report a similar but stronger result in the case of
value stocks using momentum instead of financial health, and in the case of growth
stocks using a combination momentum and financial health instead of financial health
alone.
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large Australian stocks. Furthermore, the existence of mispricing as a function both of
valuation ratios and of financial distress justifies, to some extent, the choice of financial
distress as a control variable in research questions 2 and 3, which examine variation in
analysts’ forecast errors and variation in market reactions to earnings surprises
respectively.

2.4 Analyst Efficiency
As discussed in Section 2.3.5.4, analysts’ earnings forecasts have been shown to be
more optimistic for high B/M stocks than for low B/M stocks, a result which directly
contradicts the predictions of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. In effect, research
question 2 examines whether this result is sensitive to the omission of a potentially
relevant control variable, namely financial distress. One reason why financial distress
might be important in this context is that, as discussed in the previous section, financial
distress might differentiate the value and growth firms that are mispriced from those
that are rationally priced. Another reason is that the observed relationship between
analyst optimism and B/M might be due to analyst underreaction to financial distress.
The purpose of this section is to discuss prior evidence that supports analyst
underreaction, which exists within the broader literature on analyst efficiency 13.

An early piece of evidence regarding analyst inefficiency is provided in De Bondt and
Thaler (1990), who compared the forecast change in earnings (in other words, next
year’s forecast minus last year’s reported earnings) with the actual change in earnings
(in other words, next year’s reported earnings minus last year’s reported earnings). They
13

A similar line of research studies the recommendations of analysts (for example, ‘buy’, ‘sell’, or
‘hold’), both for biases and for investment value. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) and Azzi and
Bird (2005) find that analysts’ recommendations generally favour stocks with high momentum, and
growth characteristics.
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find that the slope of a regression of actual changes on forecasted changes is less than
unity, and consequently argue that forecast earnings changes, and hence earnings
forecasts themselves, are too extreme. This result, they argue, is consistent with analyst
overreaction to prior earnings information. However, the majority of subsequent studies
disagree with the De Bondt and Thaler (1990) overreaction conclusion.

A number of studies have found that analysts underreact to prior information, where
prior information includes both prior earnings performance and prior stock returns.
Klein (1990) finds that analysts tend to be too optimistic in their earnings forecast for
stocks that had recently suffered large price declines, consistent with underreaction to
the price decline. Both Lys and Sohn (1990) and Abarbanell (1991) find that analysts’
forecast errors are correlated with prior stock returns, and therefore analysts’ forecasts
do not fully reflect the information in prior returns. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)
argue that analysts underreact to prior changes in earnings, and in particular are too
optimistic in cases where firms suffered poor earnings performance. They find that
analysts’ forecast errors are positively autocorrelated for up to three quarters, consistent
with analyst underreaction. Similarly to De Bondt and Thaler (1990), they perform
regression tests to determine if analysts’ forecasts are too extreme. However, they
regress forecast error (next year’s earnings minus the forecast for next year) on last
year’s change in earnings (last year’s earnings minus the previous year’s earnings). As
the slope coefficient from this regression is positive, they find that the prior change in
earnings predicts the future forecast error; a result consistent with analyst underreaction
to the prior change in earnings.
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Further evidence of analyst inefficiency is uncovered by Frankel and Lee (1998), who
show that the errors in earnings forecasts up to three years in the future can be predicted
using publicly available information. They define forecast error in terms of the
difference between actual return on equity and the return on equity implied by the
consensus earnings forecast, and show that this difference is predicted by four variables:
B/M, historical sales growth, forecast long term growth, and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson
valuation model.

Easterwood and Nutt (1999) report a slightly different result to previous studies. They
examine the tendency of analysts to overreact or underreact to prior information, but
introduce dummy variables to account for a differential response depending upon
whether the prior information was good or bad. Similarly to previous studies, they
report that analysts tend to overestimate future earnings when firms had suffered poor
prior returns or earnings performance. However, following relatively good prior returns
or earnings performance, analysts also overestimated future earnings. Easterwood and
Nutt (1999) interpret this evidence as being consistent with underreaction to negative
informative (that is, relatively poor price and earnings performance) and overreaction to
positive information (that is, relatively good price and earnings performance).

Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) conduct both parametric and non-parametric tests of
analyst underreaction and overreaction to prior information, where prior information
includes abnormal returns and earnings changes. Using parametric tests, they find that
analysts underreact to both types of information regardless of whether the prior
information comprises good news or bad news. However, Abarbanell and Lehavy
(2003) emphasise the non-normality of the distribution of forecast errors, and hence
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argue that non-parametric tests are more appropriate than parametric tests. Using nonparametric tests, they find that analysts underreact to prior bad news only. Cohen and
Lys (2003) argue that despite the properties of forecast error distributions, the results of
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) are consistent with the overall stance of prior literature:
analysts underreact to prior information, and hence are inefficient.

In summary, there is evidence in the analyst efficiency literature that suggests analysts’
earnings forecasts reflect underreaction to publicly available information, particularly
where the information represents bad news. It is pertinent to note that earnings and
market prices, the main variables used in this literature as proxies for information, enter
financial-distress models including Altman’s Z-score, Ohlson’s O-score and DD as
explanatory variables. Thus, declines in earnings and market prices are consistent with
an increase in financial distress, and the observed underreaction to bad news (in both
earnings and stock prices) is consistent with an underreaction to financial distress.
Analyst underreaction to financial distress is also consistent with the finding in Moses
(1990) that forecast optimism is significantly greater for firms that subsequently
experience bankruptcy than for non-failing firms; although he attributes this to the
withholding of bad news by the failing firm and not to underreaction on the part of the
analyst. Analyst underreaction to financial distress is therefore suggested by previous
findings; consequently this underreaction might help to explain the Doukas et al. (2002)
findings that analyst optimism increases with B/M and is a primary motivating factor
behind research question 2.
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2.5 The Market Reaction to Earnings Surprises
Stock prices react when companies announce earnings that are either higher or lower
than is expected by the market. There is an extensive body of literature that studies this
market reaction, in terms of the relationship between unexpected or abnormal returns
and the difference between the level of announced returns and the level of expected
returns, or earnings surprise. The emphasis of this section is on two particular issues in
the literature which are of relevance to this thesis; namely the functional form of the
relationship between unexpected returns and earnings surprises, and the variables that
affect this relationship.

2.5.1 The functional form of the relationship between unexpected
returns and earnings surprises
Functional form(s) adopted in the literature on the errors-in-expectations hypothesis

A number of studies in the literature on the errors-in-expectations hypothesis (Section
2.3.5) are concerned with market reactions to earnings surprises. These studies include
Dreman and Berry (1995), Levis and Liodakis (2001), Skinner and Sloan (2002), and
Chan et al. (2006a) and have as a common feature the reliance upon the sign but not the
magnitude of the earnings surprise. The magnitude of the earnings surprise (referred to
hereafter as earnings surprise, or simply ES) plays little if any role in the inferences of
these studies; this contrasts with the literature on earnings response coefficients,
discussed below, which is concerned with the relationship between ES and abnormal
returns. The relevant studies in the value premium literature draw inferences by
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classifying firm-year observations into either value or growth stocks, and
simultaneously into positive and negative surprises. The main purpose of this
classification system is to examine differences between value and growth stocks with
regard to their average returns from positive and negative surprises of any magnitude,
rather than with regard to the relationship between returns and ES.

The inferences in Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Chan et al. (2006a) rely primarily on
unexpected returns conditioned on the sign of ES, using a return-earnings relationship
of similar specification to equation (2.2), which does not include ES.

UR = β 0 + β1G * BAD + β 2 G * GOOD + other terms + ε

(2.2)

In equation (2.2), UR is the unexpected return; G is a dummy variable to indicate
value/growth orientation based on B/M (G=0 for high B/M firms and 5 for low B/M
firms); BAD is a dummy variable equal to 1 for negative surprises and 0 otherwise; and
GOOD is a dummy variable equal to 1 for positive surprises and 0 otherwise. In Chan et
al. (2006a), G is replaced by separate dummy variables for Value, Growth and
intermediate B/M stocks. The other terms in the specification (which differ between the
two studies and are omitted here for brevity) allow for variation in unexpected returns of
value stocks with positive and negative surprises. ES plays no part in the above
specification, which is intended to capture the effect of an earnings ‘torpedo’ where the
occurrence of a negative earnings surprise is a more important determinant of abnormal
returns than ES itself.
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However, there is evidence suggesting that a model of the return-earnings surprise
relationship that omits ES is misspecified. First, Skinner and Sloan (2002) investigated
a number of functional forms of the returns-earnings surprise relation which do include
ES, and report a higher coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) for these forms than
the forms which do not include ES. Therefore, the exclusion of ES results in a poorer
goodness of fit of the modelled return-earnings surprise relationship.

Second, Figure 4 (p. 299) in Skinner and Sloan (2002) demonstrates that returns are
monotonically increasing with ES for both value and growth stocks. Hand (2002) points
out that this figure is actually inconsistent with a torpedo effect, and by itself does not
justify the inclusion of intercept dummy variables (that is, GOOD and BAD) at the
expense of excluding ES from the return-earnings surprise relationship. Similarly,
graphical evidence in Kinney et al. (2002) and Burgstahler and Chuk (2008) is
inconsistent with an asymmetric response of value and growth stocks to positive and
negative earnings surprises. Kinney et al. (2002) also report that they find no evidence
of a torpedo effect in growth stocks.

Finally, Payne and Thomas (2003) argue that the results of Skinner and Sloan (2002)
are biased because of the rounding error in adjusted I/B/E/S data (also discussed in
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002) which leads to many zero forecast-error
computations when in fact, the forecast error is non-zero 14. Using unadjusted I/B/E/S

14

Payne and Thomas (2003) document that most of the misclassified zero forecast errors are actually
positive, hence resulting in an upward bias in average return for zero forecast error stocks. This bias tends
to exaggerate the earnings torpedo effect: the difference in average returns between zero forecast error
stocks and those which miss forecasts is biased upwards, and similarly the difference in average returns
between those stocks which beat forecasts and zero forecast error stocks is biased downwards. As the
rounding error is more prevalent in growth stocks than in value stocks, owing to their greater frequency of
stock splits, the earnings torpedo effect is exaggerated in growth stocks.
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data free from the rounding error, Payne and Thomas (2003) are not able to find
evidence that the ‘torpedo effect’ is greater for growth stocks than it is for value stocks.

Functional form(s) adopted in the literature on earnings response coefficients

There is an extensive body of literature in the accounting discipline concerned with the
relationship between earnings and stock returns, commencing with Ball and Brown
(1968). Part of this literature specifically deals with the earnings response coefficient
(ERC), defined as the slope of the relationship between unexpected earnings (or
earnings surprises) and unexpected stock returns. The theory underlying the ERC
assumes that earnings changes are related to changes in investors’ expectations of future
cash flows, and that stock prices equal the present value of expected future cash flows
(Kormendi and Lipe, 1987). The magnitude of the ERC is thus related to the rate at
which expected future cash are discounted. For example, if earnings changes correspond
exactly to cash flow changes and the appropriate discount rate is r=10%, a permanent
change in earnings of $1 has a present value of (1+1/r) =11; the theoretical value of the
ERC in this case (Kothari, 2001). In this framework, returns increase monotonically
with unexpected earnings and asymmetric intercept terms generally play no part in the
return-earnings relationship, unlike the return-earnings relationship either specified or
implicitly assumed in the value premium studies discussed above.

The functional form of the return-earnings relationship assumed in most of the ERC
literature models unexpected returns as a linear and increasing function of unexpected
earnings; the most basic form of which is given by equation (2.3), where the coefficient

β1 represents the ERC. Specific examples include Easton and Zmijewski (1989), Hayn
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(1995), Kothari and Zimmerman (1995), and Kinney et al. (2002). The basic functional
form given by equation (2.3) has been modified to allow for variation in β1 (the ERC)
with variables such as: growth, persistence, risk and interest rates (Collins and Kothari,
1989; Jones, Morton and Schaefer, 2000); forecast dispersion (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992);
business cycle stages (Johnson, 1999); and the presence of dilutive securities (Huson,
Scott and Wier, 2001). The modelling of this variation is achieved by the use of dummy
variables D such that β1 is replaced by β1(1+D); the resulting model is still nevertheless
consistent with the functional form given by equation (2.3). One variation includes
allowance for the S-shaped nonlinearity of the return-earnings relationship; this has
been achieved by replacing UE with arctan (UE) (Freeman and Tse, 1992) or by the
addition of the term |UE|*UE (Lipe, Bryant and Widener, 1998). To avoid measurement
error problems associated with UE, models based upon equation (2.3) have also been
estimated in a number of studies using reverse regression as suggested by Collins and
Kothari (1989). In these cases UE becomes the dependent variable; however the
underlying assumption still remains that the return-earnings relationship is of the form
given by equation (2.3).

UR = β 0 + β1UE + ε

(2.3)

In summary, the functional form of the return-earnings relationship used in empirical
work varies primarily with the purpose of the study and the assumptions underlying the
work. Studies in the value premium literature of the effect of errors-in-expectations
have modelled returns as a function of the sign of the earnings surprise and
value/growth orientation, with little or no consideration of the magnitude of the earnings
surprise. In these studies the effect of negative surprises vis-à-vis positive surprises has
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been modelled using intercept dummy variables. Studies in the ERC literature have
modelled returns as an increasing function of the magnitude of earnings surprise, with
the slope of this function conditioned on a number of potentially relevant variables (also
by the use of dummy variables). Therefore, there exists some uncertainty about the
correct functional form to use in a study of market reactions to earnings surprises which
falls within the value premium literature, particularly with regard to the appropriateness
of the intercept dummy. For consistency with both sets of literature, the analysis of
market reactions to earnings surprises in this thesis will therefore allow for both
asymmetric intercept terms and asymmetric slope terms in the return-earnings
relationship.

2.5.2 Key variables identified in the literature
The ERC literature has proposed a large number of variables that affect the market’s
reaction to earnings surprises (or unexpected earnings); the search for which has been
justified as an attempt to explain why empirical estimates of the ERC itself are smaller
than values predicted by theory15. These variables include (but are not limited to)
systematic risk and interest rates (Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Collins and Kothari,
1989); growth, or the presence of growth opportunities (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987;
Collins and Kothari, 1989; Biddle and Seow, 1991; Jones et al., 2000); earnings
persistence (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Jones et al., 2000);
losses (Hayn, 1995; Lipe et al., 1998); earnings uncertainty or, where analysts’ forecast
are used to measure expected earnings, forecast dispersion (Freeman and Tse, 1992;
Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Subramanyam, 1996; Kinney et al., 2002); the current stage of
business cycle (Johnson, 1999); earnings quality (Ghosh, Gu and Jain, 2005); the
15

For example, Kothari (2001) states that while the ERC is expected to be between 8 and 20 under
reasonable assumptions, actual empirical estimates are generally between 1 and 3.
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presence of dilutive securities (Huson et al., 2001); and default risk (Dhaliwal and
Reynolds, 1994; Billings, 1999). The main variable in the related value premium
literature is B/M, used primarily to differentiate value and growth stocks which are
expected to react differently to earnings surprises. Of the above variables, growth
(measured by B/M), earnings uncertainty (measured by forecast dispersion) and default
risk are of most relevance to this thesis; and therefore the following discussion
emphasises these three variables 16.
2.5.2.1 Risk

For changes in earnings that are permanent (that is, not transitory), the ERC is
theoretically inversely related to a firm’s required rate of return on equity, because the
effect of a permanent change in cash flows on equity value is greater for firms with a
low discount rate than for firms with a higher discount rate. According to the CAPM, a
firm’s required rate of return on equity is directly related to the firm’s systematic risk,
and therefore the ERC is predicted by theory to be inversely related to both systematic
risk (as measured by beta) and the risk-free rate of interest. Empirical evidence shows
that estimated response coefficients are indeed inversely related to systematic risk
(Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Collins and Kothari, 1989), however the evidence
regarding the statistical significance of this relationship is mixed. Easton and Zmijewski
(1989) report statistically insignificant correlation coefficients between estimated
response coefficients and beta, while Collins and Kothari (1989) report statistically
significant coefficients from reverse regressions. Subsequent studies have generally not
included additional terms in the return-earnings relationship to allow for variation in
16

Although book-to-market has been used in the ERC literature to measure growth and earnings
persistence, this thesis remains consistent with the value premium literature in employing book-to-market
solely as a measure of a firm’s value/growth orientation. The fact that low book-to-market stocks exhibit
high earnings persistence is irrelevant to the findings herein.
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systematic risk (for example Freeman and Tse, 1992; Hayn, 1995; Kinney et al., 2002;
Ghosh et al., 2005); some studies do however allow for variation in the ERC across
firms due to differences in unmeasured variables including systematic risk (Teets and
Wasley, 1996; Lipe et al., 1998).

Whilst there are theoretical reasons why the ERC might be (inversely) related to
systematic risk (or beta), Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) hypothesise that the ERC might
also be inversely related to a firm’s default risk of debt. Their argument depends on the
concept that equity beta is directly related to the riskiness of a firm’s debt; therefore if
the CAPM is the correct asset pricing model but beta is measured with error, default
risk may contain additional information regarding a firm’s systematic risk besides the
information in the (erroneously) estimated beta. An alternative argument (which
Dhaliwal and Reynolds, 1994, do not cite) for an inverse relationship between the ERC
and default risk is that financial distress might be another form of priced risk (as
discussed in Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1992, and Section 2.3.2) not
specified in the CAPM. To test their hypothesis, Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) use two
measures of default risk, namely bond ratings and leverage (debt-to-equity ratio). In
both cases and after controlling for estimated beta, they find a strong and statistically
significant inverse relationship between default risk and response coefficients.

On the other hand, Billings (1999) argues that both measures of default risk used by
Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) are correlated with expected earnings growth, and
therefore the observed inverse relation between ERC and default risk is merely
capturing the association between ERC and growth (discussed below). Billings tests this
idea by re-running the regression analysis in Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) and
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controlling for two measures of expected growth, namely I/B/E/S long term growth
forecasts and return-on-equity. He finds that the relation between bond ratings and ERC
disappears and the relation between debt-to-equity ratios and ERC is substantially
weakened after controlling for return-on-equity (but not after controlling for I/B/E/S
long term growth forecasts). Based on the mixed nature of his results, Billings (1999)
raises doubts that default risk explains response coefficients independently of the effect
of growth.
2.5.2.2 Persistence, Growth and B/M

B/M is a variable which is related theoretically to the market reaction to earnings
surprises. An inverse relationship between B/M and ERC magnitudes is predicted in
theory because low B/M firms exhibit both earnings persistence and the presence of
growth opportunities (Collins and Kothari, 1989), both of which imply high values of
ERC. Earnings persistence is defined simply as the extent to which earnings changes
persist in the future, and consequently also to the effect that a change in earnings has on
expectations of future earnings. Therefore, ERC magnitudes are expected to increase
with earnings persistence; a relationship confirmed empirically by Kormendi and Lipe
(1987), Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and Collins and Kothari (1989) using time-series
measures of persistence. Similarly, Collins and Kothari (1989) argue that the existence
of growth opportunities is expected to increase the magnitude of ERC independently of
persistence; because the valuation of growth firms is largely dependent upon the growth
in future cash flows, and earnings surprises are indicative of changes in growth
opportunities. The relationship between ERC magnitudes and growth is confirmed
empirically using growth measures such as B/M (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Biddle and
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Seow, 1991) Tobin’s q (Harikumar and Harter, 1995) and composite growth variables
based on factor analysis (Jones et al., 2000).

An inverse relationship between B/M and ERC magnitudes is also implied by equity
valuation models that recognise the importance of book value of equity as well as
earnings (for example Ohlson, 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). When book values
decrease relative to earnings, current earnings become increasingly important to firm
valuation; consequently response coefficients are larger for low B/M firms than for high
B/M firms. Proponents of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis also argue that high
B/M stocks are expected to have a larger immediate reaction to negative earnings
surprises because such surprises are interpreted by investors as a failure of growth
stocks to match over-optimistic growth expectations (La Porta et al., 1997; Skinner and
Sloan, 2002).

The predicted inverse relationship between B/M and response coefficients is supported
by empirical results in Collins and Kothari (1989) and Biddle and Seow (1991). Skinner
and Sloan (2002) estimate a number of models of the relationship between returns and
earnings surprises; their results confirm that both the slope of this relationship (which is
equivalent to the ERC) and the asymmetric intercept term for negative surprise (the
effect of earnings torpedoes) are inversely related to B/M. Payne and Thomas (2003)
confirm the Skinner and Sloan (2002) results regarding the slope but not, however, the
asymmetric intercept term17. Results similar to Skinner and Sloan (2002) were obtained
by Levis and Liodakis (2001) and Chan et al. (2006a), who find that low B/M stocks
react more severely than high B/M stocks to negative earnings surprises. In summary,
17

However, Skinner and Sloan (2002) rely most heavily upon the asymmetric intercept term for their
inferences.
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there is extensive evidence that B/M is an important determinant of the magnitude of
market reactions to earnings surprises.
2.5.2.3 Nonlinearity, Uncertainty & Analyst Dispersion

Empirically, the return-earnings relationship has been found to be nonlinear (S-shaped),
being steepest for earnings surprises close to zero and flattening out as the magnitude of
earnings surprises of either sign increases (Freeman and Tse, 1992; Lipe et al., 1998).
Subramanyam (1996) argues that this nonlinearity is caused by uncertainty regarding
the precision of earnings signals. Investors are likely to infer a smaller signal-to-noise
ratio for more extreme information, where the information is the ex-post magnitude of
the earnings surprise. Consequently, the market attaches less weight to extreme earnings
surprises resulting in a decline in the response per unit of earnings surprise; an argument
which in effect states that extreme earnings surprises have lower persistence.

Kinney et al. (2002) also explain the S-shaped return-surprise relationship in terms of
investor uncertainty regarding the precision of earnings signals, where uncertainty is
measured from the ex-ante dispersion of analyst forecasts. They demonstrate
empirically that extreme earnings surprises are associated with high dispersion
forecasts, and more importantly that the return-earnings surprise relationship becomes
steeper as dispersion decreases; the latter result having also been obtained by Imhoff
and Lobo (1992). Therefore, nonlinearity in the return-earnings relationship can
potentially be explained by the observation that extreme earnings surprises coincide
with high earnings uncertainty, which is reflected in high analyst forecast dispersion.
Both Kinney et al. (2002) and Burgstahler and Chuk (2008) find that the nonlinearity all
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but disappears when they control for dispersion before estimating the earnings response
coefficient.

Dispersion measures the extent to which analysts disagree about the future earnings of a
firm but has been employed in the finance literature in a more general sense as a proxy
for earnings uncertainty amongst investors. For example Diether et al. (2002), Park
(2005) and Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006) employ dispersion as a proxy for
divergence of opinion amongst investors, to test the Miller (1977) hypothesis that
divergence of opinion and short sales constraints keep pessimists out of the market, and
consequently prices reflect only the most optimistic views 18. Zhang (2006) also uses
dispersion in this sense to test whether momentum is greater when uncertainty is
greater. Similarly, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006) argue that investors view low
dispersion forecasts as more reliable than high dispersion forecasts; an argument
consistent with Kinney et al. (2002). They find that a forecast increase in earnings from
the previous year, coupled with a low dispersion of forecasts, results in overvaluation
and hence low future returns. When analysts forecast a decrease in earnings from the
previous year and there is low dispersion in forecasts, stocks tend to be undervalued and
have high future returns. They interpret these findings as consistent with the hypothesis
that investors regard low dispersion stocks for which forecasts are ‘optimistic’ as sure
winners, and low dispersion stocks for which forecasts are ‘pessimistic’ as sure losers 19.
Thus, the importance of dispersion for the market reaction to earnings surprises is
supported theoretically as well as empirically.

18

In other words, securities tend to be overvalued in the presence of uncertainty and short sales
constraints.
19
Note that the terms ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ are used here in a different sense to that used
elsewhere in this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis an optimistic forecast is one where forecast
earnings exceed actual earnings, in other words the forecast is too high. In Doukas et al. (2006) an
optimistic forecast is one where earnings-per-share is forecast to increase from the previous year.
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Dispersion is of particular relevance to this thesis because it is directly related to B/M
(Doukas et al., 2004) and likely to increase with default risk. Dispersion is likely to
increase with default risk because analysts are more likely to update and provide
accurate forecasts for firms they think will perform well than for firms they think will
perform poorly (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; Hayes, 1998). Given the importance of
dispersion to market reactions to earnings surprises it could potentially help explain
why high B/M stocks simultaneously have higher returns and larger negative earnings
surprises than low B/M stocks (the latter being the main result in Doukas et al., 2002).

2.5.3 Summary of the Literature on the Market Reaction to Earnings
Surprises
This section has discussed a number of results from the literature regarding market
reactions to earnings surprises, and which are of relevance to the final research question
in this thesis. These results pertain to the functional form of the relationship between
unexpected returns and earnings surprises and to evidence of the roles played by default
risk, B/M and analyst forecast dispersion in this relationship. The value premium
literature emphasises the sign of the earnings surprise, while the literature on earnings
response coefficients models returns as an increasing function of earnings surprise. The
analysis of market reactions to earnings surprises (chapter 5) models the relationship
between unexpected returns and earnings surprises in such a way as to maintain
consistency with both sets of literature; in other words it allows for variation in both the
intercept and slope terms with the key control variables.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
The value premium is a robust empirical anomaly that is not easily explained by
traditional asset pricing models such as the CAPM. It has been observed in most
national stock markets including Australia and over a range of time periods. A number
of modifications have been proposed to asset pricing models to accommodate the value
premium, the most notable of which is the Fama-French three-factor model which
includes HML as a risk factor. HML is derived as the size-controlled return differential
between a portfolio of value stocks and a portfolio of growth stocks; the justification for
its inclusion as a risk factor in asset pricing models is that it proxies for a priced
financial distress factor and/or that it captures economic risk factors to which value
stocks are more sensitive than growth stocks, and which investors wish to hedge
against. In general, the rational pricing explanations for the value premium mainly
revolve around the argument that value stocks have low prices because they are more
risky than growth stocks, in the sense that they generally possess poorer economic
fundamentals and/or are more sensitive to economic downturns than growth stocks.

In contrast to explanations based on rational pricing, behavioural finance advocates
argue that the value premium is due to mispricing of value and growth stocks, the
subsequent correction of which results in the high (low) returns of value (growth)
stocks. Mispricing is argued to be due to cognitive biases on the part of investors which
induce them to engage in less-than-optimal behaviour such as extrapolation of past
performance, overreaction and/or underreaction to news, and the overweighting of
personal information (or information obtained from personal analysis) relative to public
information. The most notable behavioural explanation for the value premium is the
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errors-in-expectations hypothesis, which argues that investors are overly optimistic
about the prospects of growth stocks and overly pessimistic about the prospects of value
stocks. The source of the excessive optimism and/or pessimism is argued to be
extrapolation of past performance, as the price multiples which distinguish value and
growth stocks tend to reflect past, rather than future, growth.

However, problems exist for both the rational pricing and the behavioural explanations
of the value premium, and the real explanation most likely includes elements of both.
The debate regarding the validity of HML as a risk factor remains unresolved. Whilst
value stocks are generally more financially distressed than growth stocks, HML does
not appear to be a priced financial distress factor because distress carries a negative, not
a positive, return premium. The existence of a negative distress premium opens up the
possibility of mispricing of some securities where price multiples do not reflect the
relative level of distress of the issuing firm. Admittedly, HML is correlated with a
number of economic variables, thus lending some support to the concept of a priced
recession or economic downside risk variable. Priced downside risk can be modelled as
variable systematic risk in conditional asset pricing models, but such models are not
completely satisfactory representations of reality because in empirical tests they
generally imply a much smaller magnitude of value premium than is actually observed.

Behavioural finance theories that have evolved to explain anomalies such as the value
premium also have unresolved problems, including a lack of consensus on the relative
importance of certain factors such as overreaction, underreaction and the various
cognitive biases argued to drive over/underreaction.

The errors-in-expectations

hypothesis is supported by arguments that price multiples reflect past and not future
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growth, by observed biases in forecast growth rates, and by return patterns observed
around earnings announcements and surprises. However evidence exists that is contrary
to the extrapolation (of past growth) behaviour underlying this hypothesis, and
furthermore, the pattern of analyst optimism across value and growth stocks predicted
by the errors-in-expectations hypothesis does not appear to be reflected in analysts’
earnings forecasts.

The literature summarised above contains some relatively unexplored issues and which
are the focus of this thesis. The first such issue is the existence of mispricing as a
function of valuation ratios and financial distress, which has been the subject of a
number of overseas studies but is explored in this thesis for the first time in an
Australian context. The second issue is the inconsistency between the errors-inexpectations hypothesis and the pattern of analyst optimism (or equivalently, analysts’
forecast errors) observed across value and growth stocks; investigated here and for the
first time with financial distress as a control variable. The motivation for including
financial distress as a control variable is twofold: the potential existence of distressrelated mispricing, and evidence of analyst underreaction to distress. The final issue is
the inconsistency between stock returns and the same pattern of analyst optimism
observed across value and growth stocks; explored in this thesis by examining how
B/M, distress and analyst forecast dispersion impact upon market reactions to earnings
surprises.
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CHAPTER 3: THE VALUE PREMIUM, DEFAULT
RISK AND MISPRICING: A STUDY OF LARGE
CAPITALISATION AUSTRALIAN STOCKS

3.1 Abstract
This chapter addresses the first research question of this thesis. The chapter is thus an
investigation of a mispricing hypothesis whereby stocks with high valuation ratios and
low default risk are underpriced while stocks with low valuation ratios and high default
risk are overpriced; the valuation ratios in this study being book-to-market (B/M),
earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash flow-to-price (C/P). The mispricing hypothesis is
tested in a number of ways. First, an investigation is carried out on whether static asset
pricing models can explain the returns of portfolios of large capitalisation Australian
stocks sorted by value/growth and default risk, by testing against the mispricing
hypothesis. Second, portfolio returns and Sharpe ratios are compared against alternative
risk measures not included in the asset pricing models. Finally, portfolio returns are
compared with various characteristics to facilitate an understanding of the mechanism
by which such mispricing (namely, as a function of value/growth and default risk)
might arise.

The static asset pricing models tested (the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model, and
Carhart four-factor model) are all rejected in favour of the mispricing hypothesis,
regardless of whether value/growth is defined by B/M, E/P or C/P, and regardless of
whether returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted. Although asset pricing model
misspecification cannot be ruled out, the overall findings are strongly supportive of
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mispricing that is consistent with the momentum life cycle postulated by Lee and
Swaminathan (2000).

3.2 Introduction
Whilst it is accepted that value stocks are in general more distressed financially than
growth stocks (see Fama and French, 1995; Chen and Zhang, 1998), recent studies
suggest that financial distress does not command a positive return premium in equity
markets (Dichev, 1998; Gharghori et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2008), and therefore the
superior returns of value stocks cannot be due to a rationally-priced distress risk factor.
On the contrary, there is growing evidence of systematic overvaluation of financially
distressed growth stocks and of systematic undervaluation of value stocks that are
otherwise financially strong. Notably, Piotroski (2000) uses financial statement analysis
to identify financially strong high B/M firms which are then demonstrated to have much
higher returns than other high B/M firms; Mohanram (2005) does the same for low B/M
stocks, but uses a different set of variables. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) uses Ohlson’s
O-score to identify distressed firms, and finds that distressed growth firms have
extremely low returns. Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) use a set of 24 variables to derive
a measure of financial health which they use (along with momentum) to identify
undervalued value firms and overvalued growth firms in Europe.

Although the above studies use different measures of financial health and/or distress,
their common identifiable finding is that firms where B/M (or sales-to-price in the case
of Bird and Casavecchia, 2007a) is either too high or low relative to financial distress
are mispriced. The main objective in this chapter is thus to test whether this broad result
also holds in Australia, using the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart
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four-factor model as benchmarks. As Fama (1970) argues that tests of market efficiency
cannot be differentiated from tests that the asset pricing model is correctly specified,
additional use is made of evidence besides the results of asset pricing tests to support
the case for mispricing. Specifically, portfolio risk-based measures are used to
demonstrate the inconsistency of the results with rational pricing, and the recent
earnings and price history of the sample firms are used to demonstrate that the results
are consistent with a delayed reaction to information and therefore with market
inefficiency.

This study is differentiated in a number of ways from previous studies that test for
mispricing as a function of value and financial distress/health. First, the study employs a
single default risk indicator to measure financial health amongst both value and growth
firms, thus avoiding potential conflicts arising from the use of different indicators across
studies, and across value and growth firms. Second, the tests are repeated using each of
three valuation ratios: B/M, E/P and C/P, thereby increasing the robustness of the
results. Finally, and for reasons which will become apparent, the sample is limited to
large stocks, namely those that are ranked in the top 300 by market capitalisation. The
study is similar to Gharghori et al. (2007), who test the Fama-French three-factor model
and variations of this model on Australian stock portfolios sorted by size, B/M and
default risk. However, Gharghori et al. (2007) have as their stated objective the
investigation of whether SMB and HML proxy for default risk; not the investigation of
mispricing as an explanation for cross-sectional return variation related to value and
default risk. Consequently, this study is the first Australian study to deal with the latter
objective.

93

The default risk indicator used in this study is distance-to-default (DD), a measure
developed by Moody’s KMV (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003), and previously used in value
premium studies by Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2007). DD is based
upon the bond-pricing framework of Merton (1974) which models a firm’s equity as a
call option on the firm’s assets with an exercise price equal to the value of the firm’s
debt. Default probabilities based on DD are arguably a more accurate predictor of
default risk than models based upon accounting ratios such as Altman’s z-score or
Ohlson’s O-score, and are otherwise preferable because DD implicitly emphasises the
information in current market values rather than historical data (Vassalou and Xing.
2004; Gharghori, Chan and Faff, 2006b). By using an existing and widely recognised
model this study avoids dependency problems caused by estimating a model on the
same sample data on which returns-based tests are conducted.

The study concentrates upon large stocks for a number of reasons. Preliminary analysis
(presented in Appendix 3A) reveals that size (market capitalisation) plays little, if any,
role in stock returns amongst large stocks20. In contrast, the value premium is found to
be economically and statistically significant amongst large stocks in Australia 21. On this
basis, the tests of mispricing do not include size as a variable and concentrate solely
upon the relationships between value, default risk and stock returns. In addition, the
emphasis upon large caps allows for a more accurate calculation of returns and of the
measure of default risk, namely DD, than would otherwise be possible. The calculation
of these variables is more accurate primarily because trading frequency increases with

20

This result is consistent with Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) who find the size effect in
Australia is mainly due to the smallest quintile of stocks.
21
The existence of a value premium in Australia is not unanimously accepted. In particular, Halliwell et
al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) argue that the Australian B/M effect is not statistically significant; however
their sorts on size and B/M reveal that this inference is mainly due to small stocks. Other studies finding a
significant value premium include Faff (2001), Gharghori et al. (2007) and Gharghori et al. (2009).
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size. There are thus fewer months where stocks returns are unobservable, leading to
more accurate portfolio return calculations. There are also more daily market
capitalisation observations, and thus more reliable estimates of the volatility of daily
market capitalisation, upon which the DD calculation depends.

However, mispricing is arguably more prevalent amongst small stocks than amongst
large stocks, and therefore the results of this study are implicitly biased against finding
any mispricing. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that mispricing exists firstly because
market inefficiency allows prices to deviate from fundament values, and secondly
because it is costly for arbitrageurs to profit from mispricing and therefore drive prices
back to their fundamental values. Analyst coverage and institutional ownership increase
with size, implying greater market efficiency for large stocks; while idiosyncratic
volatility, bid-ask spreads and the frequency of zero-volume trading days are all
inversely related to size, implying that arbitrage activity is more costly for small stocks
(Ali et al., 2003).

In spite of the fact that the sample is biased towards stocks which are not likely to be
mispriced, the results reject the asset-pricing models tested and are consistent with the
mispricing hypothesis: high default risk growth portfolios have large negative alphas
and low default risk value portfolios have large positive alphas. Both the alphas and raw
returns of the mispriced portfolios are inversely related to risk, where risk is measured
not only by default risk, but also by total portfolio volatility and by portfolio
idiosyncratic volatility; thus it is extremely difficult for the results to be reconciled with
rational pricing. The results are also demonstrated to be inconsistent with market
efficiency in that they imply a gross underreaction to information. Notably, the high
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default risk growth stocks have poor prior returns and declining earnings; however, the
poor returns continue after the portfolio formation date. Similarly, the high post
portfolio-formation returns of low default risk value stocks are also a continuation of
their prior earnings and return performance.

The results suggest that the Australian share market is far from efficient, even amongst
large capitalisation stocks where mispricing is expected to be minimal or nonexistent.
Behavioural explanations for the value premium (which is found to be large and
statistically significant amongst large Australian stocks) might therefore prove a fruitful
area for future Australian research.

The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.3 describes the empirical
framework for this study. Section 3.4 describes the data and methodology to carry out
the empirical tests. The results of the empirical tests are presented in Section 3.5, while
Section 3.6 interprets the results and concludes.

3.3 Empirical Framework
The empirical work carried out in this study consists of three parts. First, the
relationship between stock returns and each of the main variables in the study is
investigated using portfolios formed from one-way sorts. The study then tests whether
the variation in returns with each variable is explained by any of the asset-pricing
models considered (the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the Carhart
four-factor model). This part of the analysis is necessary to confirm the earlier assertion
that size plays no part in the returns of large stocks, that a large-capitalisation valuepremium exists, and that the results from the subsequent two-way sorts are not primarily
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driven by any one variable alone. The standard testing methodology from similar
studies is employed, namely (i) a t-test of the return differential between the extreme
portfolios and (ii) a t-test that the portfolio alphas are zero.

Second, the mispricing hypothesis is tested by double-sorting stocks into three
value/growth classifications and independently into three default risk classifications.
The returns of each portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate are then regressed in timeseries against those of the factors in each asset pricing model. The risk factors and their
estimation are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4. The alphas (or pricing errors)
under each asset pricing model are the intercept terms from the time-series regressions
and form the basis of the tests of mispricing.

The main hypothesis is that mispricing is associated with valuation ratios that are too
high or too low relative to default risk 22. Mispricing associated with valuation ratios that
are too high relative to default risk implies undervaluation and a positive alpha (α) for
low default risk value portfolios, while mispricing associated with valuation ratios that
are too low relative to default risk implies overvaluation and negative α for high default
risk growth portfolios. The formal tests for mispricing applied in this study therefore
consist of two non-nested hypothesis tests based on portfolio α. The first test is of the
hypothesis that the α of high default risk growth portfolios are zero, the rejection which
against the one-sided alternative α<0 is evidence consistent with overvaluation of high
default risk growth portfolios. Similarly, the second test is of the hypothesis that the α
of low default risk value portfolios are zero, the rejection of which against the one-sided

22

As valuation ratios are defined in this study with price or market value in the denominator, value stocks
have “high” valuation ratios while growth stocks have “low” valuation ratios.
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alternative that α>0 is evidence consistent with undervaluation of low default risk value
portfolios.

Note, however, that whilst evidence that α>0 for low default risk value portfolios and
that α<0 for high default risk growth portfolios is consistent with mispricing, it may
also be consistent with misspecification of the asset pricing models used to compute α.
The third part of the empirical analysis therefore provides additional evidence regarding
the consistency or inconsistency of the (α-based) mispricing results with rational pricing
and with market efficiency.

To demonstrate the inconsistency with rational pricing, it is necessary to show that the
overpriced (high default risk growth) portfolios have unambiguously higher risk than
the underpriced (low default risk value) portfolios. The analyses based on portfolio
returns and alphas by themselves constitute a direct test of the proposition that
overpriced stocks have higher risk than underpriced stocks, because one of the variables
(default risk) used to construct the portfolios itself measures risk. Consequently,
evidence that the returns and alphas of low default risk value stocks exceed those of
high default risk growth stocks is consistent with this proposition, with risk measured in
terms of default risk. However, this study applies two additional measures of risk to this
context, namely total portfolio volatility and residual (that is, idiosyncratic) volatility
from a market model. Residual volatility is relevant to behavioural explanations of stock
returns in the sense that it is argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to be a significant
impediment to arbitrage activity and thus an important reason for the existence of
mispricing.
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To demonstrate the inconsistency with market efficiency the study then tests for
evidence of that the mispricing results are due to underreaction, a line of enquiry that
can be justified in terms of the momentum life cycle proposed by Lee and Swaminathan
(2000). Whilst overreaction is a frequently-cited behavioural explanation for the value
premium 23, the results to this point actually prove to be more consistent with
underreaction than with overreaction. As DD incorporates the information in share
prices, a low (high) DD score implies that the market has to some extent responded to a
firm’s deteriorating (improving) financial health. In the case of high default risk growth
stocks, poor price performance after portfolio formation indicates the market response
to deteriorating financial health implicit in DD is not yet complete. An incomplete
market response to improving financial health is also consistent with the relatively good
price performance of low default risk value stocks after portfolio formation.

To test the underreaction hypothesis, it is demonstrated that undervalued stocks (which
have relatively good price performance after portfolio formation) also have improving
financial health and high returns before portfolio formation, and that overvalued stocks
(which have relatively poor price performance after portfolio formation) also have
deteriorating financial health and low returns before portfolio formation. The study thus
tests for variation in financial health and prior returns across portfolio groupings, using
the Kruskal-Wallis test (the non-parametric counterpart of the multivariate ANOVA
test). For these tests, financial health is measured by the change in earnings, return-onassets (ROA) and the change in ROA.

23

Examples include Barberis et al. (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003).
However, Daniel et al. (1998) model the value premium as an under-reaction to public information.
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3.4 Data and Methodology
The data employed for this study are from four sources. Financial data are sourced from
the Aspect Huntley Datalink database, from which are calculated book value of equity,
earnings, cash earnings and debt. Monthly market data are sourced from the AGSM
SPPR database, from which market capitalisation, used in the computation of the
valuation ratios and to measure size, and stock returns are calculated. Daily market
capitalisation data are sourced from SIRCA 24, which is used in the calculation of DD.
Finally, the Reserve Bank of Australia website is used to obtain short-term interest rate
data for the calculation of DD. The financial data span the period from July 1994 till
June 2006, the daily market capitalisation data span the period from November 1994 till
November 2007, and the monthly market data span the period from January 1996 till
December 2008. To be included in the sample, firms must have fully-paid ordinary
shares listed on the ASX and be ranked in the top 300 by market capitalisation at
December 31st each year. From the resulting list of companies, property trusts,
investment trusts and shares of foreign or dual-listed companies are excluded.

The definitions of the valuation ratios B/M, E/P and C/P follow the conventions of
similar studies. B/M is calculated as the book value of equity from the company’s latest
balance sheet in the twelve months prior to June 30, divided by market capitalisation as
at June 30 of each year. The book value of equity is defined as the book value of
common equity excluding preference capital and outside equity and including balance
sheet provisions for deferred taxes. Market capitalisation is the ordinary share price
times the number of ordinary shares outstanding. E/P is calculated as earnings from the
24

Data supplied by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on
behalf of the Australian Securities Exchange.
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company’s latest annual report in the twelve months prior to June 30, divided by market
capitalisation as at June 30 of each year. The earnings number is earnings after interest,
depreciation, taxes and preference dividends but before extraordinary and abnormal
items. C/P is defined as cash flow from the company’s latest annual report in the twelve
months prior to June 30, divided by market capitalisation as at June 30 of each year.
Cash flow is earnings with non-cash items depreciation and amortisation added back.
Size is defined as market capitalisation, which is defined above.

Following Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2007), the default risk of
individual firms is measured using DD. The methodology for calculating DD is defined
in Crosbie and Bohn (2003), and following Merton (1974) models a firm’s equity as a
European call-option on the firm’s assets, where the exercise price is the value of the
firm’s liabilities. The value of the firm’s equity is then given by the Black-Scholes
equation for a call option, as in equation 3.1:

VE = VA N(d 1 ) − Xe − rT N(d 2 )
(3.1)
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In equation 3.1, r is the risk-free rate, X is the strike price, VE is the value of the firm’s
equity, VA is the value of the firm’s assets, σA is the volatility of the firm’s assets, T is
the maturity of the firm’s debt and N is the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution. In accordance with Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al.
(2006b), the time to maturity T is set to one year and the strike price X set to the book
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value of current liabilities plus one-half of non-current liabilities. Consistent with the
calculation of B/M, the book values of current liabilities and non-current liabilities are
obtained from the company’s latest balance sheet in the twelve months prior to June 30.
As in Gharghori et al. (2006b), the risk-free rate r is the 180-day bank bill rate from the
Reserve Bank of Australia website. The value of equity VE is the firm’s market
capitalisation, as defined above, and the values of VA and σA are determined using an
iterative procedure as follows.

The annualised standard deviation of the daily equity values VE from the previous
twelve months are used as initial estimates of each firm’s σA. The initial value of σA is
then plugged into equation (3.1) to yield daily estimates of VA, which are then used to
estimate a new value of σA. The new value of σA is then plugged into equation (3.1) to
yield a new estimate of VA. This process is repeated until the value of σA converges to
within 0.0001, in accordance with Gharghori et al. (2006b). The DD is then defined
according to equation 3.2:
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(3.2)

In equation (3.2) µ is the instantaneous drift in the value of the firm’s underlying assets
VA under an assumed Geometric Brownian Motion. Following Vassalou and Xing
(2004) it is calculated as the mean of the daily change in ln (VA). Unlike Vassalou and
Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2007) the default probabilities implied by DD are not
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computed. As default probability is a monotonic function of DD, the ranking of firms
by default probability is the same as the ranking by DD.

DD is calculated at the end of November each year, employing data from the same set
of financial statements as used in the calculation of B/M, E/P and C/P. DD cannot be
observed as instantaneously as market capitalisation because of the additional
computational effort required, and therefore, DD is calculated one month before
portfolio formation to conservatively allow time for its computation based on relatively
recent data. The daily market capitalisation data span the period from December 1st in
the previous year until November 30th in the current year. As portfolios are formed at
the end of December, a potential investor would thus have easily been able to compute
DD (and the valuation ratios) at the time of portfolio formation.

Individual stock returns are the total monthly returns including capital gains and
dividend yield. Portfolios are formed by ranking stocks on the above variables at
December 31st each year, and held for the following 12 months. Portfolio returns are
calculated each month on both an equally-weighted and a value-weighted basis. The
equally-weighted return is the arithmetic average return of all stocks in the portfolio.
The value-weighted return is the market capitalisation-weighted average return of all
stocks in the portfolio. As portfolios are formed on December 31st each year, the
portfolio weights are set proportional to market capitalisations on this date, with the
weights at the end of the months from January to November adjusted to reflect capital
gains and dividend reinvestment. The value-weighted return of a portfolio is thus the
actual return that would be realised by an investor who forms the portfolio on December
31st each year by allocating capital to stocks in proportion to their market capitalisation,
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who reinvests dividends in the same stock, and who makes no other changes until the
end of the subsequent year. Where a return is not able to be calculated for a particular
stock in a portfolio, it is replaced by the equally-weighted average return of the
portfolio.

For the tests of mispricing, three asset pricing models are employed: the CAPM, the
Fama-French three-factor model, and the Carhart four-factor model. The market risk
premium for these models is the monthly value-weighted market return less the risk-free
rate from the AGSM SPPR database. The SMB and HML factors are computed in
accordance with Fama and French (1993) with the exception that portfolios are formed
in December rather than June each year. Stocks above and below the median market
capitalisation are classified as ‘big’ and ‘small’ respectively. Firms in the top 30%,
middle 40% and bottom 30% by B/M are classified as ‘high’, ‘middle’ and ‘low’
respectively. Six portfolios are then constructed at the intersections of the size and B/M
classifications, and the monthly value-weighted returns of each portfolio are calculated.
SMB is then calculated as the average return of the three small portfolios minus the
average return of the three big portfolios. HML is calculated as the average of the two
high (B/M) portfolios minus the average return of the two low (B/M) portfolios. The
PR1YR factor is calculated in accordance with Carhart (1997). Stocks are ranked each
month on their previous 11-month return lagged by one month. PR1YR for the
following month is then the equal-weighted average return of the top 30% of firms
minus the equal-weight average return of the bottom 30% of firms.
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3.5 Results

3.5.1 Returns and Pricing Errors from One-Way Sorts
In this section, portfolios are formed by sorting on one variable at a time, and then the
raw returns and pricing errors of each portfolio computed. The return differential
between extreme portfolios and its statistical significance are then computed, to
determine whether the variable has a relationship with stock returns. Finally, the alphas
of each portfolio are computed using the Fama-French three-factor model; these alphas
will be of use in Section 3.5.2 where they will be compared with the three-factor alphas
of double-sorted portfolios. Table 3.1 presents the results of this analysis.

Table 3.1 shows no evidence of a premium for small size in the sample. In fact there is a
monotonic increase in equal-weighted returns from the smallest to the largest size
portfolio; however this effect is much weaker for value-weighted returns and
statistically insignificant for both equal-weighted and value-weighted returns. From this
point on size is excluded from the analysis, as there are no intuitive reasons to retain this
variable. In contrast, the results show an economically and statistically significant value
premium, regardless of whether value and growth are differentiated by B/M, E/P or C/P
and regardless of whether returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted. Table 3.1 also
shows some evidence of a negative default risk premium, as equal-weighted returns
increase monotonically with DD and the return differential between extreme portfolios
is statistically significant. However, this result is substantially weaker and statistically
insignificant for value-weighted returns.
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The alphas of each portfolio from the Fama-French three-factor model are shown in the
lower half of Table 3.1. There are no significant three-factor alphas for any of the
portfolios sorted B/M, and thus the three-factor model appears to adequately explain the
B/M effect. The low E/P and low C/P portfolios have significantly negative three-factor
alphas if returns are equal-weighted, while the high E/P and high C/P portfolios have
significantly positive alphas if returns are value-weighted. Thus, the three-factor model
does not adequately explain the returns of all portfolios sorted by E/P and C/P. Finally,
the relationship between DD and returns is not totally explained by the three-factor
model, as the two extreme equal-weighted portfolios and the high DD value-weighted
portfolio all have significant alphas. The next section will refer to the three-factor alphas
in Table 3.1, where they will be compared with those of double sorted portfolios.
Attention now turns to the main emphasis of the study: whether valuation ratios that are
too high or too low relative to default risk are consistent with mispricing.
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Table 3.1: Returns and Three-Factor Alphas of Large Capitalisation Portfolios formed from One-Way Sorts
All stocks within the top 300 by Market Capitalisation excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference shares and
partly-paid shares are sorted into quintile portfolios by Size (Market Capitalisation), book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P), cash flow-toprice (C/P) and distance-to-default (DD) at December 31st each year from 1995 to 2007. Monthly returns rp,t are calculated for each portfolio for
the following 12 months after each portfolio formation date. Three-Factor Alphas are the intercept terms from the time series
regression (rp, t − rf, t ) = α p + β p (rm,t − rf, t ) + s p SMB t + h p HML t + ε t ; rf,t is the risk-free rate from the SPPR monthly database, rm,t is the return of
the SPPR value-weighted market portfolio, and SMBt and HMLt are calculated in accordance with Fama and French (1993). Significance levels
of t-statistics are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).

Low
2
3
4
High
HighLow

Equal-weighted returns
Size
B/M
0.37%
0.29%
0.61%
0.44%
0.72%
0.73%
0.76%
0.78%
0.76%
1.02%
0.38%
0.73%
(1.392)
(2.439***)

E/P
0.14%
0.62%
0.93%
1.14%
0.89%
0.75%
(2.738***)

C/P
0.10%
0.77%
0.73%
1.05%
0.98%
0.88%
(3.206***)

DD
0.28%
0.54%
0.51%
0.76%
1.06%
0.78%
(2.355***)

Value-weighted returns
Size
B/M
E/P
0.54%
0.42%
0.25%
0.84%
0.69%
0.64%
0.96%
0.85%
0.82%
0.97%
0.93%
1.07%
0.75%
1.15%
1.26%
0.21%
0.73%
1.01%
(0.73)
(1.98**) (2.91***)

C/P
0.39%
0.53%
0.83%
1.06%
1.32%
0.93%
(2.57***)

DD
0.61%
0.74%
0.89%
0.89%
0.86%
0.25%
(0.68)
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Table 3.1: Returns and Three-Factor Alphas of Large Capitalisation Portfolios formed from One-Way Sorts (continued)

Low
2
3
4
High

Three-Factor Alphas (equal-weighted portfolios)
-0.42%
-0.34%
-0.80%
-0.72%
(-1.730*) (-1.313)
(-2.404**) (-2.248**)
-0.15%
-0.21%
-0.32%
-0.04%
(-0.585) (-1.122)
(-1.741*)
(-0.224)
0.01%
-0.02%
0.22%
-0.06%
(0.040)
(-0.100)
(1.422)
(-0.395)
0.01%
0.08%
0.29%
0.25%
(0.052)
(0.391)
(1.813*)
(1.480)
0.07%
0.05%
0.15%
0.14%
(0.819)
(0.275)
(0.696)
(0.602)

-0.60%
(-2.086**)
-0.21%
(-0.991)
-0.21%
(-1.028)
0.09%
(0.536)
0.38%
(2.286**)

Three-Factor Alphas (value-weighted portfolios)
-0.23%
-0.06%
-0.38%
-0.21%
-0.05%
(-1.000) (-0.314)
(-1.085)
(-0.625)
(-0.171)
0.07%
0.16%
-0.11%
-0.18%
0.09%
(0.310)
(1.052)
(-0.534)
(-0.976)
(0.540)
0.25%
0.19%
0.27%
0.04%
0.08%
(1.338)
(1.304)
(1.782*) (0.266)
(0.399)
0.23%
0.14%
0.37%
0.28%
0.13%
(1.387)
(0.684)
(1.824*) (1.436)
(0.701)
0.09%
0.07%
0.48%
0.46%
0.32%
(1.273)
(0.236)
(2.104**) (1.729*) (1.808*)
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3.5.2 Analysis of Portfolios formed from Two-Way Sorts
In this section, portfolios are formed by double sorting on default risk and value. The
main aim is to test for mispricing when valuation ratios are either too high or too low
relative to default risk. Specifically, the analysis tests for overvaluation amongst growth
stocks with high default risk and for undervaluation amongst value stocks with low
default risk. Growth stocks are defined as those with B/M, E/P and C/P in the bottom
third of stocks in the sample and value stocks as those with B/M, E/P and C/P in the top
third of stocks in the sample. Similarly, high default risk stocks are defined as those
with DD in the bottom third of stocks in the sample and low default risk stocks as those
with DD in the top third of stocks in the sample. There are thus three sorting procedures
carried out to form portfolios: First by sorting on B/M and DD, second by sorting on
E/P and DD, and finally by sorting on C/P and DD. Table 3.2 presents the
characteristics of the portfolios formed in each of the three procedures.

The restrictions imposed on the sample (top 300 by market capitalisation, fully-paid
ordinary shares only, no property or investment trusts and no foreign companies) result
in a relatively small sample compared with other similar studies. Despite the relatively
small number of stocks allocated to nine portfolios, each portfolio contains at least 11.5
stocks on average. The portfolios with the largest number of stocks are those where the
valuation ratio is aligned with default risk; namely those consisting of either low default
risk growth stocks, high default risk value stocks, or stocks with intermediate default
risk and classified as neither value nor growth. For example, the low B/M, high DD (i.e.
low default risk growth) portfolio contains on average 35.8 stocks.
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In contrast, portfolios of stocks where the valuation rather appears misaligned with
default risk contain relatively fewer stocks. For example, the high B/M, low DD (i.e.
high default risk growth) portfolio contains on average only 13.0 stocks. These results
suggest that most stocks have valuation ratios which reflect default risk, for example
high B/M stocks generally have high default risk.

Panels C, D and E demonstrate the similarity of three valuation ratios when they are
used to classify value and growth stocks. Value stocks generally have higher B/M, E/P
and C/P than growth stocks, regardless of whether the value/growth classification is
carried out using B/M, E/P or C/P. Thus it could be argued that the three valuation
ratios are consistent with one another in their ability to differentiate value and growth
stocks. Not surprisingly, however, the greatest spread in portfolio valuation ratios
occurs when the same valuation ratio is used in the portfolio sorting process; for
example the greatest spread in portfolio average B/M ratios occurs with portfolios
sorted by B/M and DD. Thus, the three valuation ratios each contain incremental ability
relative to the others to differentiate between value and growth stocks.

Table 3.3 presents the average equal-weighted returns and pricing errors of portfolios
formed by sorting large capitalisation stocks on DD and each of the valuation ratios.
Table 3.4 following immediately after is similar except the returns and pricing errors are
based upon value-weighted returns. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are both divided horizontally
into three sections, each of which corresponds to one valuation ratio. The section
headed B/M refers to the results for portfolios sorted by B/M and DD, the section
headed E/P refers to the results for portfolios sorted by E/P and DD, and the section
headed C/P refers to the results for portfolios sorted by C/P and DD. The results of most
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interest are those for portfolios of high default risk growth stocks and of low default risk
value stocks; the cells referring to these portfolios are shaded for ease of reference.

The average portfolio returns in Panel A tell a story that is incompatible with a riskbased explanation of stock returns. Regardless of the choice of valuation ratio, the
average equal-weighted monthly return of high default risk growth stocks is negative
over the sample period: -0.59% for low B/M, low DD stocks; -0.27% for low E/P, low
DD stocks; and -0.32% for low C/P, low DD stocks. The corresponding value-weighted
returns are -0.22%, -0.18% and -0.08% respectively. Thus, investors in these types of
stocks were penalised severely rather than rewarded for holding assets that are risky.
Consistent with arguments proposed by Griffin and Lemmon (2002), these results
suggest overvaluation of high default risk growth stocks even before adjusting for risk.
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Large-Capitalisation Portfolios Sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference shares and partly-paid shares are ranked independently on
distance-to-default (DD), book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash earnings-to-price (C/P) at December 31st each year from 1995
to 2007. Each stock is independently assigned to both a DD category and a category based upon B/M, E/P or C/P, and nine portfolios are formed
from the intersections of the DD and B/M, E/P or C/P categories.
The number of stocks in each portfolio and the average DD, B/M, E/P and C/P of the stocks in each portfolio are determined at each portfolio
formation date. The respective figures quoted are the time-series averages of these computations.
B/M
Low
Mid
High
Low
Panel A: Average Number of Stocks
DD Low
13.0
23.0
35.2
24.6
Mid
22.5
29.2
19.9
20.1
High
35.8
19.6
16.9
27.1
Panel B: Average Market Value ($ millions)
DD Low 254,130 535,870 141,830 160,120
Mid
291,500 368,610 295,490 223,170
High 316,200 275,680 168,390 244,970
Panel C: Average B/M
DD Low
0.256
0.517
1.088
0.690
Mid
0.258
0.522
0.928
0.412
High
0.216
0.510
0.909
0.348

E/P
Mid

High

Low

C/P
Mid

High

17.5
24.3
30.2

29.7
27.6
15.0

18.7
18.7
34.4

19.4
26.2
26.4

33.7
27.1
11.5

347,400
300,470
285,920

357,960
415,560
286,580

222,240
213,920
184,780

597,480
418,700
342,040

145,430
305,740
363,740

0.701
0.523
0.495

0.807
0.672
0.584

0.581
0.380
0.408

0.616
0.491
0.455

0.902
0.722
0.615
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Large-Capitalisation Portfolios Sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008 (continued).

Low
Panel D: Average E/P
DD Low
0.028
Mid
0.038
High 0.038
Panel E: Average C/P
DD Low
0.058
Mid
0.063
High 0.056
Panel F: Average DD
DD Low
4.02
Mid
6.70
High 10.82

B/M
Mid

High

Low

E/P
Mid

High

Low

C/P
Mid

High

0.061
0.060
0.057

0.052
0.081
0.064

-0.023
0.011
0.021

0.055
0.054
0.054

0.106
0.097
0.090

-0.029
0.015
0.029

0.054
0.057
0.058

0.090
0.090
0.089

0.108
0.100
0.089

0.147
0.148
0.086

0.040
0.041
0.035

0.104
0.094
0.079

0.190
0.153
0.126

0.001
0.030
0.037

0.086
0.086
0.086

0.201
0.165
0.144

3.83
6.59
10.71

3.46
6.41
12.42

3.48
6.58
11.83

3.87
6.60
11.17

3.73
6.56
9.90

3.52
6.69
12.40

3.82
6.60
10.22

3.69
6.48
9.58
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Table 3.3: Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference shares and partly-paid shares are ranked independently on
distance-to-default (DD), book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash earnings-to-price (C/P) at December 31st each year from 1995
to 2007. Each stock is independently assigned to both a DD category and a category based upon B/M, E/P or C/P, and nine portfolios are formed
from the intersections of the DD and B/M, E/P or C/P categories.
Monthly returns rp,t are calculated for each portfolio for the following 12 months after each portfolio formation date. One-Factor Alphas are the
intercept terms from the time series regression (rp, t − rf, t ) = α p + β p (rm,t − rf, t ) + ε t ; Three-Factor Alphas are the intercept terms from the time series
regression (rp, t − rf, t ) = α p + β p (rm,t − rf, t ) + s p SMB t + h p HML t + ε t

; Four-Factor Alphas are the intercept terms from the time-series

regression (rp, t − rf, t ) = α p + β p (rm,t − rf, t ) + s p SMB t + h p HML t + p p PR1YR t + ε t ; rf,t is the risk-free rate from the SPPR monthly database;
(rm,t − rf, t ) is the market risk premium, calculated as the return of the SPPR value-weighted market portfolio less the risk-free rate; SMBt and
HMLt are calculated in accordance with Fama and French (1993), and PR1YRt is calculated in accordance with Carhart (1997). Significance
levels of t-statistics are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).

B/M
Mid

Low
High
Panel A: Raw Returns
DD Low -0.59%
0.45%
0.73%
Mid -0.22%
0.70%
1.12%
High 0.86%
0.94%
1.12%
Panel B: One-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -1.49%
-0.31%
-0.07%
(-3.315***) (-1.297*) (-0.278)
Mid -1.04%
-0.03%
0.41%
(-2.661***) (-0.169) (2.088**)
High 0.11%
0.22%
0.46%
(0.611)
(1.263)
(2.721***)

Low

E/P
Mid

High

Low

C/P
Mid

High

-0.27%
-0.39%
0.48%

0.65%
0.74%
1.12%

0.83%
1.03%
1.36%

-0.32%
-0.44%
0.71%

0.60%
0.68%
1.07%

0.78%
1.09%
1.45%

-1.13%
(-3.248***)
-1.22%
(-2.685***)
-0.29%
(-1.235)

-0.10%
(-0.389)
0.01%
(0.032)
0.46%
(3.240***)

0.05%
(0.211)
0.31%
(1.676**)
0.67%
(3.307***)

-1.21%
(-3.285***)
-1.28%
(-2.919***)
-0.04%
(-0.206)

-0.13%
(-0.571)
-0.03%
(-0.161)
0.40%
(2.549***)

-0.01%
(-0.039)
0.35%
(1.751**)
0.76%
(3.483***)
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Table 3.3: Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
(continued)
B/M
Low
Mid
High
Panel C: Three-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -1.27%
-0.28% -0.28%
(-2.840***) (-1.095) (-1.142)
Mid -0.79%
-0.01% 0.37%
(-2.093**) (-0.049) (1.787**)
High 0.23%
0.16%
0.46%
(1.240)
(0.873) (2.531***)
Panel D: Four-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -1.08%
-0.14% -0.04%
(-2.470***) (-0.573) (-0.179)
Mid -0.74%
0.06%
0.43%
(-1.932**) (0.305) (2.130**)
High 0.25%
0.12%
0.51%
(1.325*)
(0.652) (2.827***)

E/P

C/P

Low

Mid

High

Low

Mid

High

-0.99%
(-2.887***)
-1.00%
(-2.216**)
-0.16%
(-0.664)

-0.31%
(-1.128)
0.04%
(0.245)
0.46%
(3.064***)

-0.04%
(-0.144)
0.32%
(1.646*)
0.61%
(2.868***)

-1.05%
(-2.933***)
-1.03%
(-2.433***)
0.05%
(0.233)

-0.26%
(-1.046)
-0.04%
(-0.209)
0.41%
(2.497***)

-0.12%
(-0.437)
0.36%
(1.705**)
0.66%
(2.883***)

-0.79%
(-2.427***)
-0.88%
(-1.955**)
-0.15%
(-0.621)

-0.09%
(-0.365)
0.11%
(0.602)
0.49%
(3.262***)

0.14%
(0.610)
0.37%
(1.906**)
0.62%
(2.850***)

-0.88%
(-2.535***)
-0.97%
(-2.272**)
0.06%
(0.301)

-0.08%
(-0.339)
0.03%
(0.165)
0.43%
(2.582***)

0.09%
(0.367)
0.40%
(1.873**)
0.66%
(2.885***)
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Table 3.4: Monthly Value-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
All details are identical to Table 3.3, except portfolio returns are value-weighted rather than equal-weighted.
B/M
Mid

Low
High
Panel A: Raw Returns
DD Low -0.22%
0.66%
1.22%
Mid 0.52%
1.09%
1.04%
High 0.86%
0.90%
1.17%
Panel B: One-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -1.00%
-0.08% 0.49%
(-2.450***) (-0.296) (1.872**)
Mid -0.28%
0.34%
0.31%
(-0.917)
(1.518*) (0.999)
High 0.17%
0.20%
0.49%
(1.053)
(0.796) (2.328**)

Low

E/P
Mid

High

Low

C/P
Mid

High

-0.18%
0.61%
0.38%

0.96%
0.65%
1.19%

0.85%
1.25%
1.46%

-0.08%
0.26%
0.70%

0.92%
0.70%
1.00%

1.04%
1.38%
1.40%

-1.05%
(-2.743***)
-0.21%
(-0.584)
-0.36%
(-1.685**)

0.26%
(1.033)
-0.10%
(-0.495)
0.54%
(3.041***)

0.16%
(0.640)
0.51%
(1.964**)
0.77%
(2.514***)

-0.96%
(-2.502***)
-0.56%
(-1.649*)
-0.04%
(-0.186)

0.22%
(0.870)
-0.01%
(-0.065)
0.36%
(1.822**)

0.32%
(1.263)
0.61%
(2.093**)
0.69%
(1.955**)
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Table 3.4: Monthly Value-Weighted Returns and Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
(continued)
B/M
Low
Mid
High
Panel C: Three-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -0.67%
-0.03% 0.30%
(-1.584*) (-0.093) (1.107)
Mid 0.08%
0.25%
0.01%
(0.265)
(1.068) (0.046)
High 0.34%
0.24%
0.53%
(2.039**) (0.919) (2.361***)
Panel D: Four-Factor Alphas and t-statistics
DD Low -0.64%
0.13%
0.47%
(-1.503*) (0.461) (1.850**)
Mid 0.06%
0.33%
-0.06%
(0.201)
(1.407*) (-0.184)
High 0.28%
0.18%
0.53%
(1.688**) (0.662) (2.327**)

Low

E/P
Mid

Low

C/P
Mid

High

High

-0.87%
(-2.160**)
-0.05%
(-0.140)
-0.19%
(-0.863)

0.11%
(0.427)
-0.01%
(-0.027)
0.67%
(3.741***)

0.21%
(0.810)
0.36%
(1.373*)
0.81%
(2.498***)

-0.72%
(-1.793**)
-0.30%
(-0.869)
0.10%
(0.490)

0.17%
(0.657)
0.04%
(0.192)
0.49%
(2.444***)

0.33%
(1.225)
0.36%
(1.236)
0.67%
(1.802**)

-0.68%
(-1.740**)
-0.09%
(-0.243)
-0.23%
(-1.051)

0.20%
(0.782)
-0.02%
(-0.112)
0.69%
(3.809***)

0.29%
(1.150)
0.41%
(1.576*)
0.71%
(2.211**)

-0.59%
(-1.477*)
-0.28%
(-0.803)
0.04%
(0.176)

0.25%
(0.973)
0.06%
(0.277)
0.50%
(2.463***)

0.41%
(1.573*)
0.37%
(1.252)
0.60%
(1.605*)
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In contrast, the average monthly equal-weighted returns of low default risk value stocks
were exceptionally high over the sample period: 1.12% for high B/M, high DD stocks;
1.36% for high E/P, high DD stocks and 1.45% for high C/P, high DD stocks. The
corresponding value-weighted returns are 1.17%, 1.46% and 1.40% respectively. For
each of the three valuation ratios, no other portfolio displayed higher average returns
than the low default risk value stock portfolio (although the value-weighted portfolios
exhibit one exception to this observation). Thus, contrary to risk-based explanations for
stock returns and consistent with mispricing, investors are rewarded for holding assets
with low levels of default risk.

Panel B presents the alphas of the portfolios after adjusting for risk using the CAPM. In
the case of high default risk growth stocks, the equal-weighted CAPM alphas are all
large, negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. As expected, the alphas are
larger in absolute value than the raw returns: -1.49% for low B/M, low DD stocks; 1.13% for low E/P, low DD stocks and -1.21% for low C/P, low DD stocks. The
corresponding alphas for value weighted returns are -1.00%, -1.05% and -0.96%. Thus
risk-adjustment using the CAPM strengthens the case for overpricing of high default
risk growth stocks and weakens the case for a risk-based explanation.

In the case of low default risk value stocks, the equal-weighted CAPM alphas are large,
positive and statistically significant: 0.46% for high B/M, high DD stocks; 0.67% for
high E/P, high DD stocks and 0.76% for high C/P, high DD stocks. All the equalweighted alphas are statistically significant at the 1% level. The corresponding valueweighted alphas are 0.49%, 0.77% and 0.69% respectively, and are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Panels C and D provide similar evidence in favour of mispricing based upon the FamaFrench three-factor model and the Carhart four-factor model. Using equal-weighted
returns, the results are similar to those obtained in Panel B. All the high default risk
growth portfolios have monthly alphas close to -1% and all are statistically significant at
the 1% level. All the low default risk value portfolios have monthly alphas close to
0.5% and all are statistically significant at the 1% level.

The evidence that high default risk growth stocks are overpriced is somewhat weaker in
the case of value-weighted returns. For low B/M, low DD portfolios the hypothesis of
no mispricing can only be rejected (in favour of overpricing) at the 10% level of
significance, using either the Three-Factor or Four-Factor Model. However, the alphas
of low E/P, low DD portfolios are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level
in both models. For low default risk value portfolios, the hypothesis of no mispricing
can be rejected (in favour of underpricing) at the 5% level or better except in the case of
the high C/P, high DD portfolio where it can be rejected at the 10% level. Using either
the Three-Factor or Four-Factor model, the monthly value weighted alphas of high
default risk growth stocks are all in the range -0.87% to -0.59%, while the monthly
value-weighted alphas of low default risk value stocks are all in the range 0.53% to
0.81%.

The pricing errors of low default risk value stocks and of high default risk growth stocks
are not due solely to the value premium or to the effect of default risk; the combined
effect of both DD and the relevant valuation ratio is required to generate pricing errors
of the magnitude shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. For example, the three-factor alpha of the
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low B/M, low DD portfolio (-1.27% equal weighted and -0.67% value-weighted) is
larger in absolute value than the three-factor alphas of the low B/M quintile in Table 3.1
(-0.34% equal-weighted and -0.06% value-weighted) and the low DD quintile (-0.60%
equal-weighted and -0.05% value-weighted). Similarly, the three-factor alphas of the
high B/M, high DD portfolio (0.46% equal-weighted and 0.53% value-weighted) are
larger than the three-factor alphas of the high B/M quintile (0.05% equal-weighted and
0.07% value-weighted) and the high DD quintile (0.38% equal-weighted and 0.32%
value-weighted). This result holds for all three valuation ratios and applies equally well
to a comparison of the t-statistics of the alphas. Thus, the anomaly is not a de-facto
value premium or default risk effect; it requires the interaction of both value and default
risk.

In summary, the evidence presented in this section is consistent with the mispricing of
large capitalisation Australian stocks when valuation ratios are either too high or too
low relative to default risk. Even before adjusting for risk using any of the three assetpricing models, the negative average returns of high default risk growth portfolios
defies explanation on a reward-for-risk basis, and is thus consistent with overvaluation.
Following risk-adjustment using the above three models, the evidence is still consistent
with the overvaluation of high default risk growth stocks and the undervaluation of low
default risk value stocks. However, it must be borne in mind that the evidence based
upon the alphas from any asset pricing model might equally well indicate model
misspecification. This particular concern is addressed in the next section.
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3.5.3 Inconsistency with Rational Pricing and Market Efficiency
In this section, additional evidence is presented to determine whether the results in
Section 3.5.2 are most likely attributable to mispricing or to asset pricing model
misspecification. First, the pricing of portfolio risk rather than default risk is examined
as a possible explanation for the raw returns and pricing errors observed for high default
risk growth stocks and low default risk value stocks. An observation that high default
risk growth stocks have lower portfolio risk than low default risk value stocks would be
consistent with rational pricing, and thus strengthen the case that the significant pricing
errors reported in Section 3.5.2 are due to model misspecification rather than to
mispricing. This section therefore compares high default risk growth and low default
risk value portfolios on the basis of reward-to-risk (Sharpe Ratio), volatility and residual
volatility from the CAPM, and conducts F-tests of equality of the latter two. Table 3.5
presents the results.

The Sharpe ratio is the excess return of a portfolio per unit of total risk (standard
deviation). However, expressing portfolio performance on a per-unit of total risk basis
provides no support for a rational pricing explanation of the results of this study. The
low default risk value portfolios all have Sharpe ratios far in excess of the Sharpe Ratio
for the market, while the high default risk growth portfolios all have large negative
Sharpe ratios. Similarly, there is no evidence in Table 3.5 that low default risk value
portfolios have higher risk than high default risk growth portfolios, whether risk is
measured as total volatility or as residual volatility from a market model. On the
contrary, the high default risk growth portfolios are uniformly riskier than the low
default risk value portfolios, a result that applies to both total volatility and to residual
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volatility, to all of the valuation ratios, and to both equal-weighted and value-weighted
returns. In most cases, the difference in portfolio risk between high default risk growth
stocks and low default risk value stocks is statistically significant, the exception being
value-weighted returns where C/P is the valuation ratio. In summary, rational pricing of
portfolio risk cannot explain the large positive returns and pricing errors of low default
risk value portfolios or the large negative returns and pricing errors of high default risk
growth stocks.
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Table 3.5: Risk and Performance Measures for High Default Risk Growth and Low Default Risk Value Portfolios
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference shares and partly-paid shares are ranked independently on
distance-to-default (DD), book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash earnings-to-price (C/P) at December 31st each year from 1995
to 2007. Each stock is independently assigned to both a DD category and a category based upon B/M, E/P or C/P, and nine portfolios are formed
from the intersections of the DD and B/M, E/P or C/P categories. The following table shows portfolio performance and risk measures for the
high default risk growth and the low default risk value portfolios, based on equal-weighted returns (Panel A) and value-weighted returns (Panel
B). The F-statistics test the equality of the applicable volatility measures of the high default risk growth and low default risk value portfolios,
based on a given valuation ratio (either B/M, E/P or C/P).
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Returns
Low B/M High B/M Low E/P High E/P Low C/P High C/P
Low DD High DD Low DD High DD Low DD High DD
Sharpe Ratio
0.076
-0.128
0.195
-0.103
0.226
-0.103
0.238
Annualised Volatility
12.12% 28.12%
11.89%
24.02% 14.06% 25.87%
14.58%
F-statistic
2.3654
1.7080
1.7737
(p-value)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Annualised Residual Volatility
19.35%
7.33%
14.96%
8.73%
15.96%
9.33%
F-statistic
2.6405
1.7129
1.7096
(p-value)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Market

Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Low B/M High B/M Low E/P High E/P Low C/P High C/P
Low DD High DD Low DD High DD Low DD High DD
Sharpe Ratio
0.076
-0.099
0.181
-0.085
0.205
-0.072
0.171
Annualised Volatility
12.12% 23.31%
13.80%
25.53% 17.10% 25.73%
19.29%
F-statistic
1.6892
1.4927
1.3338
(p-value)
(0.001)
(0.007)
(0.037)
Annualised Residual Volatility
17.60%
9.12%
16.53% 13.14% 16.59%
15.16%
F-statistic
1.9304
1.2578
1.0940
(p-value)
(0.000)
(0.077)
(0.288)
Market
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Next, evidence is examined that determines whether the pricing error results are
consistent with market inefficiency. Given that a high DD score implies the information
in recent share prices is relatively favourable, the high returns of high DD value stocks
imply return continuation and therefore underreaction. Similarly, as a low DD score
implies unfavourable information embedded in recent share prices, the low returns of
low DD growth stocks are also consistent with underreaction. The main testable
hypotheses in this analysis are therefore that high DD value stocks do indeed have
previous good price performance and favourable information relative to other value
stocks, while low DD growth stocks do indeed have previous poor price performance
and unfavourable information relative to other growth stocks. This section therefore
compares the previous returns and earnings-related information of firms sorted by
default risk and valuation ratios. All of the dependent variables in this analysis are
computed at June 30th each year, six months before portfolio formation, thus the
information represented by these variables is information prior to classification by value
and default risk. Table 3.6 presents the results of this comparison.

It is immediately apparent from Panel A in Table 3.6 that prior returns vary inversely
with each valuation ratio, and thus growth stocks in general have higher recent returns
than value stocks. However, returns also increase with DD across all B/M, E/P and C/P
categories, and thus high DD value stocks have higher prior returns than other value
stocks, and low DD growth stocks have lower prior returns than other growth stocks.
Therefore, the stocks argue to be undervalued (low default risk value stocks) have high
returns before (as well as after) portfolio formation relative to other value stocks,
consistent with underreaction. Similarly, the stocks argued to be overvalued (high
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default risk growth stocks) have low returns before (as well as after) portfolio formation
relative to other growth stocks, also consistent with underreaction.

Panel B presents the prior change in earnings-per-share (EPS), deflated by share price.
Within each B/M, E/P and C/P category (except for the intermediate B/M category), the
change in EPS increases monotonically with DD. Thus high DD firms have EPS that are
increasing at a faster rate than low DD firms. The difference between low DD growth
stocks and high DD value stocks is particularly striking. High DD value stocks have the
largest prior increase in EPS than any other category including high DD growth stocks,
a result that holds regardless of whether B/M, E/P or C/P is the valuation ratio.
Similarly, low DD growth stocks have the largest prior decrease in EPS of any category
when E/P or C/P is the valuation ratio; stocks with low DD and low B/M have a change
in EPS that is statistically indistinguishable from that of stocks with low DD and high
B/M. In any event, the results from Panel B support the contention that low default risk
value stocks have improving earnings relative to other stocks, while high default risk
growth stocks have deteriorating earnings relative to other stocks.

Panel C presents the variation in profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA),
across portfolios. Consistent with Fama and French (1995), profitability is inversely
related to B/M. As E/P and C/P are both computed from current earnings, the increase
in profitability that Panel C displays with respect to these two variables is
unremarkable. However, of more interest is the observation that ROA increases
monotonically with DD in each B/M, E/P and C/P category, a result that is highly
statistically significant. Thus, low default risk value stocks are more profitable than
other value stocks and high default risk growth stocks are less profitable than other
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growth stocks. However, when value/growth is measured using E/P and C/P the
evidence of underreaction from Panel C is much stronger – high default risk growth
stocks have the lowest ROA of any other category and low default risk value stocks
have the highest ROA of any other category. Thus, the high returns of undervalued (low
default risk value) stocks can be viewed as a delayed reaction to high profitability,
whilst the low returns of overvalued (high default risk growth) stocks can be viewed as
delayed reaction to low profitability.

The same conclusion applies when considering the change in ROA (∆ROA) from the
previous year, rather the actual level of ROA (Panel D). ∆ROA measures the historical
change in profitability. As was the case with ROA, ∆ROA also increases monotonically
with DD in each B/M, E/P and C/P category, and this variation is statistically significant
for all stocks except those with high B/M. Thus, high DD firms have a larger ∆ROA
than other firms in the same value/growth category. Amongst the portfolios sorted by
E/P and C/P, low default risk value firms have the largest ∆ROA of any category, and
high default risk growth firms have the smallest ∆ROA of any category (a result similar
to that in Panel C). Thus, Panel D supports the contention that the high returns of
undervalued stocks are a delayed reaction to an increase in profitability, whilst the low
returns of overvalued stocks are a delayed reaction to a decrease in profitability.

In summary, the results of this section demonstrate that high default risk growth stocks
have relatively poor price and earnings performance prior to portfolio formation, while
low default risk value stocks have relatively good price and earnings performance prior
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to portfolio formation 25. The fact that the poor (good) price performance of high default
risk growth (low default risk value) stocks continues after portfolio formation is
consistent with an underreaction to earnings-related information.

25

At the very least, it is confirmed that DD effectively captures an element of financial distress related to
profitability.
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Table 3.6: Other Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008
Stocks are assigned to portfolios based upon their ranking by DD, B/M, E/P and C/P as per Table 3.2. Prior Six-Month Return is the return over
the six months from January to June in the year of portfolio formation. Price-Deflated Change in Earnings-per-Share (EPS) is earnings-per-share
from the latest financial statement as at June 30th in the year of portfolio formation, less earnings-per-share from the previous fiscal year divided
by share price at June 30th. Return on Assets (ROA) is net income divided by total assets from the latest financial statement as at June 30th in the
year of portfolio formation; the Change in ROA is ROA from the latest financial statement as at June 30th in the year of portfolio formation, less
ROA from the previous fiscal year. KW χ2 is the Kruskal-Wallis test statistic of equality of group medians, with figures in parenthesis denoting
the p-value of a test that the group medians are identical.
B/M
Low
Mid
High
Panel A: Median Prior Six-Month Return
DD Low
7.74%
0.77%
-7.39%

E/P
KW χ

2

Low

45.65
-4.92%
(0.000)
Mid
9.96%
11.75% 5.35%
13.67
11.25%
(0.001)
High
15.68% 12.66% 6.94%
35.46
14.36%
(0.000)
90.44
17.46
89.79
KW χ2 112.09
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.000)
Panel B: Median Price-Deflated Change in Earnings-per-Share
DD Low
0.00002 0.00010 -0.00001 3.39
-0.00018
(0.184)
Mid
0.00011 0.00010 0.00006 2.49
-0.00000
(0.288)
High
0.00011 0.00010 0.00023 15.81
0.00007
(0.000)
2.32
15.26
14.35
KW χ2 42.28
(0.000) (0.314) (0.000)
(0.001)

C/P

Mid

High

-1.19%

-1.75%

9.67%

8.58%

11.78%

9.59%

68.06
(0.000)

94.55
(0.000)

0.00007

KW χ

2

Low

16.19
1.63%
(0.000)
5.87
13.60%
(0.053)
0.65
14.25%
(0.724)
142.79
(0.000)

Mid

High

KW χ2

2.32%

-6.15%

8.96%

7.83%

9.78%

12.02%

18.78
(0.000)
8.71
(0.013)
18.64
(0.000)

45.28
(0.000)

42.99
(0.000)

0.00013 29.25
-0.00005 0.00009 0.00007
(0.000)
0.00010 0.00021 73.83
0.00002 0.00011 0.00016
(0.000)
0.00012 0.00033 106.00 0.00009 0.00011 0.00034
(0.000)
10.56
80.20
25.38
5.43
75.54
(0.005) (0.000)
(0.000)
(0.066) (0.000)

13.58
(0.001)
28.89
(0.000)
38.31
(0.000)
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Table 3.6: Other Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Valuation Ratios and Distance-to-Default, 1996-2008 (continued)
Panel C: Median Return on Assets (ROA)
DD Low
4.46% 3.17% 2.83% 161.82
(0.000)
Mid
6.91% 5.08% 4.29% 29.30
(0.000)
High
9.15% 6.47% 4.47%
6.62
(0.036)
KW χ2 120.47 120.53 74.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel D: Median Change in ROA (∆ROA)
DD Low
0.00% -0.03% -0.24% 3.23
(0.199)
Mid
0.18% 0.11% 0.17% 1.50
(0.472)
High
0.66% 0.42% 0.22% 3.63
(0.163)
13.37
1.25
KW χ2 17.87
(0.000) (0.001) (0.535)

0.79%

3.05%

4.91%

2.49%

5.05%

6.67%

4.90%

7.00%

8.56%

129.59 234.91 157.34
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-1.30% -0.02% 0.12%

92.08
(0.000)
177.99
(0.000)
274.21
(0.000)

0.55%

2.61%

4.28%

2.68%

5.34%

6.02%

5.88%

7.36%

7.37%

27.29
(0.000)
103.72
(0.000)
224.86
(0.000)

109.87 246.59 196.97
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

16.90
-0.67% -0.05%
(0.000)
-0.65% 0.16% 0.47% 50.54
-0.42% 0.08%
(0.000)
0.25% 0.29% 0.93% 70.53
0.24% 0.38%
(0.000)
11.16
14.33
27.87
16.26
24.67
(0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)

0.09%
0.45%
0.85%

9.99
(0.007)
34.85
(0.000)
29.59
(0.000)

24.96
(0.000)
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3.6 Summary and Conclusion
This study has made three contributions to the Australian asset-pricing literature. First,
the absence of a size effect and the existence of a large and statistically significant value
premium amongst large-capitalisation stocks are documented. Second, and more
importantly, all of the static asset-pricing models tested (the CAPM, Fama-French
three-factor model and Carhart four-factor model) are rejected when confronted with a
hypothesis that high default risk growth stocks are overvalued while low default risk
value stocks are undervalued. Finally, evidence is presented that the rejection of the
above models is most likely due to market inefficiency, in the form of underreaction to
earnings-related information. Each of these three contributions is now discussed in more
detail.

3.6.1 Cross-sectional Determinants of the Returns of Large Australian
Stocks
A relatively minor contribution of this study is to examine the cross-sectional
determinants of stock returns specifically amongst large capitalisation stocks. Whilst
Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) study the role of size and B/M in the returns of
Australian stocks, they do so for the whole market-capitalisation spectrum, and the
relevance of their inferences to a specific large capitalisation universe is somewhat
diminished. For example, whilst both of these studies argue the evidence for a value
premium in Australia is weak, it is clear that this conclusion is due to small stocks. Both
studies tabulate a direct relationship between B/M and returns amongst the largest size
quintiles but no relationship between B/M and returns amongst the smallest size
quintiles. Both studies also report a return premium for small size, but only for the
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smallest size quintiles. This study also finds similar patterns of returns in the sample
tested (1996-2008) by sorting the full market capitalisation spectrum on size and each of
the valuation ratios (B/M, E/P and C/P), but these results are confined to Appendix 3A
to conserve space.

However, when one-way sorts are conducted on size, B/M, E/P and C/P based on a
large-capitalisation universe, this study finds no statistically significant evidence that
size plays a role in stock returns, but does find evidence of a value premium that is
economically and statistically significant. This contrasts with the conclusions of
Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) that evidence of a value premium in Australia
is weak. Based on the sorts on DD, this study also finds evidence of a negative default
risk premium if returns are equal-weighted, (consistent with Campbell et al., 2008),
however this evidence is not statistically significant for value-weighted returns
(consistent with Gharghori et al., 2007).

3.6.2 Value, Default Risk and Stock Returns
The main contribution is the study of mispricing as a function of valuation ratios and
default risk amongst large Australian stocks. The contention that high default risk
growth stocks are overvalued whilst low default risk value stocks are undervalued is
supported by the pattern of raw returns amongst value and default risk sorted portfolios,
and by the tests of the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model and Carhart four-factor
model. In the sample tested, high default risk growth stocks have negative returns on
average, whilst low default risk value stocks have very high returns on average. Whilst
conventional tests of asset pricing models test the hypothesis that portfolio alphas are
zero against a null that the alphas are non-zero, the alternative hypothesis of this study
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imposes a constraint on the sign of the alpha (namely negative in the case of high
default risk growth stocks and positive in the case of low default risk value stocks).
Consistent with this hypothesis, the alphas of low default risk value stocks are indeed all
positive, while the alphas of high default risk growth stocks are indeed all negative.
This result holds regardless of whether B/M, E/P or C/P are used to form portfolios,
regardless of whether returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted, and regardless of
the choice of asset pricing model. In all but a small number of these variations, the
alphas are significant at the 5% level or better. The alphas that are not significant at the
5% level are significant at the 10% level. The tests thus overwhelmingly reject all of the
asset pricing models in favour of the mispricing hypothesis. The finding that high
default risk growth stocks are overvalued is thus consistent with Griffin and Lemmon
(2002), while the finding of that low default risk value stocks are undervalued is
consistent with Piotroski (2000).

The conclusions on the adequacy of the above asset pricing models differ somewhat
from Gharghori et al. (2007), who argue that the Fama-French three-factor model
adequately explains the returns of portfolios sorted by size, B/M and default risk.
Gharghori et al. (2007) report a significantly positive three-factor alpha for their large,
low default risk value portfolio which is consistent with the findings of this study, but
they also report an insignificant three-factor alpha for their large, high default risk
growth portfolio which is inconsistent with the results of this study. However, there are
a number of key methodological differences between the current study and theirs. This
study follows Fama and French (1992) and other related studies by excluding property
trusts, investment trusts and the shares of foreign companies, for which the B/M
calculation may be problematical, and by calculating the book value of equity as the
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actual book value from each company’s balance sheet less preference capital and
including balance sheet taxes. In contrast, Gharghori et al. (2007) do not exclude
property trusts, investment trusts and the shares of foreign companies, and employ Net
Tangible Assets for book equity. Furthermore, Gharghori et al. (2007) conduct three-bythree-by-three sorts on default risk, B/M and size, whereas this study conducts three-bythree sorts on default risk and each respective valuation ratio, but limits the sample to
large stocks only.

3.6.3 Inconsistency with Rational Pricing and Market Efficiency
Whilst all of the asset pricing models tested are rejected, the possibility cannot be
rejected that the results in this regard are due to model misspecification, and not to
mispricing. However, the results are inconsistent with the rational pricing of risk and
therefore present substantial problems to alternative model specifications, at least of the
static kind 26. The portfolios of overvalued (high default risk growth) stocks not only
have high default risk, but also have high portfolio risk; in contrast, the portfolios of
undervalued (low default risk value) stocks not only have low default risk, but also have
low portfolio risk. The difference in risk between overvalued and undervalued portfolios
is statistically significant and applies to both total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Therefore,
an alternative rational asset pricing model needs to explain why it has been possible in
this study to form portfolios with high risk and low returns and portfolios with low risk
and high returns. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the presence
of idiosyncratic risk poses a substantial deterrent to arbitrageurs and is therefore an
important reason why some types of mispricing persist. The results of this study are
therefore consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) thesis with regard to high
26

It is left as a task for future research to determine whether conditional asset pricing models (see for
example, Durack et al., 2004) can explain the results of this study.
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default risk growth stocks, and demonstrate it is extremely difficult to form welldiversified portfolios of these types of stocks.

The results are also inconsistent with market efficiency because they imply a gross
underreaction to information. For example, overvalued (high default risk growth) stocks
exhibit poor prior returns and declining earnings. Their low DD score indicates that
investors responded somewhat to the prior poor performance, as DD incorporates
information in recent share prices. However, the poor returns continue after the portfolio
formation date, indicating the initial market reaction was an underreaction. Similarly,
the high post portfolio-formation returns of undervalued (low default risk value) stocks
are a continuation of their prior earnings and return performance. Low default risk value
stocks in the sample have increasing earnings and prior returns that are higher than that
of other value stocks, and their high DD score indicates that investors responded
somewhat to the relatively good prior performance.

The fact that the returns of mispriced stocks generally maintain the same direction
before and after portfolio formation suggests an important role for underreaction and
momentum in the value premium. The results are therefore consistent with Bird and
Casavecchia (2007b), who find that momentum is a key variable in the identification of
overvalued growth stocks and of undervalued value stocks, and contrasts with some
behavioural finance theories that attempt to model the value premium as an overreaction
(Barberis et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). It is therefore
plausible that the high default risk growth stocks and low default risk value stocks in
this study correspond respectively to high trading-volume losers and low tradingvolume winners in the momentum life cycle of Lee and Swaminathan (2000). In the
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momentum life cycle, high trading-volume losers were once high trading-volume
winners that became expensive growth stocks, while low volume winners were once
low volume losers that became neglected value stocks. However, momentum is not the
driving force behind the results of this study, as the evidence of mispricing withstands
the Carhart four-factor model which includes momentum as a factor. In concluding, the
study of mispricing and behavioural explanations of the value premium still offers
fruitful opportunities for further research, particularly with regard to the previouslyunderemphasised role of underreaction.
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APPENDIX 3A
Returns of Portfolios Formed by Two-Way Sorts on Size (Market
Capitalisation) and Value (Book-To-Market, Earnings-To-Price and
Cash Flow-To-Price), Based on All Listed Stocks
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Table 3A.1: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Book-to-Market
and Size, 1996-2008
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference
shares, partly-paid shares and negative book-equity firms are ranked independently on
market capitalisation (size) and book-to-market (B/M) at December 31st each year from
1995 to 2007. Each stock is independently assigned to both a size quintile and a B/M
quintile, and 25 portfolios are formed from the intersections of the size and B/M
quintiles. Market capitalisation is calculated as the product of share price and number of
shares outstanding. The size variable is the market capitalisation as at December 31st.
Book-to-market is the ratio of the book value of equity to market capitalisation as at
June 30th. Book value of equity is balance sheet shareholders’ equity excluding
preference shares and including balance sheet provisions for deferred taxes, taken from
the latest balance sheet available in the 12 months ending June 30th in the year of
portfolio formation. Equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly returns are calculated
for each portfolio for the following 12 months after each portfolio formation date.
Panels A and B are based on the time-series averages of these monthly returns. Panels C
to E are based on the pooled time-series and cross-sectional average of the
characteristic. One-sided significance levels of t-statistics are indicated by *** (1%), **
(5%) and * (10%).
Panel A: Average Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
B/M
Small
3.26%
4.29%
4.05%
3.73%
2
1.00%
0.63%
1.11%
1.35%
3
-0.76%
0.74%
0.70%
0.53%
4
-0.68%
0.20%
0.36%
0.81%
Big
0.16%
0.52%
0.79%
0.77%
Small- 3.10%
3.78%
3.26%
2.96%
Big
t3.665*** 3.639*** 4.138*** 3.698***
statistic
Panel B: Average Monthly Value-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
B/M
Small
2.45%
3.90%
3.55%
2.45%
2
0.18%
0.17%
0.91%
0.78%
3
-0.77%
1.01%
0.79%
0.73%
4
-0.07%
0.47%
0.64%
1.17%
Big
0.72%
0.70%
0.94%
0.91%
Small- 1.73%
3.20%
2.62%
1.54%
Big
t1.664** 2.792*** 2.730*** 1.711*
statistic

137

High
B/M
3.95%
1.25%
1.20%
0.88%
1.70%
2.26%

HighLow
0.69%
0.25%
1.96%
1.56%
1.54%

t-statistic

HighLow
0.05%
0.79%
2.07%
1.21%
1.45%

t-statistic

1.201
0.421
3.997***
3.809***
4.321***

2.970***

High
B/M
2.50%
0.97%
1.30%
1.14%
2.16%
0.34%
0.402

0.066
1.319
4.109***
2.843***
2.950***

Table 3A.1: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Book-to-Market
and Size, 1996-2008 (continued).
Panel C Average Number of Stocks
Low
2
3
B/M
Small
32.3
24.8
30.7
2
31.9
37.8
42.7
3
41.5
45.4
46.1
4
54.8
50.1
51.6
Big
65.3
67.8
54.9

4
44.3
52.1
48.6
48.0
32.8

High
B/M
77.7
60.4
47.9
27.5
13.0

Panel D Average Market Capitalisation ($ millions)
Low
2
3
4
B/M
Small
345
381
371
367
2
1,062
1,099
1,044
1,022
3
2,735
2,917
2,805
2,681
4
9,644
9,521
9,339
9,295
Big
254,553 383,027 287,630 161,185

High
B/M
350
1,022
2,577
8,913
93,265

Panel E: Average B/M
Low
2
B/M
Small
0.188
0.454
2
0.197
0.442
3
0.201
0.435
4
0.196
0.437
Big
0.200
0.454

High
B/M
2.778
2.408
2.381
1.729
1.643

3

4

0.690
0.701
0.684
0.693
0.676

1.045
1.051
1.043
1.031
0.986
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Table 3A.2: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Earnings-to-Price
and Size, 1996-2008
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference
shares and partly-paid shares are ranked independently on market capitalisation (size)
and earnings-to-price (E/P) at December 31st each year from 1995 to 2007. Each stock
is independently assigned to both a size quintile and an E/P quintile, and 25 portfolios
are formed from the intersections of the size and E/P quintiles. Market capitalisation is
calculated as the product of share price and number of shares outstanding. The size
variable is the market capitalisation as at December 31st. Earnings-to-price is the ratio of
earnings before abnormal items to market capitalisation as at June 30th. Earnings before
abnormal items excludes outside equity interests and preference dividends, and is taken
from the latest profit and loss statement available in the 12 months ending June 30th in
the year of portfolio formation. Equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly returns are
calculated for each portfolio for the following 12 months after each portfolio formation
date. Panels A and B are based on the time-series averages of these monthly returns.
Panels C to E are based on the pooled time-series and cross-sectional average of the
characteristic. One-sided significance levels of t-statistics are indicated by *** (1%), **
(5%) and * (10%).
Panel A: Average Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
E/P
Small
4.27%
3.51%
4.01%
2.06%
2
0.91%
1.03%
1.42%
0.93%
3
-0.40% 0.18%
0.38%
0.92%
4
0.21%
-0.88%
-0.30%
0.31%
Big
n/a
-0.84%
-0.17%
0.87%
Smalln/a
4.35%
4.18%
1.19%
Big
t-statistic n/a
4.813*** 5.662*** 1.323*
Panel B: Average Monthly Value-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
E/P
Small
2.71%
2.47%
3.76%
1.64%
2
0.29%
0.54%
0.85%
0.77%
3
-0.50% 0.15%
0.63%
0.95%
4
0.15%
-0.60%
0.37%
0.54%
Big
n/a
-0.79%
0.20%
0.92%
Smalln/a
3.26%
3.56%
0.72%
Big
t-statistic n/a
3.359*** 3.921*** 0.768
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High E/P HighLow
3.39%
-0.88%
0.83%
-0.08%
1.36%
1.75%
1.00%
0.79%
0.94%
n/a
2.45%

t-statistic
-1.172
-0.148
3.201***
1.347*
n/a

3.988***

High
E/P
2.40%
0.70%
1.59%
1.25%
1.21%
1.19%
1.665**

HighLow
-0.31%
0.41%
2.09%
1.10%
n/a

t-statistic
-0.380
0.743
3.708***
1.836**
n/a

Table 3A.2: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Earnings-to-Price
and Size, 1996-2008 (continued).
Panel C Average Number of Stocks
Low E/P 2
3
Small
113.2
59.2
26.6
2
71.6
72.9
41.7
3
35.5
62.1
55.9
4
11.7
32.6
58.3
Big
1.6
7.1
51.6

4
8.4
14.1
27.9
59.9
123.6

High E/P
26.2
33.5
52.8
71.4
50.5

Panel D Average Market Capitalisation ($ millions)
Low E/P 2
3
4
Small
339
358
386
397
2
972
1,057
1,081
1,113
3
2,577
2,615
2,807
2,937
4
7,383
8,877
9,323
10,235
Big
37,330
67,048
189,923 300,212

High E/P
354
1,127
2,888
9,343
347,017

Panel E: Average E/P
Low E/P 2
Small
-1.016
-0.128
2
-0.849
-0.123
3
-0.762
-0.114
4
-0.629
-0.104
Big
-0.712
-0.088

High E/P
0.499
0.590
0.164
0.136
0.112

3
-0.022
-0.020
-0.016
-0.010
0.012

4
0.054
0.053
0.057
0.057
0.054
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Table 3A.3: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Cash Flow-toPrice and Size, 1996-2008
All stocks excluding property trusts, foreign companies, investment trusts, preference
shares and partly-paid shares are ranked independently on market capitalisation (size)
and cash flow-to-price (C/P) at December 31st each year from 1995 to 1997. Each stock
is independently assigned to both a size quintile and a C/P quintile, and 25 portfolios are
formed from the intersections of the size and C/P quintiles. Market capitalisation is
calculated as the product of share price and number of shares outstanding. The size
variable is the market capitalisation as at December 31st. Cash flow-to-price is the ratio
of cash earnings to market capitalisation as at June 30th. Cash earnings is earnings
before abnormal items, depreciation and amortisation and excludes outside equity
interests and preference dividends, taken from the latest profit and loss statement
available in the 12 months ending June 30th in the year of portfolio formation. Equalweighted and value-weighted monthly returns are calculated for each portfolio for the
following 12 months after each portfolio formation date. Panels A and B are based on
the time-series averages of these monthly returns. Panels C to E are based on the pooled
time-series and cross-sectional average of the characteristic. One-sided significance
levels of t-statistics are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).
Panel A: Average Monthly Equal-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
C/P
Small
4.34% 3.45%
3.33%
3.24%
2
0.69% 1.43%
0.96%
0.64%
3
-0.72% 0.27%
0.36%
0.90%
4
-0.06% -0.94%
-0.07%
0.60%
Big
n/a
-0.15%
0.12%
0.82%
Smalln/a
3.60%
3.21%
2.42%
Big
t-statistic n/a
4.134*** 4.039*** 2.969***
Panel B: Average Monthly Value-Weighted Returns
Low
2
3
4
C/P
Small
2.72%
2.66%
3.14%
2.75%
2
-0.03% 0.90%
0.51%
0.33%
3
-1.08% 0.18%
0.67%
1.03%
4
-0.31% -0.86%
0.42%
0.87%
Big
n/a
-0.06%
0.37%
0.94%
Smalln/a
2.72%
2.77%
1.81%
Big
t-statistic n/a
2.917*** 2.512*** 1.876**

141

High C/P HighLow
3.42%
-0.93%
1.07%
0.38%
1.50%
2.22%
0.84%
0.90%
0.98%
n/a
2.44%

t-statistic
-1.203
0.679
4.123***
1.440*
n/a

3.690***

High
C/P
2.32%
0.88%
1.81%
1.17%
1.23%
1.09%
1.500*

HighLow
-0.40%
0.91%
2.88%
1.48%
n/a

t-statistic
-0.484
1.717**
5.530***
2.391***
n/a

Table 3A.3: Returns and Characteristics of Portfolios Sorted by Cash Flow-toPrice and Size, 1996-2008 (continued).
Panel C Average Number of Stocks
Low C/P 2
3

4

Small
2
3
4
Big

11.4
15.9
31.9
63.5
111.3

112.1
73.4
35.1
11.6
1.3

56.6
71.1
61.6
35.6
8.9

24.2
34.0
49.6
60.6
65.7

Panel D Average Market Capitalisation ($ millions)
Low C/P 2
3
4
Small
2
3
4
Big

341
975
2,572
7,567
39,007

390
1,120
2,893
9,618
218,472

377
1,071
2,980
10,156
343,985

Panel E: Average C/P
Low C/P 2

3

4

Small
2
3
4
Big

0.003
0.003
0.006
0.017
0.038

0.099
0.104
0.101
0.100
0.092

-0.863
-0.719
-0.625
-0.426
-0.528

358
1,058
2,640
8,468
57,991

-0.098
-0.092
-0.087
-0.073
-0.057
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High
C/P
29.3
39.4
55.9
62.6
47.2

High
C/P
348
1,098
2,746
9,306
249,129

High
C/P
1.577
0.661
0.291
0.245
0.208

CHAPTER 4: ANALYST OPTIMISM AND THE
ERRORS-IN-EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS:
AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF
DEFAULT RISK

4.1 Abstract
Contrary to the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, a previous study by Doukas et al.
(2002) reports an inverse relationship between analyst earnings forecast optimism (that
is, forecast errors) and book-to-market (B/M) that is highly statistically significant. This
study confirms a similar but substantially weaker relationship in Australian data over
the period from 1995 to 2007. However this relationship is completely subsumed by a
much stronger relationship between analyst optimism and default risk. Similarly, little
variation is found in forecast errors with either earnings-to-price (E/P) or cash flow-toprice (C/P) independent of default risk, with the exception of very large forecast errors
for firms with negative E/P and C/P. It is also confirmed that consensus earnings
forecasts are more optimistic for high default risk growth stocks than they are for low
default risk value stocks; a result not inconsistent with the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis considering the evidence in Chapter 3 that these two groups of stocks are
overvalued and undervalued respectively. However, the results of this study in general
support underreaction to financial distress (in the form of either high default risk or
negative earnings) and not the overreaction to or extrapolation of previous earnings
growth as posited by Lakonishok et al. (1994), and are somewhat consistent with the
momentum life cycle of Lee and Swaminathan (2000).
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4.2 Introduction
The errors-in-expectations hypothesis states that investors are overly optimistic
regarding the future prospects of, and consequently pay prices that are too high for,
growth stocks. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that the expected future growth rates
implied by valuation multiples (with which value and growth stocks are commonly
defined) are not only unrealistic, but bear little resemblance to actual growth rates
realised after the measurement of the multiples, a contention supported by evidence that
earnings growth itself is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict (La Porta,
1996; Chan et al., 2003). Similarly, evidence that a substantial proportion of the value
premium occurs close to company announcement dates is consistent with the idea that
investors are informed by earnings surprises that their initial growth expectations might
be too optimistic (La Porta et al., 1997; Skinner and Sloan, 2002).

Whilst the evidence from long-term growth rates and from announcement period returns
supports the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, some conflicting evidence has emerged
from analysts’ current year earnings forecasts. Specifically, the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis predicts that these forecasts should be more optimistic for growth stocks
than for value stocks, but the actual data from analysts’ forecasts contradicts this
prediction. In particular, Doukas et al. (2002) find that the forecast error (the amount by
which forecast earnings-per-share (EPS) exceeds actual EPS) increases directly with
B/M, the opposite result predicted by the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. Mian and
Teo (2004) also find analysts’ earnings forecasts appear to be more optimistic for value
stocks than for growth stocks in Japan. Thus, there appears to be consistent evidence
that analysts’ current-year earnings forecasts are systematically more optimistic for
value stocks than for growth stocks, a conclusion inconsistent with the errors-in144

expectations hypothesis. These results have not yet been confirmed for the Australian
stock market, and this is the first objective of the study.

However, a potentially important variable omitted from the above studies is financial
distress, because high B/M stocks generally have higher default risk and other measures
of distress relative to low B/M stocks (Fama and French, 1995; Dichev, 1998; Chen and
Zhang, 1998; Piotroski, 2000). Whilst Doukas et al. (2002) control for size in their
experiments and Chan and Chen (1991) argue that size is a proxy for distress, the Fama
and French (1995) evidence indicates that distress is more closely related to B/M than to
size. Thus, it could be argued that the relationship between analyst optimism and B/M
uncovered in Doukas et al. (2002) does not adequately control for distress. There are
two reasons why the failure to adequately control for distress might be a critical
oversight in tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis that are based on analysts’
forecast errors.

First, evidence from the analyst inefficiency literature suggests that analyst optimism
might be directly related to distress. Analysts’ forecasts are widely conjectured to be
inefficient with regard to the incorporation of relevant public information, as forecast
errors have been shown to be correlated with variables such as prior changes in EPS and
prior returns (Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Abarbanell
and Lehavy, 2003; Cohen and Lys, 2003). Analyst inefficiency makes it highly
plausible that analysts’ forecasts do not adequately reflect a firm’s state of financial
health or distress, and that forecast errors are correlated with distress-risk.
Consequently, the relationship between forecast errors and B/M reported in Doukas et
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al. (2002) might arise because of analyst inefficiency in recognising financial distress
and because of the relationship between B/M and financial distress.

Second, studies have found significant cross-sectional variation in returns when stocks
are sorted by distress/financial health indicators and valuation ratios such as B/M. In
particular, evidence in Piotroski (2000), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Mohanram
(2005), and Bird and Casavecchia (2007a) suggests that financially healthy value stocks
are undervalued while distressed growth stocks are overvalued. Chapter 3 confirmed
this result for Australian stocks sorted by default risk and each of three valuation ratios
(B/M, E/P and C/P). As the errors-in-expectations hypothesis is a model of mispricing it
is therefore most relevant to mispriced stocks, which on the basis of the above studies
include distressed growth stocks and financially healthy value stocks. Thus, to the
extent that mispricing is related to financial distress and B/M, tests of the errors-inexpectations hypothesis should be conditioned on both of these variables. This
argument is similar to that used by Bartov and Kim (2004), but they identify mispriced
stocks in terms of B/M and accruals rather than in terms of B/M and distress. The main
purpose of the study is therefore to determine how the distribution of analysts’ forecast
errors varies with valuation ratios (including B/M, E/P and C/P) and distress (which is
measured in terms of default risk). This study is therefore the first, to the author’s
knowledge, to test the errors-in-expectations hypothesis using analysts’ earnings
forecasts and controlling for distress.

This study investigates how analysts’ forecast errors, and by implication analyst
forecast optimism, vary with distress and valuation ratios. The main predictions of the
study are that forecast errors increase with distress, and consequently that analysts’
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earnings forecasts are more optimistic for overvalued (that is, distressed growth) stocks
than they are for undervalued (that is, financially healthy value) stocks, a result not
inconsistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. In the course of the analysis the
manner in which forecast errors vary with valuation ratios whilst simultaneously
controlling for distress is also investigated. Following Chapter 3, three valuation
measures are employed for robustness purposes, namely B/M, E/P and C/P; and distress
is defined in terms of default risk. As was the case in Chapter 3, the default risk
indicator is distance-to-default (DD), developed by Moody’s KMV and previously used
in value premium studies by Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Gharghori et al. (2007). DD
is arguably a more accurate predictor of default risk than models based upon accounting
ratios such as Altman’s z-score or Ohlson’s O-score, and is otherwise preferable
because it implicitly emphasises the information in current market values rather than
historical data (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Gharghori et al., 2006b).

The sample consists of the largest 300 stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX); the study is therefore the first, to the author’s knowledge, to test the errors-inexpectations hypothesis employing Australian consensus earnings forecasts. Although
analyst forecasts are generally available only for large stocks, the sample is explicitly
limited to the largest 300 stocks for consistency with Chapter 3. The tests of mispricing
in Chapter 3 were based on the largest 300 ASX-listed stocks primarily because,
amongst this group of stocks, size (market capitalisation) was found to be a relatively
unimportant determinant of stock returns whilst the value premium was found to be
economically and statistically significant. As was discussed in Chapter 3, a benefit of
limiting the sample to large stocks is an improvement in the overall accuracy of the
calculation of DD because thinly traded stocks are excluded from the sample. Another
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benefit is the exclusion of size from the tests, allowing the analysis to concentrate solely
on the effects of valuation ratios and default risk.

The results of this study can be summarised as follows. As expected, analysts’ earnings
forecasts are overly optimistic for high default risk firms; however overly-optimistic
forecasts are also observed for firms with negative values of E/P and C/P (in other
words for loss-reporting firms); two findings that are consistent with analyst
underreaction to distress. A similar but much weaker relationship is found between
forecast errors and B/M than that reported by Doukas et al. (2002); however this (weak)
relationship is completely subsumed by that between forecast errors and default risk.
Similarly, there is little or no relationship between forecast errors and positive values of
either E/P or C/P that cannot be explained by underreaction to default risk. Statistically
significant evidence is also provided that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more
optimistic for high default risk growth stocks than for low default risk value stocks; a
result not inconsistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, given the results of
Chapter 3 showing distressed growth-stocks to be overvalued and healthy value stocks
to be undervalued. However, this finding appears to be a consequence of the main
finding of analyst underreaction to distress, and is somewhat more difficult to explain
in terms of extrapolation of or overreaction to past earnings growth. As was the case in
Chapter 3, the results are argued to be more consistent with the momentum life cycle
proposed by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) than with overreaction-based explanations of
the value premium.

Analysts’ forecast errors are found to be much smaller and the results much weaker in
the second half of the sample period than in the first. However, this observation is
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attributable to the generally lower default risk observed in the latter part of the sample
period, and the fact that firms classified as high default risk by an annual sorting
procedure over this time are actually lower in default risk than similarly classified firms
in the first half of the sample period. Taking into account the inter-year variation in the
general level of default risk however, a very strong relationship between forecast error
and default risk is still observed; furthermore, loss-making firms have large forecast
errors throughout the sample period. Therefore the main finding that analysts underreact
to distress is relatively unaffected by sub-sample variation.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.3 discusses the data and
methodology. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results. The results are discussed in
detail in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 concludes.

4.3 Data and Methodology
The data for this study are from five sources. Financial data are sourced from the Aspect
Huntley Datalink database, from which are calculated book value of equity, earnings,
cash earnings and debt. Monthly market data are sourced from the AGSM SPPR
database, from which market capitalisation, used in the computation of the valuation
ratios and to measure size, and stock returns are calculated. Daily market capitalisation
data are sourced from SIRCA 27, which is used in the calculation of DD. The Reserve
Bank of Australia website is used to obtain short-term interest rate data for the
calculation of DD. Finally, analyst earnings forecast data is obtained from the I/B/E/S

27

Data supplied by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on
behalf of the Australian Securities Exchange.
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international summary database 28. The financial data span the period from July 1994 till
June 2006, the daily market capitalisation data span the period from November 1994 till
November 2007, and the monthly market data span the period from January 1996 till
December 2008. The I/B/E/S data covers forecast issued in the period from 1995 to
2006, and the earnings forecasts themselves are for fiscal year-ends covering the period
from 1996 to 2007. The first four data sources are identical to the data sources used in
Chapter 3, namely the Aspect Huntley Datalink database, the AGSM SPPR database,
SIRCA and the Reserve Bank of Australia website. To be included in the sample, firms
must have fully-paid ordinary shares listed on the ASX and be ranked in the top 300 by
market capitalisation. From the resulting list of companies, property trusts, investment
trusts and shares of foreign or dual-listed companies are excluded.

Consistent with Doukas et al. (2002), analyst optimism is measured by the error in the
consensus current year earnings forecast, or simply the ‘forecast error’. The forecast
error is the standardised (that is, deflated) difference between a company’s actual EPS
and the consensus EPS forecast for the same fiscal year-end issued prior to the earnings
announcement. Consistent with similar research, for example Skinner and Sloan (2002)
and Doukas et al. (2002), the median EPS forecast is taken as the consensus. The
median is used rather than the mean because it is less sensitive to the influence of
outliers. Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Doukas et al. (2002) report their main results in
terms of price-standardised forecast errors, although Doukas et al. (2002) also report
results for other deflators, including the absolute value of the median forecast. As Mian
and Teo (2004) point out, deflating by share price has the disadvantage of biasing the
forecast errors of growth stocks towards zero relative to the forecast errors of value
28

I/B/E/S Summary History data accessed via the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) website, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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stocks, owing to the fact that growth stocks tend to have higher price-to-earnings ratios
than value stocks. Therefore, for robustness purposes, the analysis is performed firstly
using price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) and secondly using forecast errors deflated
by the absolute value of the consensus forecast (FE/|F|), defined respectively by
equations (4.1) and (4.2). However, the tenor of the results is unaffected by the choice
of forecast error variable.

FE/P =

FE/ F =

(FEPS

y, y − m

− AEPS y )

(4.1)

Py − m

(FEPS

y, y − m

− AEPS y )

(4.2)

FEPS y,y − m

In equations (4.1) and (4.2), FEPS y,y − m is the consensus forecast EPS for fiscal year-end
y available m months prior to fiscal year-end y; AEPS y is the actual EPS for fiscal
year-end y; and Py-m is the stock price at the time of the forecast, which is obtained from
the I/B/E/S dataset. The calculation follows Doukas et al. (2002) by using the consensus
forecast available eight months prior to the fiscal year-end, in other words with m=8, in
order to ensure that analysts had access to the previous year’s annual report when
issuing their forecasts and to ensure that the results are not affected by look-ahead bias.
Whilst Doukas et al. (2002) standardise forecast errors using the stock price at the
beginning of the fiscal year, the calculation here deviates slightly by using the stock
price at the time of the forecast to calculate FE/P. This is done because it results in a
slightly larger number of forecast error observations than would have been possible had
the beginning-of-year stock price been used. To ensure the forecast used is a consensus,
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only forecast observations where three or more analysts contributed estimates are
employed.

The method for calculation of the control variables (B/M, E/P, C/P and DD) is as
described in Section 3.4, with the exception of the timing of the calculations. In this
study all the control variables are calculated at the end of every month, in order to sort
stocks into value/growth and default risk categories at the end of each month. The
ranking is performed each month because fiscal year-ends vary amongst companies.
Although all firms are included in the monthly sorts, the relevant value/growth and
default risk classification assigned to a particular forecast error observation is the
classification that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast, in
other words four months prior to the date of the forecast. For January year-end firms,
the relevant value/growth and default risk classifications are those that were current as
at January in the year preceding the forecast. For February year-end firms, the relevant
B/M and default risk classification are those that were current as at February in the year
preceding the forecast, and so on. Similarly, each firm’s ranking by market
capitalisation is also determined at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast; the
ranking by market capitalisation being used to determine the firms included in the
sample. 29

The financial data for B/M, E/P, C/P and DD (book value of equity, earnings, cash flow
and current and non-current liabilities respectively) are taken from the latest financial
statements up until the month of calculation. The value of market capitalisation used in
29

The classification methodology is similar in spirit to that used by Doukas et al. (2002), although the
latter is somewhat confusing and impractical to follow exactly as specified. The authors state that “the
sorting procedure was conducted annually at the end of the fiscal year preceding the analysts’ forecasts”
(italics added, p.2149). As not all firms have the same fiscal year end, it is technically impossible to sort
all firms on an annual basis at the end of the fiscal year.
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the denominator of B/M, E/P and C/P is the ordinary share price times the number of
shares outstanding at the end of the month of calculation, while the daily market
capitalisation data used for the calculation of DD cover the 12-month period up until the
end of the month of calculation. As there is a four-month lag between the timing of
calculation of all control variables and the relevant analyst forecast for a company,
analysts will have had sufficient time to observe and react to these variables and to the
data underlying their calculation.

For robustness purposes, the analysis is repeated after splitting the sample into two
roughly equal sub-periods. The first sub-period contains all forecast error observations
for fiscal year-ends that fall in the years 1996 to 2001, while the second sub-period
contains all forecast error observations for fiscal year-ends that fall in the subsequent
years. As the forecasts used in this study are taken from eight months prior to fiscal
year-end, the first sub-period pertains to forecasts that were current on or before April
2001. The second sub-period thus pertains to forecasts that were current on or after May
2001, which are for fiscal year-ends that fall in the period from 2002 onwards.

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Properties of Analysts’ Forecast Errors
Table 4.1 presents some summary statistics for analysts’ forecast errors over the full
sample period and the two (non-overlapping) sub-periods. Regardless of whether
forecast errors are standardised by stock price or by the absolute value of the consensus
forecast, both the mean and median forecast errors are greater than zero, consistent with
a tendency of analysts to overestimate current year earnings. The distributions of the
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two forecast error variables are also highly skewed to the left and fat-tailed, and the
Jarque-Bera statistic rejects the hypothesis of normality at better than a 0.1% level of
significance. It is apparent that the mean forecast error is influenced by outliers (even
after winsorising at the 99.5 percentiles), as its value is always close to or greater than
the 75th percentile. The analysis to follow therefore concentrates on median values
rather than mean values (as did Doukas et al., 2002), as medians are not influenced by
the magnitude of outliers.

It is also apparent from Table 4.1 that analysts’ current year forecasts were less
optimistic in the second half of the sample period. The median FE/P fell from 0.0041 in
the first sub-period to 0.0002 in the second, while the median FE/|F| fell from 0.0642 to
0.0032. In both cases, the Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the
sub-period medians are equal at better than a 0.1% level of significance.

The inter-quartile range also narrowed from 0.0242 to 0.0149 (a decrease of 38%) for
FE/P and from 0.0372 to 0.02513 (a decrease of 33%) for FE/|F|. The distribution of
forecast errors thus became narrower in the second sub-period, a result due to a large
decrease in the number of large positive forecast errors: the 75th percentile decreased
from 0.0210 to 0.0089 and from 0.3181 to 0.1459 for FE/P and FE/|F| respectively.
There were, however, a greater number of large negative forecast errors, as the 25th
percentile decreased from -0.0032 to -0.0060 and from -0.0591 to -0.1054 for FE/P and
FE/|F| respectively. Thus, analysts’ forecasts became less optimistic in the latter half of
the sample period, as forecast errors became closer to zero; and somewhat more
accurate as forecast error distributions became more tightly dispersed around the
median.
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The final three columns of Table 4.1 relate to analyst dispersion (the coefficient of
variation of consensus forecasts, not the dispersion of forecast errors). Analyst
dispersion is a widely-used measure of analyst disagreement regarding a company’s
future earnings. It is apparent that analyst dispersion decreased substantially in the
second sub-period, from a median value of 0.0888 to 0.0634, a decrease of nearly 30%.
The 25th and 75th percentile values also decreased by a similar proportion, and therefore
the decrease in dispersion generally applies to the whole cross-section of companies
covered by analysts. Thus, not only were forecasts less optimistic and more accurate
over the second sub-period, there was lower dispersion in consensus forecasts; in other
words there was less disagreement amongst analysts.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Forecast Errors
Forecast errors and analyst dispersion are calculated from consensus earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts made eight months prior to
each company’s fiscal year-end where at least three analysts have contributed estimates. FE/P is the difference between the median
EPS forecast and reported EPS deflated by the share price at the time of the forecast, while FE/|F| is the difference between the median
EPS forecast and reported EPS deflated by the absolute value of the median forecast. Analyst dispersion is the standard deviation of
EPS forecasts for a company divided by the absolute value of the median EPS forecast. The Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistic and associated
p-value test the null hypothesis that the median value of each variable is identical over the two sub-periods. The first sub-period
corresponds to forecasts issued during or before April 2001 and the second sub-period corresponds to forecasts issued during or after
May 2001. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
FE/P
FE/|F|
Analyst Dispersion
All
19952001:5All
19952001:5All
19952001:52001:4
2007
2001:4
2007
2001:4
2007
n
1805
936
869
1805
936
869
2054
1006
1048
Mean
0.0199
0.0229
0.0166
0.2753
0.3170
0.2304
0.1405
0.1667
0.1153
Median
0.0015
0.0041
0.0002
0.0254
0.0642
0.0032
0.0749
0.0888
0.0634
25th percentile
-0.0046
-0.0032
-0.0060
-0.0822
-0.0591
-0.1054
0.0461
0.0561
0.0394
75th percentile
0.0155
0.0210
0.0089
0.2297
0.3181
0.1459
0.1357
0.1579
0.1141
Inter-quartile
range
0.0201
0.0242
0.0149
0.3119
0.3772
0.2513
0.0896
0.1018
0.0747
Standard
Deviation
0.0995
0.0929
0.1062
1.4456
1.3078
1.5801
0.2914
0.3192
0.2597
Skewness
7.49
7.24
7.62
7.23
6.95
7.30
7.75
6.73
9.34
Kurtosis
68.99
68.72
67.74
64.88
66.39
61.33
72.95
56.04
102.84
Jarque-Bera
344378
176637
160156
303749
164234
130904
439337
125505
450529
statistic
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
39.53
40.20
96.41
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
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4.4.2 Results Based Upon One-Way Sorts
Table 4.2 presents the median price-deflated forecast errors of portfolios formed by sorting
stocks on each of the four variables: B/M, E/P, C/P and DD. Focusing attention on the
results for the B/M-sorted portfolios, the results are somewhat consistent with Doukas et al.
(2002). Ignoring the small number of negative B/M firms, forecast errors increase with
B/M; this observation is evident over the full sample period and most pronounced in the
first sub-period. However, the variation amongst portfolio medians is not statistically
significant and much smaller (along with the magnitudes of the median forecast errors) in
the second sub-period. Although the relationship between B/M and forecast errors is much
weaker in the sample used in this study than in Doukas et al. (2002), the results
nevertheless fail to support the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, as analysts’ current year
forecasts are not more optimistic for low B/M firms than for high B/M firms.

The median forecast errors of E/P and C/P-sorted portfolios in Table 4.2 exhibit one
dominant feature: the very large forecast errors of firms with negative E/P and C/P. The
median forecast errors of these portfolios are generally an order of magnitude larger than
the median forecast errors of positive E/P and C/P portfolios. For example, the median
forecast error of the negative E/P portfolio over the full sample period is 0.0360, 18 times
larger than the next largest median (0.0020 for the low E/P portfolio). Similarly, the median
forecast error of the negative C/P portfolio of 0.0512 is nearly 15 times larger than the next
largest C/P portfolio median. The finding that negative E/P and C/P portfolios have much
larger forecast errors than all other portfolios applies to the full sample period as well as to

157

each of the two sub-periods. Thus, analysts tend to be too optimistic for loss-reporting
firms, a result consistent with the finding of Easterwood and Nutt (1999) that analysts tend
to underreact specifically to poor earnings performance.

Apart from the large forecast errors of negative E/P and C/P firms, there is some weak
evidence of a U-shaped pattern in median (price-deflated) forecast errors. The median FE/P
decreases from 0.0020 for the low E/P portfolio to 0.0008 for E/P portfolio three, and then
increases to 0.0018 for the high E/P portfolio. A similar pattern is observed for the
portfolios sorted by C/P. The U-shape is somewhat disrupted by the high E/P portfolio in
the first sub-period (Panel B); and consistent with Table 4.1 the median FE/P of all the
positive E/P and C/P portfolios are much closer to zero in the second sub-period (Panel C)
than in the first. The variation in median FE/P across positive E/P portfolios is statistically
significant at 10%, while across positive C/P portfolios it is statistically significant at 5%.
The variation is not statistically significant in the first sub-period for positive C/P portfolios
and not statistically significant in the second sub-period for positive E/P portfolios. Thus,
the evidence of variation in FE/P with E/P and C/P excluding negative E/P and C/P firms is
not strong; in any event this evidence is not consistent with the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis as the relationship between FE/P and either E/P or C/P is not monotonic.

Finally, there is a clear inverse relationship in Table 4.2 between DD and forecast errors,
evident over the full-sample period (Panel A) and the first sub-period (Panel B). Median
FE/P decreases from 0.0039 for the low DD portfolio to the 0.0000 for the high DD
portfolio in Panel A and from 0.0088 to 0.0000 in Panel B. Thus, there is evidence that
analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic for high default risk firms than they are for
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low default risk firms. In Panel C however, the variation in median FE/P across DD
portfolios is not statistically significant if the small number of negative DD firms are
excluded; a result consistent with the result from Table 4.1 that forecast errors in general
were much closer to zero in the second sub-period. Thus, the relationship between default
risk and analyst optimism is much stronger in the first sub-period (when analyst optimism
was relatively high) than in the second sub-period (when analyst optimism was relatively
low).

The above discussion and Table 4.2 relate to the variation in median forecast errors across
various portfolios, where forecast errors were deflated by stock price. However, as Mian
and Teo (2004) point out, the choice of stock price as a deflator might potentially bias the
forecast errors of growth stocks downward relative to those of value stocks, because growth
(value) stocks generally have high (low) stock prices relative to book value and earnings.
Therefore, the analysis of Table 4.2 is repeated using the second forecast error variable,
namely forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of the consensus forecast. The results
are presented in Table 4.3.

The only material difference between the results from Table 4.2 and those from Table 4.3
pertains to portfolios sorted by E/P. In Table 4.3 the median FE/|F| of the low (positive) E/P
portfolio is quite large relative to the median FE/|F| of the other positive E/P portfolios.
Thus, there is some evidence that analysts’ current year earnings forecasts are more
optimistic for growth stocks than for value stocks, consistent with the errors-inexpectations hypothesis. This result is not as clear in the second sub-period (Panel C) where
the median FE/|F| of the high E/P portfolio exceeds that of the low E/P portfolio; and not
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evident amongst the C/P-sorted portfolios where once again a U-shaped pattern in FE/|F| is
found. Other results from Table 4.3 are consistent with Table 4.2; namely a direct but
statistically insignificant relationship between forecast errors and B/M, a fairly strong
inverse relationship between DD and forecast errors, and fairly large forecast errors
observed for negative E/P and C/P portfolios.

In summarising, the main findings in this section are that analysts overestimate current year
earnings for negative E/P and C/P firms, and that analyst optimism increases with default
risk. Although a direct relationship is observed between B/M and forecast errors consistent
with Doukas et al. (2002), this relationship is not statistically significant. Excluding
negative E/P and C/P firms, there is no conclusive evidence that analyst optimism is greater
for low E/P and low C/P firms than it is for high E/P and high C/P firms.
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Table 4.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price (FE/P) for Portfolios
sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price and Distance-toDefault
This table shows the variation in price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) with book-to-market
(B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P), cashflow-to-price (C/P) and distance-to-default (DD). FE/P
is calculated as per Table 4.1; B/M, E/P, C/P and DD are calculated each month according
to Section 4.3. For each independent variable (B/M, E/P, C/P and DD), companies are
either assigned to a negative (<0) portfolio if the variable is negative or else sorted into
quintile portfolios if the variable is positive. The relevant portfolio grouping for a forecast
error observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the
forecast. Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistics and associated p-values test the null hypothesis of no
variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios; when annotated with ‘(+ive
classifications)’ the test excludes observations in the negative (<0) portfolio. The number of
observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
Portfolio

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
Median n
0.0117
6
0.0004 286
0.0005 366
0.0017 416
0.0018 405
0.0036 326
4.59
(0.4678)
3.83
(0.4295)

Independent Variable
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n
0.0360 88 0.0512 41 0.1051 14
0.0020 276 0.0021 235 0.0039 385
0.0009 307 0.0000 325 0.0022 370
0.0008 363 0.0006 410 0.0030 373
0.0010 389 0.0027 384 0.0010 354
0.0018 381 0.0035 409 0.0000 292
60.83
55.78
29.88
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
8.17
(0.0857)

11.16
(0.0249)

23.39
(0.0001)

Panel B: 1995-2001:4

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n Median n
0.0609
2
0.0266 51 0.0446 19 0.0000
9
0.0014 138 0.0062 147 0.0036 129 0.0088 195
0.0029 187 0.0025 167 0.0023 161 0.0064 196
0.0043 234 0.0028 182 0.0035 217 0.0064 191
0.0070 200 0.0058 189 0.0044 194 0.0039 181
0.0066 175 0.0018 199 0.0079 215 0.0000 153
8.01
26.19
16.66
27.25
(0.1556)
(0.0001)
(0.0052)
(0.0001)
5.27
(0.2606)

10.09
(0.0390)
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3.28
(0.5120)

27.48
(0.0000)

Table 4.2 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price (FE/P) for Portfolios
sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price and Distance-toDefault (continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n Median n
-0.0012 4
0.0435 37 0.0726 22 0.6382
5
0.0001 148 0.0006 129 0.0007 106 0.0016 190
-0.0004 179 0.0000 140 -0.0010 164 0.0002 174
0.0000 182 0.0000 181 -0.0012 193 0.0000 182
0.0004 205 -0.0010 200 0.0011 190 -0.0007 173
0.0017 151 0.0018 182 0.0010 194 0.0000 139
3.79
43.17
45.13
19.38
(0.5796)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0016)
3.82
(0.4312)

4.71
(0.3179)
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12.85
(0.0120)

5.49
(0.2406)

Table 4.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for
Portfolios (FE/|F|) sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price
and Distance-to-Default
This table shows the variation in forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of the
median forecast (FE/|F|) with book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P), cashflow-toprice (C/P) and distance-to-default (DD). FE/|F| is calculated as per Table 4.1; all other
details are as per Table 4.2. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by
‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
Portfolio

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
Median n
0.0833
6
0.0125 286
0.0096 366
0.0284 416
0.0263 405
0.0541 326
2.79
(0.7320)
2.79
(0.5943)

Independent Variable
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n
0.6411 88 0.7216 41 0.6396 14
0.0665 276 0.0584 235 0.0581 385
0.0171 307 0.0000 325 0.0313 370
0.0148 363 0.0096 410 0.0435 373
0.0133 389 0.0332 384 0.0194 354
0.0232 381 0.0448 409 0.0000 292
63.15
51.91
27.80
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
12.19
(0.0160)

10.94
(0.0272)

22.21
(0.0002)

Panel B: 1995-2001:4

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n Median n
0.1157
2
0.4918 51 0.4152 19 0.0000
9
0.0428 138 0.1842 147 0.0800 129 0.0940 195
0.0473 187 0.0476 167 0.0510 161 0.0983 196
0.0659 234 0.0443 182 0.0492 217 0.0934 191
0.0921 200 0.0669 189 0.0639 194 0.0632 181
0.0877 175 0.0200 199 0.0723 215 0.0000 153
3.55
33.43
13.05
24.62
(0.6163)
(0.0000)
(0.0229)
(0.0002)
3.46
(0.4846)

16.60
(0.0023)
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2.62
(0.6234)

24.76
(0.0001)

Table 4.3 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for
Portfolios (FE/|F|) sorted by Book-to-Market, Earnings-to-Price, Cash Flow-to-Price
and Distance-to-Default (continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007

<0
Low
2
3
4
High
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(+ive classifications)
(p-value)

B/M
E/P
C/P
DD
Median n Median n Median n Median n
-0.0519 4
0.8220 37 1.0979 22 0.8220
5
0.0021 148 0.0130 129 0.0264 106 0.0229 190
-0.0064 179 0.0007 140 -0.0193 164 0.0028 174
0.0002 182 0.0000 181 -0.0202 193 0.0000 182
0.0058 205 -0.0152 200 0.0178 190 -0.0097 173
0.0262 151 0.0232 182 0.0169 194 0.0000 139
3.56
39.04
43.81
17.36
(0.6150)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0039)
3.47
(0.4818)

3.38
(0.4967)
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11.76
(0.0193)

4.96
(0.2914)

4.4.3 Results Based Upon Two-Way Sorts on B/M and DD
The forecast errors of portfolios sorted by both value and default risk will now be analysed.
In this section the results obtained from sorting on B/M and DD and for FE/P are discussed;
the results for FE/|F| are qualitatively similar and are therefore consigned to Appendix 4A
(Table 4A.1) for brevity. Given the relatively small numbers of negative B/M firms, the
convention of similar studies is followed by excluding these observations. Given the small
number of negative DD firms, a departure is made from Tables 4.2 and 4.3 by not creating
a separate portfolio grouping for these observations 30.

Table 4.4 presents the results for the sorts on B/M and DD. If the effect of DD is ignored,
there is somewhat stronger evidence of a direct relationship between B/M and FE/P in
Table 4.4 (with three B/M portfolios) than in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 (with five B/M portfolios).
Reading across the ‘Total’ rows, the variation in FE/P with B/M is only marginally
statistically insignificant at the 10% level in Panel A and only marginally statistically
insignificant at the 5% level in Panel B. Thus, the statistical significance of the relationship
between FE/P and B/M appears to be sensitive to the number of B/M portfolios. However,
any variation in Table 4.4 is largely due to the three cells that lie on the off diagonal and
which have relatively large numbers of observations: the low DD high B/M portfolio, the
mid DD mid B/M portfolio, and the high DD low B/M portfolio. As default risk increases
with B/M across these portfolios and given the results from Tables 4.2 and 4.3, it is likely

30

The number of observations is not the same in Table 4 as in Tables 2 and 3 because negative B/M firms are
excluded and because DD is undefined for some observations.
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that the variation in FE/P with B/M is mostly attributable to the variation in FE/P with
default risk (that is, with DD). This assertion will now be tested.

Reading across the rows corresponding to the ‘Low’, ‘Mid’ and ‘High’ DD portfolios, the
variation in FE/P with B/M after controlling for DD can be ascertained. Amongst the low
DD portfolios in Panel A, the largest median FE/P occurs for the low B/M portfolio
(0.0071) while the lowest occurs for the mid B/M portfolio (0.0011). In contrast, the largest
median FE/P amongst the mid DD portfolios occurs for the mid B/M portfolio (0.0034)
while the lowest occurs for the high B/M portfolio (0.0005). Thus, there is no consistent
relationship between FE/P and B/M after controlling for default risk using DD.
Furthermore, the variation in FE/P with B/M is statistically significant only in the row
corresponding to the low DD portfolios, and not in the rows corresponding to the mid DD
portfolio, the high DD portfolio and the ‘Total’ category. Panels B and C similarly fail to
reveal any consistent relationship between FE/P and B/M after controlling for default risk.

Reading down each column in Table 4.4, the variation in FE/P with DD after controlling
for B/M can be ascertained. Here there is clearer evidence of systematic variation in FE/P.
In the low B/M, high B/M and Total columns (Panel A), the largest median FE/P occurs for
the low DD portfolios (0.0071, 0.0058 and 0.0039 respectively). In the low B/M, mid B/M
and Total columns, the smallest median FE/P occurs for the high DD portfolios (0.0000,
0.0001 and 0.0001 respectively), whilst in the high B/M column the mid and high DD
portfolios have similar median FE/P (0.0005 and 0.0011 respectively). Therefore with one
or two exceptions the median FE/P is inversely related to DD (and thus directly related to
default risk) after controlling for B/M.
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The variation in FE/P with DD is much stronger over the first sub-period (Panel B) than the
second (Panel C) and highly statistically significant in both the full sample (Panel A) and
the first sub-period. Unlike Panel A, FE/P decreases monotonically with DD (that is,
increases with default risk) in every B/M column in Panel B. However, there is relatively
little variation in FE/P in Panel C, consistent with the earlier result from Table 4.1 that
forecast errors were generally much closer to zero in the second sub-period than in the first.

The median forecast errors of overvalued and undervalued firms will now be compared.
Based on the results of Chapter 3, overvalued firms include growth stocks with high default
risk whilst undervalued firms include value stocks with low default risk. Thus the low DD
low B/M portfolio in Table 4.4 contains overvalued firms while the high DD high B/M
portfolio contains undervalued firms. Panel A demonstrates that the median FE/P of
overvalued firms (0.0071) is greater than the median FE/P of undervalued firms (0.0011)
over the full sample period. The Mann-Whitney rank-sum statistic confirms that this
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference is more pronounced in
the first sub-period (Panel B) but not evident in the second sub-period (Panel C), consistent
with the general decrease in forecast errors in this sub-period noted earlier in the study.
Thus, the conjecture that analysts are more optimistic towards overvalued growth stocks
than they are towards undervalued value stocks is confirmed in Panels A and B, but not in
Panel C.
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Table 4.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price (FE/P) for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted
Portfolios
This table shows the variation in price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) amongst different combinations of book-to-market (B/M) and
distance-to-default (DD) classifications. FE/P is calculated as per Table 4.1; B/M and DD are calculated each month according to
Section 4.3. Companies sorted into three portfolios by B/M and independently into three portfolios by DD. The relevant portfolio
grouping for a forecast error observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis
χ2 statistics and associated p-values test the null hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios. The MannWhitney rank sum statistic tests the null hypothesis that the median forecast error of the low B/M, low DD portfolio equals that of the
high B/M, high DD portfolio. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD
Portfolio
Low
Median
Low
0.0071

n
60

Median
0.0011

n
216

Median
0.0058

n
339

Median
0.0039

n
618

Mid

0.0017

172

0.0034

282

0.0005

181

0.0020

637

High

0.0000

284

0.0001

179

0.0011

69

0.0001

533

Total

0.0004

516

0.0015

677

0.0033

589

0.0015

1788

B/M Portfolio
Mid

High

Kruskal14.85
9.29
Wallis χ2
(0.0006)
(0.0096)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=2.2052 p-value 0.0274
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13.02
(0.0015)

Total

28.22
(0.0000)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
7.03
(0.0297)
4.57
(0.1020)
0.81
(0.6657)
4.46
(0.1075)
40.68
(0.0000)

Table 4.4 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel B: 1995 to 2001:4
DD
Portfolio
Low
Median
Low
0.0212

n
30

Median
0.0059

n
108

Median
0.0114

n
180

Median
0.0091

n
319

Mid

0.0048

83

0.0055

161

0.0062

83

0.0055

328

High

0.0000

150

0.0018

92

-0.0002

36

0.0002

278

Total

0.0014

263

0.0041

361

0.0076

299

0.0040

925

B/M Portfolio
Mid

High

Kruskal21.95
6.55
Wallis χ2
(0.0000)
(0.0378)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=2.8203 p-value 0.0048

169

7.76
(0.0206)

Total

33.00
(0.0000)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
5.73
(0.0571)
0.65
(0.7224)
2.17
(0.3373)
5.82
(0.0545)
40.25
(0.0000)

Table 4.4 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel C: 2001:5 to 2007
DD
Portfolio
Low
Median
Low
0.0018

n
30

Median
0.0000

n
108

Median
0.0035

n
159

Median
0.0010

n
299

Mid

0.0003

89

0.0008

121

-0.0017

98

-0.0005

309

High

-0.0001

134

-0.0019

87

0.0020

33

0.0000

255

Total

0.0001

253

-0.0003

316

0.0010

290

0.0003

863

B/M Portfolio
Mid

High

Kruskal0.82
3.32
Wallis χ2
(0.6642)
(0.1900)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=0.1307 p-value 0.8960
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7.53
(0.0232)

Total

5.88
(0.0529)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
2.47
(0.2915)
2.99
(0.2246)
4.85
(0.0886)
1.90
(0.3860)
14.62
(0.0670)

4.4.4 Results Based Upon Two-Way Sorts on E/P and DD
Attention is now turned towards the pattern of price-deflated forecast errors amongst
portfolios sorted on E/P and DD. The tenor of the results is unaffected by the choice of E/P
or C/P and by whether forecast errors are deflated by stock price or by the absolute value of
the consensus forecast. For brevity, only the results based upon E/P and FE/P are presented
and discussed here; further results are presented in Appendix 4A based upon FE/|F| (Table
4A.2) and upon C/P (Tables 4A.3 and 4A.4).

Table 4.5 presents the median forecast errors of portfolios sorted by E/P and DD, with
negative E/P firms segregated because the earlier results of this study show negative E/P
firms to have much larger forecast errors than positive E/P firms 31. This result is now
demonstrated to still hold after controlling for default risk. In every DD category the
highest median forecast error occurs for the negative E/P portfolio, a result evident in all
three panels. Amongst the low DD firms in Panel A, the median FE/P of the negative E/P
portfolio (0.0503) is eight times larger than the median FE/P of the low E/P portfolio
(0.0062), while amongst the mid DD firms, the median FE/P of the negative E/P portfolio
(0.0196) is five times larger than the median FE/P of the low E/P portfolio (0.0037). A
similar disparity is observed in Panels B and C and amongst high DD firms, although (not
surprisingly) there are only a small number of firms with negative earnings and high DD
(that is, low default risk).

31

There are relatively few firms with negative earnings in the sample of the 300 largest companies compared
with smaller firms. Around 10% of firms in the top 300 have negative earnings; while over 60% of firms
outside the top 300 have negative earnings.
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Excluding negative E/P firms, Table 4.5 also reveals some evidence that analysts’ forecasts
are relatively optimistic for low E/P stocks, provided they have high default risk. In Panels
A and B, the highest median forecast error for positive E/P firms occurs for the low DD low
E/P portfolio. The median FE/P for this portfolio in Panel A (0.0062) is twice as large as
the next largest median FE/P (0.0031) amongst positive E/P portfolios with low DD, and
68% larger than the next largest median FE/P (0.0037) amongst all the positive E/P
portfolios. The variation in FE/P with E/P (amongst positive E/P firms) is more pronounced
in Panel B and statistically significant in both panels, but not evident in Panel C (a result
consistent with the earlier result that forecast errors were generally lower in the second subperiod). Consistent with the results from Table 4.4, the evidence suggests that analysts are
overly optimistic towards growth stocks with high default risk.

Apart from negative E/P, the most important factor in forecast errors evident in Table 4.5 is
default risk; a result consistent with Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. In Panels A and B, median
forecast errors are inversely related to DD in the low E/P, mid E/P and total columns. In the
high E/P column, the smallest median FE/P occurs for the high DD portfolio (-0.0002 in
both Panel A and Panel B). Therefore the direct relationship between default risk and FE/P
is preserved (in Panels A and B) after controlling for E/P. As was the case with the earlier
results, there appears little variation in forecast errors with default risk in the second subperiod (Panel C).

Finally, the major prediction in this study, that analysts are more optimistic towards
overvalued firms than they are towards undervalued firms is once again directly tested. As
before, undervalued stocks are value stocks with low default risk; in this case, stocks with
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high DD and high E/P. Overvalued stocks are growth stocks with low default risk, however
in this case two categories are considered: (i) stocks with low DD and negative E/P and (ii)
stocks with low DD and low E/P. Comparing the median FE/P of the low DD low
(positive) E/P portfolio (0.0062) with that of the high DD high E/P portfolio (-0.0002), the
Mann-Whitney statistic (-3.4633) rejects the hypothesis of equal medians at better than a
0.1% level of significance. Similarly, the hypothesis of equality between the median FE/P
of the low DD negative E/P portfolio (0.0503) and that of the high DD high E/P portfolio (0.0002)32 is also rejected. Thus, the conjecture that analysts are more optimistic towards
overvalued firms than they towards undervalued firms is confirmed.

Similar results are evident in Panel B. The median FE/P of the low DD low (positive) E/P
portfolio (0.0226) exceeds that of the high DD high E/P portfolio (-0.0002), and the null
hypothesis of equality between the two medians is rejected at better than a 0.1% level of
significance. Similarly, the null hypothesis of equality between the median FE/P of the low
DD negative E/P portfolio (0.0446) and the high DD high E/P portfolio (-0.0002) can also
be rejected. Consistent with the earlier results in this study, there is no significant variation
in FE/P amongst the positive E/P portfolios in the second sub-period (Panel C), and thus
the conjecture that forecast errors are greater for overvalued firms than they are for
undervalued firms is not confirmed for this sub-period. It is possible, however, to reject the
null hypothesis of equality between the median FE/P of the low DD negative E/P portfolio
(0.0652) and that of the high DD high E/P portfolio (0.0005) at better than a 0.1% level of
significance.

32

The difference between the median FE/P of the low DD negative E/P portfolio and that of the low DD low
(positive) E/P is also statistically significant.
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In summarising, the dominant factor in analysts’ forecast errors in Table 4.5 is the
incidence of prior losses (that is, negative E/P), followed by default risk. Consistent with
the errors-in-expectations hypothesis however, growth firms with positive E/P do indeed
have large forecast errors, provided they have high default risk.
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Table 4.5: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Earnings-to-Price and Distance-to-Default Sorted Portfolios
This table shows the variation in price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) amongst different combinations of earnings-to-price (E/P) and
distance-to-default (DD) portfolio classifications. FE/P is calculated as per Table 4.1; E/P and DD are calculated each month according
to Section 4.3. Companies are either sorted into a negative (<0) E/P portfolio if E/P is negative or into three portfolios E/P portfolio if
E/P is positive; companies are also independently sorted into three portfolios by DD. The relevant portfolio grouping for a forecast
error observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistics and
associated p-values test the null hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios; when annotated with ‘(E/P>0)’
the test excludes observations in the negative (<0) E/P portfolio. The Mann-Whitney rank sum statistics test the null hypothesis of that
the median forecast errors are equal for the pairs of portfolios indicated. The number of observations in each classification is denoted
by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD Portfolio
<0
Median

n

Low
Median n

E/P Portfolio
Mid
High
Median n Median n

Low

0.0503

54

0.0062

129

0.0031

151

0.0011

284

0.0039

618

Mid

0.0196

24

0.0037

135

0.0013

240

0.0019

236

0.0020

635

High

0.0284

6

197

0.0002

221

0.0001

534

0.0365

84

461

0.0010

612

0.0002
0.0011

110

Total

0.0001
0.0015

630

0.0015

1787

Kruskal-Wallis
5.49
16.39
8.56
2.80
χ2
(0.0642)
(0.0003)
(0.0139)
(0.2466)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=-3.4633 p-value 0.0005
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=6.5451 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=4.4749 p-value 0.0000
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Total
Median
n

27.74
(0.0000)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(p-value)
44.18
(0.0000)
10.85
(0.0126)
4.55
(0.2079)
57.95
(0.0000)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
7.17
(0.0278)
4.77
(0.0919)
0.62
(0.7326)
4.52
(0.1044)

86.87
(0.0000)

30.80
(0.0002)

Table 4.5 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Earnings-to-Price and Distance-to-Default Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel B: 1995-2001:4
DD Portfolio
n

Low
Median n

E/P Portfolio
Mid
High
Median n Median n

Total
Median n

0.0446

31

0.0226

67

0.0052

73

0.0059

148

0.0091

319

Mid

0.0201

14

0.0067

69

0.0044

136

0.0067

107

0.0055

326

High

0.0036

4

0.0002

108

0.0006

107 -0.0002

60

0.0002

279

Total

0.0322

49

0.0041

244

0.0030

316

315

0.0040

924

<0
Median
Low

0.0035

Kruskal-Wallis
3.55
26.29
4.89
6.20
χ2
(0.1695)
(0.0000)
(0.0868)
(0.0451)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=-4.1990 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=4.6017 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=2.0550 p-value 0.0399
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32.24
(0.0000)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(p-value)
23.27
(0.0000)
4.29
(0.2315)
1.44
(0.6962)
21.04
(0.0001)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
9.67
(0.0080)
2.83
(0.2433)
1.13
(0.5684)
3.10
(0.2119)

60.37
(0.0000)

40.18
(0.0000)

Table 4.5 Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Earnings-to-Price and Distance-to-Default Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007
DD Portfolio
n

Low
Median n

E/P Portfolio
Mid
High
Median n Median n

Total
Median n

0.0652

23

0.0004

62

0.0027

0.0010

Mid

0.0177

10

0.0012

66

-0.0015 104 -0.0009 129 -0.0005 309

High

1.0210

2

-0.0007

89

0.0000

114

50

0.0000

255

Total

0.0435

35

0.0002

217

0.0001

296 -0.0004 315

0.0003

863

<0
Median
Low

78

0.0000

0.0005

136

Kruskal-Wallis
6.96
1.91
8.35
0.13
χ2
(0.0308)
(0.3841)
(0.0154)
(0.9378)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=0.5941 p-value 0.5525
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=4.6252 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=4.1398 p-value 0.0000
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299

5.88
(0.0529)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(p-value)
26.30
(0.0000)
9.73
(0.0210)
5.90
(0.1166)
38.81
(0.0000)

Kruskal-Wallis
χ2
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
3.24
(0.1977)
3.94
(0.1398)
0.02
(0.9918)
1.58
(0.4542)

49.36
(0.0000)

10.57
(0.2271)

4.4.5 Yearly Variation in the Relationship between Default Risk and
Forecast Errors
The full-sample results thus far are consistent with analyst underreaction to negative
earnings and default risk; however the sub-period analysis finds no significant relationship
between forecast errors and DD in the second half of the sample period, and therefore no
evidence of underreaction to default risk in that period. A possible explanation is that
analysts might be inefficient in processing default risk in general, but analyst efficiency
appears to increase in years when there are fewer high default risk firms. Although there is
inter-year variation in DD within both sub-periods, DD is generally higher and therefore
default risk generally lower in the second sub-period than in the first. Therefore the
observation that forecast errors are much closer to zero and lack any discernible pattern (for
companies with positive earnings) in the second period might still be consistent with
underreaction to default risk; the underreaction might be less evident in the second-subperiod simply because there are fewer high default risk firms, and relatively more firms are
misclassified as high default risk based on an annual sorting procedure.

To shed further light on this issue, firms are reclassified into high and low default risk
categories based upon constant DD breakpoints, namely the 20th and 80th percentiles of all
(pooled) forecast error observations. The use of constant DD breakpoints to classify firms
means that the analysis is not sensitive to the inter-year variation in default risk. Moreover,
the median forecast errors of the high and low default risk groups are not materially
affected by the use of constant rather than annual breakpoints; the major difference between
using constant rather than annual breakpoints is the number of firms classified as high
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default risk. The low and high quintile breakpoints based on the pooled sample are 3.9694
and 9.8337 respectively; therefore firms with a DD less than 3.9694 are classified as high
default risk and those with a DD greater than 9.8337 are classified as low default risk.
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 show the resulting inter-year variation in forecast errors of high
and low default risk firms.

It is apparent from Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 that median forecast errors were greater for
high default risk firms than for low default risk firms in every year of the sample period,
except the four years where there were 21 or fewer high default risk firms (1996 and 2004
to 2006). In 1999 and 2003 the median forecast error of both groups was negative but still
larger for high default risk stocks. The above observations are more readily apparent in
Figure 4.1. The final column of Table 4.6 reveals that the four years where median forecast
errors were not greater for high default risk stocks than for low default risk stocks (1996
and 2004 to 2006) are the years of highest median DD (lowest default risk) in the sample.
Therefore, the evidence relating analyst forecast optimism and default risk is stronger when
there are a larger number of high default risk firms. The lack of evidence in the second subperiod of a direct relationship between forecast errors and default risk is thus directly
attributable to the smaller number of high default risk firms therein, particularly over 2004
to 2006.

In summary, the results from Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 confirm that the previous sub-period
results are sensitive to inter-year variation in default risk. After taking this variation into
account there remains a strong relationship between DD and forecast errors that is
consistent with analyst underreaction to default risk.
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Table 4.6: Median Price-Deflated Forecast Errors of High and Low Default Risk
Portfolios and Sample Median DD by Forecast Year; Constant DD Portfolio
Breakpoints
This table shows the variation in price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) amongst high default
risk and low default risk portfolios as well as the median DD of the whole sample by the
calendar year in which the forecast was made (the forecast year). Stocks are classified as
high default risk if their DD was less than the 20th percentile of the pooled sample, or
3.9694 at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Stocks are classified as low
default risk if their DD was greater than the 80th percentile of the pooled sample, or 9.8337
at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. The sample median DD in each year
includes all stocks in the sample. The number of observations in each classification is
denoted by ‘n’.

Forecast
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

High Default Risk Portfolio
(DD<3.9694)
Median FE/P
n
0.0073
35
-0.0005
21
0.0133
25
0.0074
68
-0.0012
43
0.0203
64
0.0100
54
0.0140
32
-0.0023
32
-0.0014
8
-0.0049
3
0.0006
17
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Low Default Risk Portfolio
(DD>9.8337)
Median FE/P
n
0.0034
16
0.0000
36
-0.0001
35
-0.0040
7
-0.0019
18
-0.0024
9
-0.0016
20
0.0017
8
-0.0049
18
0.0000
54
0.0012
28
0.0010
27

Sample
Median DD
6.3005
7.5815
7.1047
4.7436
5.6884
5.0243
5.7091
5.7658
6.4864
8.6423
8.1519
7.4395

Figure 4.1: Yearly Variation in Price-Deflated Forecast Errors for High and Low Default Risk Portfolios
This figure plots the median price-deflated forecast errors of high and low default-risk portfolios by the year in which the forecast was
made (the forecast year). The data and computation details are as per Table 4.6.
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4.5. Interpretation of Results
Relationship between Forecast Errors and the Variables B/M, E/P, C/P and DD

Default risk is a pertinent factor in tests conditioned upon B/M such as Doukas et al.
(2002) because high B/M firms generally also have high default risk. This assertion is
confirmed by the observation that a relatively large number of stocks are classified as
high default risk value and as low default risk growth by the independent sorts on B/M
and DD, whilst relatively few are classified as low default risk value and high default
risk growth. In the absence of a control for default risk the results of this study are
consistent with Doukas et al. (2002) in that a direct relationship is found between
analysts’ forecast errors and B/M that runs counter to the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis. In the sample tested, this relationship is not statistically significant based on
quintile B/M portfolios but is somewhat stronger when stocks are sorted into groups of
three by B/M, a by-product of the two-way sorts on B/M and DD. However, as expected
the weak relationship observed between B/M and forecast errors is completely
subsumed by a much stronger relationship between forecast errors and DD. The fact that
forecast errors tend to be high for stocks with high default risk, measured before the
forecast, is consistent with analyst inefficiency in recognising, in other words
underreaction to, default risk. Thus, analysts appear to be more optimistic towards high
B/M stocks than towards low B/M stocks because default risk tends to increase with
B/M and analysts are inefficient in recognising default risk. This inference is consistent
with an extensive literature documenting analyst inefficiency, for example Klein (1990),
Lys and Sohn (1990), Abarbanell (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Frankel and
Lee (1998), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) and Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003).
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The variation of forecast errors with E/P and C/P is different from the variation with
B/M. The biggest difference is the observation that firms with negative E/P and C/P
have very large forecast errors; a result indicating that analysts are overly optimistic
towards loss-making firms and consistent with the finding in Easterwood and Nutt
(1999) that analysts underreact to poor earnings performance. Earnings performance is a
contributing factor in default risk, as demonstrated by the observation that most of the
loss-making firms in Table 4.5 are in the low DD category. Thus, the optimism that
analysts display towards both loss-making firms and high default risk firms appears to
be essentially the same phenomenon, an underreaction to financial distress in general.

Amongst firms with positive E/P and C/P, there is no consistent pattern in forecast
errors with either variable. Based upon one-way quintile sorts, price-deflated forecast
errors display a U-shaped pattern with the smallest values for intermediate values of E/P
and C/P, while forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of the forecast are actually
quite high for low E/P firms, a result consistent with the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis. However, this pattern is not evident for C/P sorted portfolios. The U-shape
is not evident in Table 4.5 where positive E/P stocks are classified into three groups by
E/P. Instead the finding is that forecast errors appear to vary inversely with E/P, a result
consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. However, this observation is
driven by low E/P firms with high default risk and overall, the message from the twoway sorts involving either E/P or C/P is that with the exception of negative values,
neither variable is as important a factor for forecast errors as default risk or prior losses.
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Analyst Optimism and Mispricing

The observation that forecast errors (and by implication analyst optimism) are relatively
high for high default risk and loss-making firms has a direct bearing on analyst forecastbased tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, because of evidence that firms with
valuation ratios misaligned with default risk are mispriced. Chapter 3 finds that, in
Australia, growth stocks with high default risk have relatively low returns while value
stocks with low default risk have relatively high returns; a finding that applies to both
raw and risk adjusted returns. These findings and those of other similar studies (for
example Piotroski, 2000; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002) are consistent with overvaluation
of distressed growth stocks and undervaluation of financially healthy value stocks.
Thus, on the argument that not all growth stocks are overvalued and not all value stocks
are undervalued, the finding in Doukas et al. (2002) that analyst forecast optimism is
not greater for growth stocks than for value stocks says very little about the relationship
between analyst optimism and mispricing.

The results of this study show that analysts’ earnings forecasts are far more optimistic
for overvalued (that is, distressed growth) stocks than they are for undervalued (that is,
financially healthy value) stocks. In particular, analysts’ earnings forecasts are
excessively optimistic for growth stocks with high default risk, a finding that is not
dependent upon whether growth is defined by B/M, E/P or C/P, and that applies to
growth stocks with both low and negative values of E/P or C/P. Thus, analyst optimism
reflects the direction of mispricing amongst portfolios sorted by value and default risk,
and hence the results are consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis amongst
mispriced firms. This finding is consistent with Bartov and Kim (2004) who find that
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analyst optimism reflects mispricing amongst portfolios sorted by B/M and accruals,
and thus also consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.

However, as noted above the results of this study are driven by analyst underreaction to
financial distress, and are therefore not consistent with the postulated extrapolation or
overreaction behaviour underpinning the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, as
expounded in Lakonishok et al. (1994). The default risk measure employed in this study
DD incorporates the information in current share prices, and thus a low (high) DD score
implies that the market has to some extent already recognised a firm’s deteriorating
(improving) financial health. Nevertheless, analysts’ earnings forecasts are still too high
for low DD firms, despite the fact that at the time of the forecast distress-related
information is already evident in share prices and, by implication, DD. Thus, the
relationship observed between analyst forecast optimism and DD can only be consistent
with analyst underreaction to default risk as well as to the information in share prices.

The underreaction in analysts’ earnings forecasts is consistent with the underreaction
conclusion in Chapter 3, whereby high default risk growth stocks have poor recent (sixmonth) price performance both before and after portfolio formation, while low default
risk value stocks have relatively good recent price performance both before and after
portfolio formation. Furthermore, Chapter 3 showed that high default risk growth stocks
have relatively poor recent (prior year) earnings before portfolio formation while low
default risk value stocks have relatively good or improving recent earnings
performance. The overall picture that emerges is one where both analysts and share
prices respond slowly to earnings news, in other words market inefficiency.
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Consistency with the Momentum Life Cycle

The evidence presented in this study supporting underreaction suggests that momentum
plays an important role in the value premium, and thus the results are somewhat
consistent with the momentum life cycle postulated by Lee and Swaminathan (2000),
according to which stocks go through periods of favouritism and neglect. Parallels
between the momentum life cycle and this study can be drawn because the two key
variables in the momentum life cycle, trading volume and momentum, are related to the
control variables in this study, namely valuation ratios and DD. DD is related to
momentum because it increases with the drift in asset values (µ in equation 4), and
trading volume is related to valuation ratios in that Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find
that trading volume is greater for growth stocks than for value stocks. The low default
risk value stocks in this study are therefore similar to the ‘low-volume winners’ in the
momentum life cycle, which are previously-neglected stocks subject to improving
sentiment. The fact that low default risk value stocks are no worse than low default risk
growth stocks at meeting analyst expectations is consistent with their initial
undervaluation and subsequent (postulated) improvement in sentiment. Both groups of
stocks, namely the low default risk value stocks in Chapter 3 and the low volume
winners in Lee and Swaminathan (2000), are identified as the most likely to deliver high
future returns.

Furthermore, the high default risk growth stocks in this study are similar to the ‘highvolume losers’ in the momentum life cycle, which are subject to increasing unpopularity
and neglect and are the most likely stocks to disappoint investors. Consistent with this
view, high default risk growth stocks fail to meet analyst expectations at a similar level
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to high default risk value stocks, consistent with their initial overvaluation and
subsequent (postulated) decline in popularity. Both groups of stocks, namely the high
default risk growth stocks in Chapter 3 and the high volume losers in Lee and
Swaminathan (2000), are identified as the most likely to deliver low future returns.

4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the relationship between the errors in Australian analyst
earnings forecasts and a number of variables; including B/M, E/P, C/P and DD. The
study contributes to the literature by being the first Australian study to directly test the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis using analysts’ forecast errors, and also by being the
first to investigate the role of default risk in this context. Consistent with Doukas et al.
(2002) and Mian and Teo (2004), the findings of this study are that earnings forecast
optimism does not vary with valuation ratios in a manner that supports the errors-inexpectations hypothesis. However, the results of this study show that default risk and
prior losses (negative earnings) are far more important determinants of forecast errors
than B/M, positive values of E/P or positive values of C/P, and are consistent with
analyst underreaction to financial distress (evident as either losses or high default risk).
The conclusion that analysts underreact to distress is consistent with a number of
previous studies on analyst inefficiency, and in this regard is consistent with Doukas et
al. (2002) who also attribute their results to underreaction.

However, the results of this study help to explain why Doukas et al. (2002) find a highly
statistically significant direct relationship between forecast optimism and B/M. This
relationship is counterintuitive because returns increase with B/M, and forecast
optimism implies negative earnings surprises and, consequently, poor returns.
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Underreaction to distress explains why analysts tend to over-estimate earnings for high
B/M stocks in general, because B/M tends to increase with distress. Consistent with this
explanation, there is no apparent optimistic bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts for high
B/M stocks with low default risk, and there is little or no variation in forecast errors
with B/M independent of default risk. Similarly, there is little or no variation in forecast
errors with E/P or C/P, independent of default risk and over positive values of these
variables.

For firms where the valuation ratio (either B/M, E/P or C/P) appears misaligned with
default risk, the pattern of forecast errors closely reflects the pattern of mispricing found
in Chapter 3: analysts forecasts are more optimistic for overvalued (high default risk
growth) stocks than they are for undervalued (low default risk value) stocks, and in this
sense the results are actually consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.
Bartov and Kim (2004) make a similar case arguing that relatively few value and
growth firms are actually mispriced, and they too find that analyst forecast errors for
mispriced firms reflect errors-in-expectations. However, the results of this study appear
entirely due to underreaction (to distress) and consequently do not support the argument
of Lakonishok et al. (1994) that extrapolation of past earnings is the source of errors-inexpectations. On the other hand, the results of this study appear to be consistent with the
momentum life-cycle of Lee and Swaminathan (2000); especially as meaningful
analogies are able to be drawn between low default risk value stocks and the low
volume winners in the momentum life cycle, and between high default risk growth
stocks and the high volume losers in the momentum life cycle.
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There are at least two unresolved issues from this study that deserve mention. First, this
study of analysts’ forecast errors is consistent with others such as Doukas et al. (2002)
and Mian and Teo (2004) which fail to support errors-in-expectations based upon
extrapolation of past earnings. However, evidence from studies of analysts’ forecast
long-term growth rates is more supportive of this hypothesis (La Porta, 1996; Dechow
and Sloan, 1997) as is evidence that valuation ratios are directly related to past earnings
growth but not to future earnings growth (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Chan et al., 2003). A
potentially fruitful area of future research might therefore be to reconcile the difference
in the relative optimism of short-term earnings forecasts and longer-term growth
expectations of value and growth stocks. Relative errors in short-term earnings forecasts
might not reflect errors in long term growth expectations because of the sluggishness of
mean-reversion in earnings growth (see for example Lakonishok et al., 1994; Haugen,
1999), or because of manipulation of current earnings by managers, in order to delay
bad news and to sustain positive investor sentiment (see Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and
Lakonishok, 2006b).

The second unresolved issue from the analysis of this chapter pertains to the
relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and stock returns, and how this
relationship is affected by B/M and default risk. As is well known, returns increase with
B/M while the findings here show that forecast errors, and by implication the incidence
of negative earnings surprises, increase with default risk. Therefore, an important
question is why aren’t high default risk value stocks punished by the market for their
high forecast errors? Chapter 3 demonstrates that high default risk growth stocks have
very low returns and negative portfolio alphas, consistent with a strong market reaction
to negative earnings surprises. However, the chapter also demonstrates that high default
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risk value stocks do not have particularly low returns or statistically significant negative
alphas, despite the fact that they exhibit a similar level of forecast error as high default
risk growth stocks. This latter observation is consistent with a relatively muted market
reaction to negative earnings surprises. This discrepancy in apparent market reactions to
earnings surprises will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.
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APPENDIX 4A
Additional Results Omitted from Chapter 4
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Table 4A.1: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios
This table shows the variation in forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of forecast (FE/|F|) amongst different combinations of book-tomarket (B/M) and distance-to-default (DD) classifications. FE/|F| is calculated as per Table 4.1; B/M and DD are calculated each month
according to Section 4.3. Companies are sorted into three portfolios by B/M and independently into three portfolios by DD. The relevant
portfolio grouping for a forecast error observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis
χ2 statistics and associated p-values test the null hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios. The Mann-Whitney rank
sum statistic tests the null hypothesis that the median forecast error of the low B/M, low DD portfolio equals that of the high B/M, high DD
portfolio. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD Portfolio

B/M Portfolio

Low

Low
Median
0.1127

n
60

Mid
Median
0.0189

Mid

n
216

High
Median
0.0794

0.0318

172

High

0.0000

Total

0.0072

0.0569

282

284

0.0023

516

0.0233

16.14
10.13
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.0003)
(0.0063)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=1.9856 p-value 0.04708
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n
339

Total
Median
0.0585

n
618

0.0078

181

0.0297

637

179

0.0182

69

0.0014

533

677

0.0514

589

0.0252

1788

11.86
(0.0027)

27.68
(0.0000)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
5.12
(0.0775)
6.80
(0.0334)
1.58
(0.4536)
3.11
(0.2109)
41.51
(0.0000)

Table 4A.1: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel B: 1995 to 2001:4
DD Portfolio

B/M Portfolio

Low

Low
Median
0.3942

n
30

Mid
Median
0.0757

Mid

n
108

High
Median
0.1587

0.0941

83

High

0.0000

Total

0.0350

0.0869

161

150

0.0321

263

0.0632

22.39
6.12
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.0000)
(0.0468)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=2.5498 p-value 0.0108
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n
180

Total
Median
0.1293

n
319

0.0717

83

0.0867

328

92

-0.0017

36

0.0029

278

361

0.1008

299

0.0631

925

6.65
(0.0360)

30.29
(0.0000)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
4.22
(0.1215)
2.01
(0.3667)
2.30
(0.3163)
4.13
(0.1267)
38.74
(0.0000)

Table 4A.1: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Book-to-Market- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel C: 2001:5 to 2007
DD Portfolio

B/M Portfolio

Low

Low
Median
0.0468

n
30

Mid
Median
0.0002

Mid

n
108

High
Median
0.0576

0.0096

89

High

-0.0010

Total

0.0014

0.0114

121

134

-0.0315

253

-0.0032

1.23
4.05
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.5400)
(0.1318)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistic
Low DD Low B/M vs. High DD High B/M z=0.1032 p-value 0.9178
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n
159

Total
Median
0.0189

n
299

-0.0246

98

-0.0070

309

87

0.0310

33

0.0000

255

316

0.0173

290

0.0041

863

6.74
(0.0343)

5.41
(0.0669)

KruskalWallis χ2
(p-value)
1.98
(0.3712)
3.28
(0.1942)
4.35
(0.1136)
1.45
(0.4831)
14.02
(0.0814)

Table 4A.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Earnings-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios
This table shows the variation in forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of forecast (FE/|F|) amongst different combinations of earnings-toprice (E/P) and distance-to-default (DD) portfolio classifications. FE/|F| is calculated as per Table 4.1; E/P and DD are calculated each month
according to Section 4.3. Companies are either sorted into a negative (<0) E/P portfolio if E/P is negative or into three portfolios E/P portfolio if
E/P is positive; companies are also independently sorted into three portfolios by DD. The relevant portfolio grouping for a forecast error
observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistics and associated p-values test
the null hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios; when annotated with ‘(E/P>0)’ the test excludes observations in
the negative (<0) E/P portfolio. The Mann-Whitney rank sum statistics test the null hypothesis of that the median forecast errors are equal for the
pairs of portfolios indicated. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD Portfolio

Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
41.08
11.47
(0.0000)
(0.0032)
0.0295 635
19.11
8.47
(0.0003)
(0.0145)
0.0019 534
4.47
0.34
(0.2145)
(0.8419)
0.0251 1787
59.02
7.43
(0.0000)
(0.0243)
27.63
89.67
38.46
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)

Low

E/P Portfolio
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median
n
0.5503 54 0.1364 129 0.0521 151 0.0144 284 0.0585 618

Mid

1.0899

24

0.0771

135

0.0214

240

High

0.5127

6

-0.0015 197

0.0030

221 -0.0018 110

Total

0.7463

84

0.0370

0.0180

612

461

0.0257

0.0133

236

630

0.24
17.94
8.97
2.54
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.8885)
(0.0001)
(0.0113)
(0.2806)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=-3.6955 p-value 0.0003
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=6.0132 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=3.4193 p-value 0.0006
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Table 4A.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Earnings-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel B: 1995-2001:4
DD Portfolio

E/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.7216 31 0.4719 67 0.0708 73 0.0637 148 0.1293 319
28.03
16.27
(0.0000)
(0.0003)
Mid
0.8910 14 0.1181 69 0.0605 136 0.0717 107 0.0867 326
8.57
5.67
(0.0356)
(0.0586)
High
0.0849 4 0.0045 108 0.0095 107 -0.0026 60 0.0031 279
1.37
0.99
(0.7118)
(0.6088)
Total
0.7216 49 0.0925 244 0.0464 316 0.0354 315 0.0628 924
25.66
7.30
(0.0000)
(0.0260)
2
2.06
26.26
4.92
6.08
30.36
65.95
47.11
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.3575)
(0.0000)
(0.0853)
(0.0479)
(0.0000)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=-4.5805 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=4.2667 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=1.5813 p-value 0.1138
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Table 4A.2: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Earnings-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007
DD Portfolio

E/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(E/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.5399 23 0.0088 62 0.0444 78 0.0002 136 0.0189 299
21.89
3.93
(0.0001)
(0.1398)
Mid
1.2344 10 0.0205 66 -0.0218 104 -0.0129 129 -0.0070 309
12.42
4.32
(0.0061)
(0.1152)
High
14.5450 2 -0.0175 89 0.0000 114 0.0059 50 0.0000 255
5.91
0.03
(0.1159)
(0.9844)
Total
0.8221 35 0.0060 217 0.0020 296 -0.0041 315 0.0041 863
35.84
1.40
(0.0000)
(0.4960)
2
3.16
1.98
7.95
0.11
5.41
46.40
11.16
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.2060)
(0.3724)
(0.0188)
(0.9466)
(0.0669)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.1930)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low E/P vs. High DD High E/P z=-0.5941 p-value 0.5525
Low DD E/P<0 vs. High DD High E/P z=4.1265 p-value 0.0000
Low DD E/P<0 vs. Low DD Low E/P z=3.4078 p-value 0.0007
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Table 4A.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios
This table shows the variation in price-deflated forecast errors (FE/P) amongst different combinations of cash flow-to-price (C/P) and distanceto-default (DD) classifications. FE/P is calculated as per Table 4.1; C/P and DD are calculated each month according to Section 4.3. Companies
sorted into three portfolios by C/P and independently into three portfolios by DD. The relevant portfolio grouping for a forecast error observation
is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistics and associated p-values test the null
hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios. The Mann-Whitney rank sum statistics test the null hypothesis of that the
median forecast errors are equal for the pairs of portfolios indicated. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD Portfolio

Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
44.28
11.19
(0.0000)
(0.0037)
0.0020 635
4.73
0.68
(0.1929)
(0.7122)
0.0001 534
7.41
2.92
(0.0598)
(0.2318)
0.0015 1787
48.17
3.25
(0.0000)
(0.1974)
27.74
84.44
36.11
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)

Low

<0
Low
Median n Median n
0.1031 24 0.0050 90

C/P Portfolio
Mid
High
Total
Median n Median n Median
n
0.0002 190 0.0064 314 0.0039 618

Mid

0.0189

11

0.0020

127

0.0019

250

0.0019

247

High

0.0512

3

-0.0002 218

0.0010

223 -0.0006

90

Total

0.0582

38

0.0006

0.0010

663

651

435

0.0027

6.16
16.35
3.17
11.54
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.0459)
(0.0003)
(0.2047)
(0.0031)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=3.6534 p-value 0.0003
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=6.3112 p-value 0.0000
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=4.6151 p-value 0.0000
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Table 4A.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel B: 1995-2001:4
DD Portfolio

C/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.0962 10 0.0178 45 0.0026 90 0.0098 174 0.0091 319
20.54
10.19
(0.0001)
(0.0061)
Mid
0.0212 5 0.0042 71 0.0059 134 0.0052 116 0.0055 326
2.58
0.26
(0.4604)
(0.8766)
High
0.0263 2 0.0000 113 0.0021 118 -0.0003 46 0.0002 279
3.47
1.79
(0.3244)
(0.4081)
Total
0.0512 17 0.0021 229 0.0038 342 0.0059 336 0.0040 924
18.93
2.75
(0.0003)
(0.2527)
2
1.55
22.83
8.17
6.23
32.24
58.63
41.49
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.4600)
(0.0000)
(0.0169)
(0.0444)
(0.0000)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=-3.6396 p-value 0.0003
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=4.0440 p-value 0.0001
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=2.0622 p-value 0.0392
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Table 4A.3: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by Stock Price for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-Default- Sorted Portfolios
(continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007
DD Portfolio

C/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.1195 14 0.0001 45 -0.0011 100 0.0037 140 0.0010 299
27.61
4.13
(0.0000)
(0.1268)
Mid
0.0127 6 0.0007 56 -0.0008 116 -0.0008 131 -0.0005 309
4.86
2.33
(0.1823)
(0.3123)
High
0.2859 1 -0.0004 105 0.0003 105 -0.0015 44 0.0000 255
5.08
2.22
(0.1659)
(0.3303)
Total
0.0652 21 0.0000 206 -0.0004 321 0.0010 315 0.0003 863
32.19
2.33
(0.0000)
(0.3126)
2
7.21
1.73
1.29
5.08
5.88
43.66
11.43
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.0271)
(0.4220)
(0.5251)
(0.0788)
(0.0529)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.1785)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=-1.6453 p-value 0.0999
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=4.8607 p-value 0.0000
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=4.2851 p-value 0.0000
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Table 4A.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios
This table shows the variation in forecast errors deflated by the absolute value of forecast (FE/|F|) amongst different combinations of cash flowto-price (C/P) and distance-to-default (DD) classifications. FE/|F| is calculated as per Table 4.1; C/P and DD are calculated each month according
to Section 4.3. Companies sorted into three portfolios by C/P and independently into three portfolios by DD. The relevant portfolio grouping for
a forecast error observation is the one that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast. Kruskal-Wallis χ2 statistics and
associated p-values test the null hypothesis of no variation in median forecast error amongst portfolios. The Mann-Whitney rank sum statistics
test the null hypothesis of that the median forecast errors are equal for the pairs of portfolios indicated. The number of observations in each
classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Panel A: Full Sample
DD Portfolio

Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
33.58
12.75
(0.0000)
(0.0017)
0.0295 635
11.45
2.57
(0.0095)
(0.2763)
0.0019 534
8.55
2.70
(0.0358)
(0.2598)
0.0251 1787
43.00
2.06
(0.0000)
(0.3562)
27.63
80.95
39.79
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)

Low

<0
Low
Median n Median n
0.5503 24 0.1152 90

C/P Portfolio
Mid
High
Total
Median n Median n Median
n
0.0025 190 0.0736 314 0.0585 618

Mid

2.0435

11

0.0648

127

0.0275

250

0.0254

247

High

0.9254

3

-0.0039 218

0.0182

223 -0.0088

90

Total

0.7718

38

0.0129

0.0182

663

651

435

0.0325

0.13
19.69
3.56
11.68
Kruskal-Wallis χ2
(0.9362)
(0.0001)
(0.1685)
(0.0029)
(p-value)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=3.8594 p-value 0.0001
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=5.6856 p-value 0.0000
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=2.8150 p-value 0.0049
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Table 4A.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel B: 1995-2001:4
DD Portfolio

C/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.3847 10 0.4445 45 0.0529 90 0.1297 174 0.1293 319
18.89
14.09
(0.0003)
(0.0009)
Mid
2.0435 5 0.1008 71 0.0929 134 0.0597 116 0.0867 326
3.97
1.04
(0.2646)
(0.5948)
High
0.5127 2 -0.0008 113 0.0311 118 -0.0037 46 0.0031 279
4.27
1.52
(0.2333)
(0.4669)
Total
0.4152 17 0.0584 229 0.0573 342 0.0605 336 0.0628 924
12.97
0.80
(0.0047)
(0.6695)
2
0.31
25.05
8.38
6.33
30.36
56.42
44.19
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.8582)
(0.0000)
(0.0152)
(0.0422)
(0.0000)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.0000)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=3.9175 p-value 0.0001
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=3.5305 p-value 0.0004
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=0.4474 p-value 0.6546
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Table 4A.4: Medians of Forecast Errors Deflated by the Absolute Value of Forecast for Cash Flow-to-Price- and Distance-to-DefaultSorted Portfolios (continued)
Panel C: 2001:5-2007
DD Portfolio

C/P Portfolio
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 Kruskal-Wallis χ2
<0
Low
Mid
High
Total
(p-value)
(C/P>0)
(p-value)
Median n Median n Median n Median n Median n
Low
0.6914 14 0.0023 45 -0.0163 100 0.0559 140 0.0189 299
21.70
3.57
(0.0001)
(0.1674)
Mid
2.0613 6 0.0130 56 -0.0152 116 -0.0109 131 -0.0070 309
8.55
2.44
(0.0360)
(0.2953)
High
8.9268 1 -0.0115 105 0.0060 105 -0.0217 44 0.0000 255
4.61
1.74
(0.2029)
(0.4193)
Total
0.9494 21 0.0000 206 -0.0041 321 0.0156 315 0.0041 863
31.42
1.85
(0.0000)
(0.3971)
2
1.36
2.09
0.82
4.66
5.41
40.34
10.48
Kruskal-Wallis χ
(0.5057)
(0.3515)
(0.6629)
(0.0972)
(0.0669)
(p-value)
(0.0000)
(0.2331)
Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Statistics
Low DD Low C/P vs. High DD High C/P z=-1.7110 p-value 0.0871
Low DD C/P<0 vs. High DD High C/P z=4.4609 p-value 0.0000
Low DD C/P<0 vs. Low DD Low C/P z=3.4477 p-value 0.0006
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CHAPTER 5: THE MARKET RESPONSE TO
EARNINGS SURPRISE, CONDITIONAL UPON
BOOK-TO-MARKET, DEFAULT RISK AND
ANALYST AGREEMENT

5.1 Abstract
This study uses Australian data and long horizon (240 trading day) returns to examine
variation in the market’s reaction to earnings surprises across value/growth, default risk
and analyst agreement categories. Consistent with prior literature, the findings
demonstrate that this market reaction is inversely related to a firm’s book-to-market
(B/M) ratio and directly related to the degree of analyst agreement regarding expected
(forecast) earnings. In other words, the market reaction is relatively strong for growth
stocks and for earnings forecasts with a high degree of analyst agreement, and relatively
muted for value stocks and for earnings forecasts with a relatively low level of analyst
agreement. Controlling for B/M and analyst agreement, there appears no residual effect
of default risk in this context, a finding which contributes to the relatively sparse
literature on the effects of default risk on the market reaction to earnings surprises

The data support a model of the return-earnings relationship with a slope (or earnings
response coefficient, ERC) that is increasing in analyst agreement (consistent with prior
literature) and with an asymmetric intercept term that captures the effects of an earnings
torpedo, in other words the large negative returns attributable to even a marginally
negative surprise. Consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002) this asymmetric intercept
term is larger for low B/M stocks than for high B/M stocks. When the asymmetric
intercept term was not explicitly modelled, the slope was also found to vary inversely
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with B/M; a result consistent the ERC literature. However, when the regression tests
allowed for variation in both the intercept and slope, no statistically significant variation
between high and low B/M stocks was found in the slope term.

The findings are applied to a conundrum posed by the findings of Doukas et al. (2002),
whereby high B/M stocks are observed to have larger, more negative earnings surprises
than low B/M stocks, despite that fact that high B/M stocks are observed to have higher
returns than low B/M stocks. This conundrum is not explained by differences in analyst
agreement between value and growth stocks, despite the observation that analyst
agreement affects the severity of the market reaction to earnings surprise and that value
stocks generally possess lower analyst agreement than growth stocks. The best
explanation for the conundrum that can be offered by this study is that value stocks
remain relatively unpunished by the market for missing earnings expectations while
growth stocks are heavily punished for missing earnings expectations. Although this
result is known from previous studies (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Chan et al., 2006a), a
major contribution is to show that the effect exists independently from differences in
analyst agreement and default risk.

5.2 Introduction
In this study, Australian data are employed to measure the market reaction to earnings
surprises, and how this reaction varies with B/M, default risk and analyst forecast
dispersion. All three variables above have been the subject of studies in the earnings
response coefficient (ERC) literature, and therefore the effect of each of these variables
is of interest in its own right (the ERC is the slope of the relationship between
unexpected returns and unexpected earnings). However, there are few if any studies in
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this literature that examine all three variables in this context simultaneously; a
seemingly worthwhile endeavour because B/M, default risk and forecast dispersion are
all correlated. In addition, further results are provided based on asymmetric slope and
intercept terms of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship, including the
‘earnings torpedo’ and its relationship with B/M as documented by Skinner and Sloan
(2002). This study thus provides Australian evidence regarding the determinants of the
ERC as well as on the importance of the earnings torpedo for growth stocks.

The study is motivated by recent results in the value premium literature. Whilst it is by
now a well known empirical result that stock returns increase with B/M (see for
example Fama and French, 1992), earnings surprises have been found to be more
negative for high B/M stocks than for low B/M stocks (Bauman and Miller, 1997;
Doukas et al., 2002). This result is counterintuitive because in general it implies an
inverse relation between stock returns and earnings surprises 33. At first glance, a simple
explanation is that growth stocks merely respond more than value stocks to unexpected
earnings, a result not inconsistent with prior results in the literature (for example Collins
and Kothari, 1989; Skinner and Sloan, 2002). However, this story fails to explain why
returns are directly related to B/M but earnings surprises are inversely related to B/M,
unless the ERC is negative or value-relevant information is missed in comparisons of
average earnings surprises and returns of B/M-sorted portfolios. An examination
involving the three variables in this study is intended to shed light on the discrepancy
noted above between the average returns and earnings surprises of B/M sorted

33

According to Doukas et al. (2002), analysts tend to issue earnings forecasts which are more upwardly
biased for high B/M stocks than for low B/M stocks. The median earnings surprises implied by their
results are -0.0026 for bottom quintile of stocks by B/M stocks and -0.0118 for the top quintile of stocks
by B/M. In a study that uses the same study period (1976 to 1997), Ali et al. (2003) report average annual
returns of 13% and 21.9% for the bottom and top quintile of stocks by B/M.
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portfolios. The primary objective, however, is to determine the relative importance of
each of the variables to the market reaction to earnings surprises.

The importance of B/M to the market reaction to unexpected earnings has long been
recognised. As pointed out by Collins and Kothari (1989) a low B/M ratio is indicative
of either or both of two characteristics, the presence of growth opportunities and
earnings persistence, each of which increase the importance of unexpected earnings
news to a firm’s valuation and which therefore imply an inverse relationship between
B/M and ERC. The inverse relationship between B/M and ERC is confirmed in Collins
and Kothari (1989) and Biddle and Seow (1991). Moreover, an inverse relationship
between B/M and ERC is also implied in valuation models that recognise the
importance of both book value and earnings to equity value, for example Ohlson (1995)
and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). In particular, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) argue
that current earnings are relatively more important to firm valuation when book values
are low relative to earnings (indicating that the firm’s assets are being productively
utilised) rather than when book values are high relative to earnings (indicating that the
firm’s assets might be adapted to alternative, more productive uses).

In the finance literature B/M is often used to distinguish between value and growth
stocks, for example in Fama and French (1992). The market reaction to earnings
surprises and the variation of this reaction with B/M (and other valuation measures) has
been of interest to finance researchers in tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.
This hypothesis states that investors’ expectations of future growth in earnings are more
optimistic towards growth stocks than towards value stocks, resulting in overvaluation
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of growth stocks relative to value stocks 34. Whilst the errors-in-expectations hypothesis
is couched in terms of erroneous future growth expectations (for example in Lakonishok
et al., 1994, and La Porta, 1996), some empirical studies of the hypothesis have
examined the effects of actual earnings announcements (for example La Porta et al.,
1997 35) and earnings surprises on returns. In particular, Skinner and Sloan (2002) find
that low B/M stocks suffer large negative returns as a consequence of negative earnings
surprises; a result they argue is consistent with the downward revision of growth
expectations and therefore with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. In contrast, high
B/M stocks are less affected by negative surprises. Similar results were also obtained by
Levis and Liodakis (2001) and Chan et al. (2006a)36.

In contrast to the ERC literature, Skinner and Sloan (2002) and Chan et al. (2006a) base
most of their inferences upon regressions of returns upon dummy variables intended to
capture the sign, rather than the magnitude, of the earnings surprise. Implicit in this
particular return-earnings surprise specification is the effect of the ‘earnings torpedo’,
whereby the act of missing analysts’ forecasts by even a small margin is more relevant
to the market reaction than the actual magnitude of the earnings surprise. In effect,
modelling of the earnings torpedo introduces a discontinuity of the return-earnings
surprise relationship at the zero level of earnings surprise. Both studies cited above find
that the effect of the earnings torpedo is greater for low B/M stocks than for high B/M
stocks, and therefore imply that the intercept in the return-earnings surprise relationship
for negative surprises is lower (more negative) for growth than for value stocks. In this
34

The opposing view in the literature is that growth stocks are not overvalued, but rather earn lower
returns than value stocks because they are less risky (Fama and French, 1992, 1993).
35
La Porta et al. (1997) find that a disproportionate amount of the annual value premium occurs in the 12
days surrounding the quarterly earnings announcements of US firms, suggesting the arrival of
predominantly bad news for growth stocks and of a downward revision of growth expectations, and
therefore consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis.
36
Dreman and Berry (1995) also compare value and growth stocks for their reaction to positive and
negative surprises, but differentiate value and growth on the basis of earnings-to-price rather than B/M.
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study, allowance is made for variation in both the slope and intercept terms of the
return-earnings surprise with B/M; however the results are generally supportive of the
growth stock earnings torpedo reported by Skinner and Sloan (2002).

Default risk is considered in the analysis for two reasons. First, Dhaliwal and Reynolds
(1994) point out that default risk may represent a form of priced risk not adequately
reflected in observed equity betas, but relevant to the expected rate of return required by
shareholders, and therefore also relevant to the discounted value of expected future cash
flows and to the observed ERC 37. Consistent with this line of reasoning Dhaliwal and
Reynolds (1994) observe an inverse relationship between ERC and default risk,
measured in terms of either bond ratings or debt-to-equity ratios, after controlling for
equity beta. On the other hand, Billings (1999) argues that both measures of default risk
used by Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) are correlated with expected earnings growth,
and therefore the inverse relation between ERC and default risk is merely capturing the
association between ERC and growth. Billings (1999) finds that the relation between
bond ratings and ERC disappears when he controls for expected growth, measured as
either the I/B/E/S long term growth forecast or as return-on-equity. However, he still
finds a negative relation between debt-to-equity ratios and ERC after controlling for
growth, suggesting that the effect of default risk on the ERC may not be completely
subsumed by that of growth. The results of this study provide additional evidence on

37

Theoretically, the ERC is underpinned by an assumption that current earnings are directly related to
expected future cash flows, and by a valuation model linking expected future cash flows to current share
price (Collins and Kothari, 1989). If the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is valid, the rate at which
expected future cash flows are discounted is proportional to equity beta and consequently, the ERC is
inversely related to equity beta. However, equity beta is directly related to the riskiness of a firm’s debt
and hence to default risk; put differently, equity holders may demand a higher return on equity for
investing in companies with higher default risk. Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) point out that if the equity
beta is measured without error and the CAPM is valid, the effect of default risk is subsumed by the effect
of equity beta. If the equity beta is measured with error or the CAPM is not valid, however, the expected
return demanded by shareholders may appear to increase with default-risk, and hence the ERC will be
inversely related to default-risk.
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this issue, particularly as an alternative measure of default risk is used, namely the
distance-to-default (DD) measure developed by Moody’s KMV and discussed in
Crosbie and Bohn (2003). DD is arguably a cleaner measure of default risk than ratios
or statistical models upon which bond ratings are based, because it captures equity
market participants’ ex ante assessment of the solvency of each firm (Vassalou and
Xing, 2004; Gharghori et al., 2006b).

The second reason default risk is considered here is because it is correlated with B/M
(Fama and French, 1995; Dichev, 1998), and therefore may provide some intuition
regarding the discrepancy between the returns and earnings surprises of B/M sorted
portfolios. An inverse relation between default risk and the market reaction to earnings
surprise would at least partially explain why high B/M stocks are not punished by the
market for failing to meet analysts’ forecasts. However, such an inverse relationship
also implies that growth stocks with high default risk are also likely to escape
punishment for negative earnings surprises. It is argued that this is an unlikely outcome,
particularly as evidence in Griffin and Lemmon (2002) shows that the poor returns of
growth stocks are actually concentrated in high default risk growth stocks (a result
confirmed for Australian stocks in Chapter 3). Furthermore, the weight of recent
evidence suggests that default risk is not priced in equity market (see for example
Dichev, 1998; Gharghori et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2008). It is therefore expected
that default risk plays a relatively unimportant role in the market reaction to earnings
surprises after controlling for B/M and forecast dispersion, and the results of this study
generally support this conjecture.
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Forecast dispersion (the coefficient of variation of analysts’ earnings-per-share
forecasts) is considered because this variable has been demonstrated empirically to be
an important determinant of the magnitude of earnings response coefficients (Imhoff
and Lobo, 1992; Kinney et al., 2002) and because Doukas et al. (2004) find that high
B/M stocks have relatively high forecast dispersion. This observation alone might
therefore explain the discrepancy between the returns and earnings surprises of B/M
sorted portfolios. Kinney et al. (2002) argue that high forecast dispersion implies that a
firm’s earnings are difficult to predict, and consequently investors pay less attention to
earnings surprises when dispersion is large. Similarly, Doukas et al. (2006) argue that
investors view low dispersion forecasts as more reliable than high dispersion forecasts.
In support of this view, they find that the degree to which prices reflect forecast changes
in earnings is inversely related to forecast dispersion. The results of this study strongly
support the inverse relationship between forecast dispersion and the market reaction to
earnings surprise. As it turns out however, this relationship unfortunately sheds little
light on the discrepancy between returns and earnings surprises of B/M sorted
portfolios.

The principal findings of the study are as follows. As expected default risk, which is
measured using DD, has little impact upon the market reaction to earnings surprise after
controlling for B/M and forecast dispersion. In contrast, both B/M and forecast
dispersion are important. Consistent with Imhoff and Lobo (1992) and Kinney et al.
(2002), the slope of the return-earnings relation (or ERC) is found to be inversely
related to forecast dispersion; however the effect of B/M is somewhat more
complicated. When the return-earnings relation is modelled without an earnings torpedo
the slope (ERC) is inversely related to B/M, consistent with Collins and Kothari (1989)
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and the valuation models of Ohlson (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997).
However, upon including asymmetric intercept terms that vary with B/M, no
statistically significant evidence is found that the slope increases with B/M, but
evidence is found consistent with the growth stock torpedo effect of Skinner and Sloan
(2002). Finally, it is shown that the discrepancy between the returns and earnings
surprises of B/M sorted portfolios is confined to negative surprises, and is consistent
with both the growth stock torpedo effect and a marked lack of market response to value
stocks’ negative surprises.

The results of this study are robust to a number of changes in experimental design,
including the definition of unexpected returns, the exclusion of losses, the use of only
June year-end companies, and the use of earnings-to-price (E/P) rather than B/M. The
study also addresses concerns raised in Payne and Thomas (2003) that the growth-stock
earnings torpedo arises because of a rounding error in I/B/E/S.

The remainder of the chapter is structured as follow. Section 5.3 lays out the empirical
framework for the study. The data and methodology is discussed in Section 5.4. Section
5.5 presents the results, which are interpreted and analysed graphically in Section 5.6.
Section 5.6 also applies the results to an analysis of the discrepancy discussed above
between the returns and earnings surprises of B/M sorted portfolios. Section 5.7
concludes.
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5.3 Empirical Framework
The main research question of this study asks whether the market reaction to earnings
surprise varies with B/M, default risk and forecast dispersion. In the context of the ERC
literature, this question asks whether the slope of the unexpected return-earnings
surprise varies with the three variables. However, the analysis also includes an earnings
torpedo or asymmetric intercept term, and the question is therefore slightly more
complicated: whether the slope and intercept terms vary with B/M, default risk and
forecast dispersion. The picture is made even more complicated by the fact that a flatter
slope is observed for negative surprises generally, and further allowances are therefore
required for this asymmetry.

To keep the analysis tractable and avoid confusing the reader, the analysis is divided
into three sections. With each progressive section, a layer of complexity is added to the
return-earnings relation. In the first section, a simple ERC specification is considered
which allows the slope of the return-earnings relation to vary with each of the three
control variables:

UR=β 0 +β1ES+β 2 G*ES+β3DR*ES +β 4 AA*ES+ε

(5.1)

In equation (5.1), UR is the unexpected return, ES is the earnings surprise or unexpected
return, and G, DR and AA are indicator variables 38. G takes on the values 0, 1, and 2 for
38

To make the results easier to interpret, the three variables (B/M, default risk and forecast dispersion)
are expressed as indicator or categorical variables which are also employed as regression dummy
variables. To this end, default risk is converted into a categorical variable of the same name (DR). B/M is
converted into to a growth score (G) with high B/M stocks having a low value of G and vice-versa.
Forecast dispersion is converted into an ‘analyst agreement’ score (AA) with high forecast dispersion
stocks having a low value of AA and vice-versa. The order of magnitude for G and AA are reversed
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stocks which are classified respectively as high B/M, intermediate B/M and low B/M;
thus G=2 for growth stocks and G=0 for value stocks. Similarly, DR takes on the values
0, 1, and 2 for stocks which are classified as low, intermediate and high default risk
respectively. AA, for ‘analyst agreement’, takes on the values 0, 1, and 2 for stocks
classified respectively as high, intermediate and low forecast dispersion; thus AA=0 for
high forecast dispersion (low analyst agreement) stocks and AA=2 for low forecast
dispersion (high analyst agreement) stocks. Variation in the ERC (or market reaction to
earnings surprise) with B/M, default risk and forecast dispersion is tested by examining
the coefficients β2, β3 and β4 respectively. To illustrate the interpretation of equation
(5.1), the ERC of value stocks equals β1, the ERC of intermediate B/M stocks is β1+β2,
and the ERC of growth stocks is β1+2β2. The approach adopted for the indicator
variables is similar to that adopted by Skinner and Sloan (2002) in defining their
GROWTH variable, except they employ five B/M categories while this study employs
only three, partly to avoid overly constraining the parameter values and partly because
the sample used here is much smaller.

Next, allowance is made for asymmetric slope coefficients between positive and
negative surprises as follows:

UR = β 0 + β 1 ES+ β 2 BAD * ES+ β 3 G * ES + β 4 G * BAD * ES
+ β 5 DR * ES + β 6 DR * BAD * ES + β 7 AA * ES + β 8 AA * BAD * ES + ε

(5.2)

because, based on the literature discussed in the introduction, the market reaction to earnings surprise is
expected to be an increasing function of G and AA.
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Equation (5.2) introduces the BAD indicator variables, which takes on the value of 1 if
ES<0 and 0 otherwise. Thus, value stocks with low DR and AA have an ERC of β1 for
positive surprise and β1+β2 for negative surprises; growth stocks with low DR and AA
have an ERC of β1+β2+2β3 for positive surprises and β1+β2+2β3+2β4 for negative
surprises. The results show that β2 is generally statistically significant and therefore the
term BAD*ES is included in all subsequent analyses. Variation in the ERC (or market
reaction to earnings surprise) with B/M, default risk and forecast dispersion is tested by
testing the coefficients β3, β5 and β7 respectively. Further tests examine whether the
incremental effect of these variables is different for negative surprises, via the
coefficients β4, β6 and β8 respectively. Fortunately, this task is made easier by the fact
that none of the terms β4, β6 or β8 is statistically significant, and to avoid clutter the
terms G*BAD*ES, DR*BAD*ES and AA*BAD*ES are omitted from the remaining
discussion and equations in this section.

Next, allowance is made for asymmetric intercept terms, without mixed terms involving
G, DR or AA:

UR = β 0 + β 1 G + β 2 BAD + β 3 G * BAD + β 4 ES+ β 5 BAD * ES+ β 6 G * ES + ε

(5.3a)

UR = β 0 + β 1 DR + β 2 BAD + β 3 DR * BAD + β 4 ES+ β 5 BAD * ES+ β 6 DR * ES + ε

(5.3b)

UR = β 0 + β 1 AA + β 2 BAD + β 3 AA * BAD + β 4 ES+ β 5 BAD * ES+ β 6 AA * ES + ε

(5.3c)

Equations (5.3a), (5.3b) and (5.3c) include asymmetric intercept terms which vary with
the sign of the surprise (β0 and β2), the categorisation of each stock by G, DR or AA
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(β1) and the interaction of the sign of the surprise with the categorisation by G, DR or
AA (β3). Thus equation (5.3a) for example gives us an estimate of the intercepts for
value and growth stocks; value stocks have intercept terms of β0 for positive surprises
and β0+β2 for negative surprises while growth stocks have intercept terms of β0+β1 for
positive surprises and β0+2β1+β2+2β3 for negative surprises. Note that Skinner and
Sloan (2002) find β3 to be a large negative number, implying a torpedo effect that is
particularly strong for growth stocks, and β1=0 implying that there is no residual value
premium after taking the growth-earnings torpedo into account.

Finally, the most significant terms from equations (5.3a), (5.3b) and (5.3c) are
combined; in other words the terms involving G, DR and AA are finally mixed in a
regression specification that allows for asymmetric slope and intercept terms.

5.4 Data and Methodology

5.4.1 Data
The data for this study are from five sources and is identical to the data used in Chapter
4. Financial data are sourced from the Aspect Huntley Datalink database, from which
are calculated book value of equity, earnings, cash earnings and debt. Monthly market
data are sourced from the AGSM SPPR database, from which market capitalisation,
used in the computation of the valuation ratios and to measure size, are calculated. Daily
market capitalisation data are sourced from SIRCA 39, which is used in the calculation of
DD. Analyst earnings forecast data is obtained from the I/B/E/S international summary
39

Data supplied by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) on
behalf of the Australian Securities Exchange.
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database 40. The financial data span the period from July 1994 till June 2006, the daily
market capitalisation data span the period from November 1994 till November 2007,
and the monthly market data span the period from January 1996 till December 2008.
The I/B/E/S data covers forecast dates from 1995 to 2006, and the earnings forecasts
themselves are for fiscal year-ends covering the period from 1996 to 2007. To be
included in the sample, firms must have fully-paid ordinary shares listed on the
Australian Stock exchange and be ranked in the top 300 by market capitalisation. As
was the case in Chapter 4 and for consistency with Doukas et al. (2002), the ranking by
market capitalisation is determined at the end of the fiscal year prior to the relevant
earnings forecast. From the resulting list of companies, property trusts, investment trusts
and shares of foreign or dual-listed companies are excluded.

5.4.2 Calculation of Unexpected Returns
Following Chan et al. (2006a), size-adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR)
are employed as a measure of unexpected returns, calculated over a return window
which covers the period from 180 trading days before to 60 trading days after the
earnings announcement date. This return window always commences after the forecast
date, and makes allowances for the post-earnings announcement drift documented in
Chan et al. (2006a). Observations where the announcement date occurs more than six
months after the fiscal year end are excluded. Following Skinner and Sloan (2002) and
Chan et al. (2006a), all abnormal returns are size-adjusted, computed as the buy-andhold stock return less the equally-weighted return on a size-matched portfolio. As in
Chan et al. (2006a) size-based quintiles on the top 500 ASX-listed stocks are formed.
Each stock is matched to a size quintile at the end of the month immediately before the
40

I/B/E/S Summary History data accessed via the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) website, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
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return measurement period. The size-adjusted return is the stock return over the period
from 180 trading days prior to the earnings announcement date to 60 trading days after
the announcement date, minus the return of the size-matched portfolio over the same
period. For robustness purposes abnormal returns are also computed as stock returns
less the equal-weighted return of the top 500 stocks over the same holding period 41.

5.4.3 Definition of Earnings Surprise
In this study, unexpected earnings are measured as the price-deflated difference between
actual earnings-per-share (EPS) for a company and the consensus analyst forecast from
the I/B/E/S database, in other words the earnings surprise (ES). For consistency with
Doukas et al. (2002) and Chapter 4, the consensus forecast is defined as the median
forecast issued eight months prior to fiscal year end, where three or more analysts have
contributed forecasts 42. The earnings surprise is deflated by the I/B/E/S stock price at
the forecast date to calculate ES.

As is well known, deflating earnings surprises by stock price creates a number of
extreme outliers (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Cohen and Lys, 2003). To circumvent
the influence of such outliers, the analysis follows similar research by excluding
earnings surprise observations outside the 1st and 99th percentiles.

41

Unlike a number of papers in the ERC literature, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS) are not used
because errors in risk adjustment are amplified over return windows as long as the one used in this study,
and because the correct model of expected returns is uncertain (Kothari and Warner, 2006).
42
The earnings surprise is minus one times the forecast error defined in Doukas et al. (2002); however
this definition is conventional in that a ‘positive’ (‘negative’) earnings surprise implies that a company
has beaten (failed to meet) the consensus forecast.
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5.4.4 Definition of Indicator Variables G, DR and AA
The indicator variables G, DR and AA are based respectively on rankings of the
underlying variables B/M, DD and forecast dispersion; for one of the robustness checks
G is also obtained from a firm’s ranking by E/P rather than from its ranking by B/M.
Firms are assigned a value of 0 if they are ranked in the top third of the sample by the
underlying variable and a value of 2 if they are ranked in the bottom third of the sample
by the underlying variable; otherwise a value of 1 is assigned. As was the case in
Chapter 4, B/M, E/P and DD are computed at the end of each month in the sample
period, and the ranking performed at the end of each month (AA is discussed below).
The ranking is performed each month because fiscal year-ends vary amongst
companies. Although all firms are included in the monthly sorts, the relevant G and DR
classifications assigned to a particular earnings surprise observation is the classification
that was current at the end of the fiscal year preceding the forecast, in other words four
months prior to the date of the forecast. For January year-end firms, the relevant G and
DR classifications are those that were current as at January in the year preceding the
forecast. For February year-end firms, the relevant G and DR classification are those
that were current as at February in the year preceding the forecast, and so on.

Unfortunately, there is a maximum of one earnings surprise observation per company
per year, and thus a maximum of one forecast dispersion observation per company per
year. The situation is unfortunate because fiscal year ends vary by company, and thus it
is not possible to include every company simultaneously in the monthly sorts. For AA
therefore, stocks are grouped by the calendar year in which the forecast was issued, and
the ranking is therefore based on calendar year rather than month. As most companies in

219

Australia have June year-ends, the analysis is later repeated using only June year-end
companies, with the dispersion calculation and ranking carried out the same time every
year (namely in October, as eight-month forecasts are used). The results do not
materially differ for this restricted sample, and the results are therefore not sensitive to
the original method of combining firms with the same forecast year to determine AA.

5.4.5 Calculation of B/M, E/P, DD and Forecast Dispersion
The method for calculation of B/M, E/P and DD is as described in Section 3.4 with the
exception of the timing of the calculations. In this study B/M, E/P and DD are
calculated at the end of every month, in order to perform the monthly sorts required for
the calculation of G and DR as described above. Thus, the timing of the calculation of
B/M, E/P and DD is consistent with Chapter 4, the other empirical chapter in this thesis
that is based upon analysts’ earnings forecasts. Forecast dispersion is defined as the
standard deviation of EPS forecasts for a company at the forecast date, divided by the
absolute value of the mean forecast for the company at the forecast date. The absolute
value of the mean forecast is used in the denominator rather than the mean forecast to
avoid artificially assigning low dispersion rankings to forecasts which have a negative
mean.
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5.5 Results

5.5.1 Preliminary Data Analysis
Table 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics for the sample data. Of particular interest
are the rank correlation coefficients in Panel B and the characteristics of portfolios
implied by the categorical variables G, DR and AA. First, Panel B shows that B/M and
DD are negatively correlated; confirming the earlier assertion in Section 5.2 that B/M
and default risk are correlated. Similarly, forecast dispersion is positively correlated
with B/M, confirming the results of Doukas et al. (2004), and negatively correlated with
DD (in other words, positively correlated with default risk). The correlation between
forecast dispersion and earnings surprise is especially noteworthy. Note that the
correlation is large and positive when earnings surprise is expressed in absolute value.
This result implies that high forecast dispersion is associated with large earnings
surprises of either sign, and confirms a similar result in Kinney et al. (2002). A
consequence of this result is that differences in dispersion are expected to add more
explanatory power over the ERC for larger earnings surprises, where the slope of the
returns-earnings relation is generally flatter, than for earnings surprises close to zero
where the slope is generally steeper (as previously documented in Freeman and Tse,
1992, and others).

Panel C illustrates the stock characteristics implied by the levels of each the three
categorical variables used to measure the effect of B/M, default risk and forecast
dispersion on the market reaction to earnings surprise. The levels range from 0 (lowest)
to 2 (highest). Of particular interest are the average earnings surprises (ES) and buy221

hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of stocks grouped by G. B/M increases from 0.2524 for
the high G portfolio to 0.9764 for the low G portfolio; similarly BHAR increases from 0.05 to 0.0447, consistent with the direct relationship between returns and B/M.
However, notice that the average ES for the low G portfolio is large and negative (0.0179) while the average ES for the high G portfolio (-0.0091) whilst still negative is
not as large in absolute value. Consistent with the results of Doukas et al. (2002), this
pattern reflects the direct relationship between forecast optimism and B/M, and as
discussed in Section 5.2 forms the motivation for the study.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics and Correlations
The following table shows summary statistics and correlations of the main variables in
this study, and characteristics of portfolios formed by grouping stocks by the indicator
variables G, DR and AA. ES is the price-deflated earnings surprise based on analysts’
consensus median earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast issued eight months prior to fiscal
year end. BHAR is the size-adjusted buy and hold abnormal return over the period from
180 trading days prior to the earnings announcement date to 60 trading days after the
announcement date. B/M is the book-to-market ratio calculated as the book value of
equity from the company’s latest balance sheet divided by market capitalisation at the
end of the fiscal year prior to the forecast. DD is the distance-to-default calculated in
accordance with Section 5.4.5. Dispersion is the standard deviation of EPS forecasts for
a company at the forecast date, divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast for
the company at the forecast date. Analyst Coverage is the number of analysts who
contributed forecasts as part of the consensus forecast. Market capitalisation is the
market capitalisation of the company which is the subject of the EPS forecast, at the end
of the fiscal year prior to the forecast. G, DR and AA are based respectively on rankings
of the underlying variables B/M, DD and dispersion with values of 0, 1 and 2 assigned
if firm is ranked in the top, middle and bottom thirds of the sample respectively, by the
underlying variable. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by
‘n’.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Raw Variables

n
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Median
Standard
Deviation
25th
Percentile
75th
Percentile
Skewness
Kurtosis

Market
Capitalisation
($millions)
1651
75
101,376
3,345
901

ES
1651
-0.4521
0.0720
-0.0117
-0.0017

BHAR
1651
-1.1223
5.7302
0.0009
-0.0245

B/M
1651
0.0149
3.3251
0.5891
0.5211

DD
1635
-0.42
24.83
6.64
6.33

Dispersion
1651
0.0055
30.0000
0.1357
0.0731

Analyst
Coverage
1651
3.00
20.00
8.74
9.00

0.0442

0.3949

0.3797

3.41

0.7647

3.78

7,361

-0.0152

-0.2152

0.3440

4.27

0.0453

6.00

389

0.0047
-4.78
36.29

0.1694
2.86
34.66

0.7443
1.96
10.45

8.54
0.78
4.29

0.1253
36.35
1411.59

11.75
0.31
2.29

2,920
5.13
39.71

Panel B: Rank Correlation Coefficients
B/M
DD
Dispersion
BHAR
ES

DD
-0.373

Dispersion
0.217
-0.313

BHAR
0.100
0.035
-0.084
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ES
-0.057
0.135
-0.155
0.372

|ES|
0.209
-0.266
0.402
-0.077
-0.329

Table 5.1 Summary Statistics and Correlations (continued)
Panel C: Characteristics of Stocks Grouped by Indicator Variables
Variable
G

DR

AA

Category
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
2

n
537
624
490
500
586
549
512
561
578

B/M
0.9764
0.5201
0.2524
0.3917
0.5585
0.8032
0.7029
0.5878
0.4895

DD
4.9742
6.4580
8.4730
10.3220
6.4209
3.5138
5.5074
6.5251
7.5646

Dispersion
0.1332
0.1115
0.1693
0.0779
0.1681
0.1526
0.3065
0.0792
0.0392

ES
-0.0179
-0.0085
-0.0091
-0.0041
-0.0100
-0.0206
-0.0213
-0.0102
-0.0048

BHAR
0.0447
0.0031
-0.0500
-0.0035
-0.0193
0.0272
-0.0187
-0.0022
0.0213

5.5.2 Response Coefficients with simple slope dummy variables
Table 5.2 presents the results for the analyses in which the unexpected return-earnings
surprise relation is modelled as a linear function, but with the slope of the function
allowed to vary with B/M, default risk and analyst agreement. As in Kinney et al.
(2002), estimates over progressively narrower ranges about zero of ES are included to
observe the effect of non-linearity on the results. The well known S-shape is manifest in
the increase in slope as |ES| approaches zero.

Using all earnings surprise observations, Table 5.2 shows an ERC of around 2.7 43.
However, all three variables add explanatory power when introduced in isolation of one
another. The difference in ERC between value and growth stocks, captured by the
coefficient on G*ES, is statistically significant and large in economic terms, ranging
from around 6 for all observations to 10 for |ES|<0.02. Using all observations, value
stocks have an ERC close to zero (no reaction) while growth stocks have an ERC
around 6 (2*3.0). However, the ERC for both value and growth stocks increases as the
range of ES is narrowed. Default risk has an inverse relationship with the ERC, as

43

An ERC of 2.7 implies that a change in price-deflated earnings surprise of 0.01 (i.e. a change in
unexpected earnings-per-share of 1% of the share price) leads to 2.7% change in unexpected return.
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evidenced by the negative coefficient on DR*ES. Using all observations, it is found that
high DR stocks have an ERC of around 1.5 (6.606-2*2.577) while low DR stocks have
an ERC of 6.6. In accordance with Kinney et al. (2002), the ERC appears to be
positively related to AA, but only for large ES (also consistent with Kinney et al.,
2002). Notice also that the incremental value stays around 3, until |ES| is restricted to
less than 0.02.

With all three slope dummies present, the least significant variable is DR*ES. Thus, any
explanatory power DR has over ERC appears to be due to its correlation with the other
two variables. If DR is excluded, both G and AA are significant until |ES| is restricted to
0.02. In general, Table 5.2 shows ERC increasing as ES become smaller in absolute
value (consistent with the S-shape), and increasing with both G and AA. Value stocks
with low analyst agreement have an ERC close to zero based on all observations, or
about 4 based on observation where |ES|<0.05. At the other extreme, growth stocks with
high analyst agreement have an ERC of around 11 based on all observations, or 15
based on |ES|<0.05.
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Table 5.2: Earnings Response Coefficients Conditional on Book-to-Market (G),
Default Risk (DR) and Analyst Agreement (AA)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the regression equation
UR it = β 0 + β1 ESit + β 2 G it * ESit + β 3 DR it * ESit + β 4 AA it * ESit + ε it , where URit is the
size-adjusted buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) of stock i in year t, and ESit is the
earnings surprise of stock i in year t, Git, DRit and AAit are indicator variables based on
B/M, DD and forecast dispersion as defined in Section 5.3.4. The coefficients are
estimated using the Fama-MacBeth procedure; in other words they are the time-series
averages from a series of 12 yearly cross-sectional regressions; the t-statistics (in
parenthesis) are based upon the time-series of estimated coefficients. Significance levels
are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).
Range |ES|<
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02

Intercept
0.027
(2.264**)
0.034
(2.254**)
0.023
(1.372)
0.028
(2.243**)
0.035
(2.297**)
0.023
(1.312)
0.027
(2.131*)
0.034
(2.184*)
0.023
(1.309)
0.024
(2.116*)
0.033
(2.271**)
0.019
(1.205)
0.027
(2.162*)
0.036
(2.314**)
0.022
(1.270)
0.028
(2.235**)
0.035
(2.320**)
0.02
(1.239)

ES
2.669
(5.698***)
7.655
(8.383***)
11.937
(8.139***)
0.814
(1.007)
4.938
(3.580***)
6.654
(1.992*)
6.606
(8.278***)
9.78
(6.613***)
15.834
(7.965***)
1.949
(4.197***)
5.909
(4.921***)
8.907
(2.931**)
1.896
(1.435)
4.134
(2.688**)
7.031
(1.884*)
0.138
(0.136)
3.676
(2.827**)
5.013
(1.631)

G*ES

DR*ES

AA*ES

Average
Adjusted R2
6.4%
11.7%
9.3%

2.967
(4.116***)
3.672
(2.469**)
5.36
(2.241**)

11.0%
14.9%
11.7%
-2.577
(-4.745***)
-1.587
(-1.395)
-3.976
(-1.932*)

1.819
(1.696)
3.582
(2.617**)
3.487
(1.492)
2.34
(2.526**)
3.275
(2.156*)
3.583
(1.306)
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-0.945
(-1.635)
-0.145
(-0.139)
-1.643
(-1.026)

9.7%
12.7%
10.4%
2.845
(3.189***)
2.724
(2.751**)
3.433
(1.016)
2.796
(3.883***)
2.019
(2.011*)
3.21
(0.898)
2.986
(4.190***)
2.394
(2.518**)
3.567
(1.017)

9.1%
13.1%
11.6%
13.6%
16.3%
13.4%
13.0%
16.1%
13.4%

5.5.3 Response Coefficients with asymmetric slope dummy variables
A further dummy variable is now introduced to account for the flatter slope of the
return-earnings relation for negative ES (the flatter slope for negative ES is a
consequence of shareholders’ limited liability and the compounding of returns over a
long window). The statistical significance of the incremental slope parameter
(BAD*ES) is now studied as well as that of the interaction of BAD with each of the
other three variables, G, DR and AA (G*BAD, DR*BAD and AA*BAD respectively).
The interaction terms allow for the possibility that the incremental effect on ERC of a
variable, for example G, is not the same for positive and negative surprises. In Table
5.3, the ERC for value and growth stocks with positive surprises are β1 and β1+2β3
respectively, whilst for negative surprises they are β1+β2 and β1+β2+2β3+2β4
respectively. The coefficient on G*BAD*ES (β4) thus allows the difference in ERC
(slope term) between value and growth stocks to be greater or smaller for negative
surprises than for positive surprises.

In Table 5.3, the coefficient on BAD*ES (β2) is statistically significant in nearly all the
cases except for cases where |ES|<0.02, confirming the overall flatter slope of the
return-earnings relation over negative surprises. The adjusted R2 values in Table 5.3 are
higher by about 3% than those in Table 5.2 when the estimation includes all ES, but
around the same for |ES|<0.02. Thus, allowing for a flatter slope for negative surprises
adds explanatory power particularly for large earnings surprises. This result is intuitive
because the limited liability of equity (returns cannot be less than -100%) is not likely to
come into play for small earnings surprises, which are not indicative of catastrophic
losses.
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Note however that the inclusion of BAD*ES does not appear to affect the statistical
significance of terms involving G*ES, DR*ES or AA*ES; the coefficients on these
terms (β3, β5 and β7) all remain highly statistically significant. The ERC of growth
stocks is higher than that of value stocks by around 5 (2β3). Similarly, the ERC of high
default risk stocks is lower than that of high default risk stocks by around 4 (2β5) and
the ERC of high analyst agreement stocks is higher than that of low analyst agreement
stocks by around 4 (2β7).

There is little evidence in Table 5.3 that the term G*BAD*ES is significant. Therefore,
although the ERC appears different for value and growth stocks, the difference in ERC
is not affected by the sign of the earnings surprise. Similarly, neither DR*BAD*ES nor
AA*BAD*ES are statistically significant. Thus, the incremental effect of both DR and
AA on the ERC does not appear to vary between positive and negative surprises,
although the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation is generally flatter for negative
surprises than for positive surprises. Henceforth, the interaction terms G*BAD*ES,
DR*BAD*ES and AA*BAD*ES are excluded from the analysis because they appear to
add little explanatory power.

Finally, the initial three variables (G, DR and AA) and the BAD indicator variable are
included without the interaction terms, with the conclusion from the previous section
remaining unaltered. The coefficients of G*ES and AA*ES are statistically significant
while that of DR*ES is not, suggesting DR adds explanatory power only because it is
correlated with G and AA. Thus, the market response to earnings surprise depends on G
and AA but not DR. The ERC estimates are higher by around 4 (2β3) for growth stocks
228

than for value stocks, higher by around 5 (2β7) for high analyst agreement stocks than
for low analyst agreement stocks, and higher by around 8 (β2) for positive than for
negative surprises.
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Table 5.3: Earnings Response Coefficients Conditional on Book-to-Market (G), Default Risk (DR) and Analyst Agreement (AA) and the
Sign of Earnings Surprise (BAD)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression equation.
UR it = β 0 + β 1 ESit + β 2 BAD it * ES it + β 3 G it * ESit + β 4 G it * BAD it * ESit + β 5 DR it * ESit + β 6 DR it * BAD it * ESit
+ β 7 AA it * ESit + β 8 AA it * BAD it * ESit + ε it
All variables are as per Table 5.2 with the exception of BADit, which takes the value of 1 if ESit<0 and 0 otherwise. All other details are as per
Table 5.2.
Range
|ES|<
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All

Intercept
-0.022
(-1.757)
0.004
(0.230)
0.004
(0.188)
-0.024
(-1.890*)
0.006
(0.309)
0.002
(0.107)
-0.019
(-1.342)
0.003
(0.144)
0.009
(0.350)
-0.020
(-1.511)
0.005
(0.257)
0.012
(0.449)
-0.021

ES
9.290
(5.068***)
9.226
(3.298***)
10.638
(2.283**)
9.836
(4.237***)
10.712
(3.358***)
13.911
(2.124*)
13.217
(7.507***)
13.868
(4.248***)
19.391
(4.304***)
14.253
(3.910***)
12.564
(3.718***)
16.474
(3.152***)
9.869

BAD*ES
-9.470
(-6.253***)
-6.464
(-1.953*)
-6.624
(-1.414)
-10.001
(-5.065***)
-8.011
(-2.389**)
-14.186
(-1.777)
-8.783
(-4.220***)
-6.557
(-1.820*)
-5.495
(-0.945)
-9.560
(-2.326**)
-4.531
(-1.285)
0.635
(0.093)
-8.846
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G*ES
2.451
(3.503***)
3.519
(2.435**)
5.258
(2.540**)
1.944
(0.782)
1.281
(0.451)
1.762
(0.333)

G*BAD*ES

DR*ES

DR*BAD*ES

AA*ES

AA*BAD*ES

Average
Adjusted R2
15.1%
16.9%
11.7%

0.431
(0.167)
2.588
(0.751)
6.630
(0.946)

16.2%
19.0%
15.5%
-1.957
(-3.292***)
-1.449
(-1.218)
-4.122
(-2.065*)
-2.098
(-1.140)
-0.393
(-0.218)
-1.225
(-0.298)

13.8%
14.9%
11.0%
-0.012
(-0.006)
-1.454
(-0.846)
-5.641
(-1.179)

14.0%
14.9%
12.1%
2.161

12.6%

Range
|ES|<
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02
All
0.05
0.02

Intercept
(-1.979*)
0.000
(-0.025)
0.003
(0.108)
-0.025
(-2.238**)
-0.004
(-0.217)
-0.004
(-0.171)
-0.016
(-1.115)
0.003
(0.137)
0.004
(0.162)
-0.017
(-1.255)
0.002
(0.100)
0.002
(0.106)

ES
(6.403***)
10.485
(3.870***)
12.603
(4.719***)
7.756
(4.470***)
8.902
(3.097**)
5.152
(1.580)
8.594
(3.451***)
8.429
(2.880**)
11.528
(3.586***)
7.815
(3.380***)
8.132
(3.056**)
8.864
(2.816**)

BAD*ES
(-5.871***)
-7.126
(-2.203**)
-6.225
(-1.138)
-6.639
(-3.450***)
-5.222
(-1.319)
3.338
(0.482)
-8.476
(-4.490***)
-7.083
(-2.100*)
-6.543
(-1.342)
-8.569
(-4.962***)
-6.963
(-2.223**)
-6.529
(-1.398)
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G*ES

1.718
(1.730)
3.641
(2.845**)
3.280
(1.654)
2.073
(2.182*)
3.208
(2.159*)
3.503
(1.430)

G*BAD*ES

DR*ES

-0.476
(-0.709)
-0.019
(-0.015)
-1.927
(-1.157)

DR*BAD*ES

AA*ES
(3.818***)
2.556
(2.814**)
3.368
(1.018)
6.459
(3.184***)
5.275
(3.229***)
11.362
(2.139*)
2.388
(4.100***)
1.882
(1.858*)
2.931
(0.825)
2.406
(4.454***)
2.245
(2.497**)
3.501
(0.999)

AA*BAD*ES

Average
Adjusted R2
15.0%
12.0%

-4.101
(-1.548)
-3.089
(-1.072)
-10.530
(-1.727)

13.8%
16.1%
14.5%
17.1%
18.2%
13.4%
16.4%
17.9%
13.4%

5.5.4 Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts
The analysis is now extended to cases where the intercept terms in the unexpected
return-earnings surprise relationship vary with the three main variables (G, DR and AA)
and also with the sign of the earnings surprise 44. In order to keep the analysis and
discussion tractable, this functional form is investigated separately for each of the main
variables before a more complicated model is examined which includes all of the main
variables. The simplified analysis, where the main variables are examined one at a time,
is the subject of this section. Furthermore, as the asymmetric intercept terms capture
much of the non-linearity associated with ES close to zero, attention is focused on
regressions based on an unrestricted range of ES.

Asymmetric Intercepts and slopes conditional on G

The unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship is first estimated with asymmetric
intercepts as a function of G only; the results are shown in Table 5.4. The intercept
terms for positive surprises are β0 for value stocks and β0+2β1 for growth stocks. The
intercept terms for negative surprises are β0+β2 for value stocks and β0+2β1+β2+2β3 for
growth stocks. The coefficient on G is not statistically significant in any of the
specifications tested, indicating the absence of a residual value premium in the presence
of the other explanatory variables.

44

The effect of allowing the intercept to vary between positive and negative surprises introduces a point
of discontinuity at ES=0 and permits incorporation of the ‘Earnings Torpedo’. The Earnings Torpedo is
the large negative price response to firms announcing earnings-per-share even marginally below analyst
expectations. Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that this effect is greater in growth than in value stocks and
is an important factor in the value premium.
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In contrast, the coefficient on BAD (β2) is large and statistically significant in each of
the specifications that include it as an explanatory variable, supporting the existence of
an earnings torpedo effect (note however, that the earnings torpedo may merely be a
manifestation of the steepness of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship
around ES=0). The coefficient on G*BAD is also statistically significant in all the
specifications that include it except when G is also included, in which case its t-statistic
is larger than that of G. Thus, it can be inferred that the negative intercept term for
negative surprises is much larger (in absolute value) for growth stocks than for value
stocks, a result in accordance with Skinner and Sloan (2002).

The intercept terms implied by the various specifications support the same inference
regarding the asymmetric effects of negative surprises on value and growth stocks. In
the specification that includes all three of the terms G, BAD and G*BAD, the intercept
term is -3.1% for value stocks with negative surprises and -12.7% for growth stocks
with negative surprises 45. The corresponding terms in the specification that includes
only BAD and G*BAD are -3.2% and -12.6% 46. Thus the torpedo effect is large in
economic terms and especially so for growth stocks; in other words growth stocks are
more heavily punished than value stocks for missing earnings forecasts.

In contrast, there is a smaller and statistically insignificant difference between value and
growth stocks in the implied intercept terms for positive surprises. The difference
between value and growth stocks in the intercept term for positive surprises is given by
2β1 and has a largest (absolute) value of 6.2%, which occurs in the specification that
includes G and BAD but not G*BAD. However, the omission of G*BAD constrains the
45
46

These terms are computed as (0.084 – 0.115) and (0.084 – 2(0.014) – 0.115 – 2(0.034)) respectively.
These terms are computed as (0.064 – 0.096) and (0.064 – 0.096 – 2(0.047)) respectively.
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value-growth differential to be the same for both positive and negative surprises, and
the figure of 6.2% thus represents an average difference between value and growth
stocks with both positive and negative surprises. The specifications that include
G*BAD allow the value-growth differential to differ between positive and negative
surprises, and in such cases, the difference in the positive intercept term (2β1) is either 2.8% or +4.4%. Furthermore, β1 is not statistically significant in any of the
specifications tested. Thus the value-growth differential observed for positive surprises
is inconsistent in sign, not statistically significant and much smaller in absolute value
than the differential observed for negative surprises (which is around 9% or greater).

Table 5.4: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts
Conditional on Book-to-Market (G)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression
equation.
UR it = β 0 + β 1 G it + β 2 BAD it + β 3 G it * BAD it + β 4 ES it + β 5 BAD it * ES it + β 6 G it * ES it + ε it

All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Intercept
0.001

G
-0.022

BAD

(0.024)

(-0.932)

0.103

-0.031

-0.149

(2.201*)

(-1.232)

(-5.231***)

0.084

-0.014

-0.115

(1.624)

(-0.433)

(-2.986**)

0.012
(0.398)

G*BAD

ES
9.022

BAD*ES
-9.112

G*ES
2.312

(5.270***)

(-5.942***)

(3.202***)

5.289

-5.759

1.875

(2.833**)

(-3.117***)

(2.408**)

-0.034

5.759

-6.071

1.488

(-1.271)

(2.853**)

(-3.172***)

(1.879*)

0.022

-0.100

8.024

-7.930

1.060

(0.966)

(-5.089***)

(4.826***)

(-5.057***)

(1.244)

0.064

-0.141

5.960

-6.579

2.061

(2.760**)

(-5.714***)

(2.961**)

(-3.741***)

(2.711**)

0.031

-0.085

7.840

-7.604

1.355

(1.391)

(-3.903***)

(4.037***)

(-4.316***)

(1.693)

0.064

-0.096

-0.047

6.279

-6.659

1.655

(2.723**)

(-4.852***)

(-1.981*)

(3.241***)

(-3.640***)

(1.996*)
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Average
Adjusted R2
16.6%
18.9%
18.9%
18.5%
17.3%
17.6%
18.1%

Asymmetric Intercepts and slopes conditional on DR

The results involving asymmetric intercepts and slopes conditioned on DR are presented
in Table 5.5. As before, the BAD dummy variable is highly statistically significant in all
specifications tested, supporting the existence of a general earnings torpedo effect
(different intercept for positive and negative surprises).

The evidence in Table 5.5 suggests that of all the variables considered, DR and
DR*BAD are redundant. When DR is included, it is quite small in magnitude and
statistically insignificant, except when DR*BAD is included and BAD is omitted.
Similarly, DR*BAD is quite small in magnitude and statistically insignificant except
when BAD is excluded. The sign of the coefficient on DR*BAD is positive when BAD
is included but negative when BAD is omitted. Given the strong evidence regarding the
importance of BAD, it is therefore likely the estimate of DR*BAD is heavily biased by
the omission of BAD. Similarly, the significance of DR in the fourth specification
appears to be an over-compensation for the effect of DR*BAD. To see this, note that the
implied intercept term for low DR firms in this specification is β0 = -1.5% for both
positive and negative surprises, a result which appears inconsistent with the fact that
growth stocks are heavily represented amongst low DR firms, and that the earlier results
confirm that growth stocks are heavily punished by the market for missing analyst
expectations.
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Table 5.5: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts
Conditional on Default Risk (DR)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression
equation.
UR it = β 0 + β1 DR it + β 2 BAD it + β 3 DR it * BAD it + β 4 ESit + β 5 BAD it * ESit
+ β 6 DR it * ESit + ε it
All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Intercept
-0.025

DR
0.006

BAD

(-1.090)

(0.476)

0.057

0.014

-0.146

(1.950*)

(1.032)

(-5.682***)

0.065

0.008

-0.159

(2.121*)

(0.323)

(-4.600***)

-0.015
(-0.644)

DR*BAD

ES
13.186

BAD*ES
-8.805

DR*ES
-1.917

(7.162***)

(-4.077***)

(-3.077**)

8.685

-5.757

-1.369

(4.317***)

(-2.557**)

(-1.944*)

0.010

8.329

-5.887

-1.065

(0.302)

(4.439***)

(-2.514**)

(-1.432)

0.050

-0.078

11.288

-6.609

-2.290

(2.522**)

(-3.268***)

(5.573***)

(-2.820**)

(-4.078***)

0.065

-0.140

9.100

-6.084

-1.454

(2.665**)

(-5.541***)

(4.537***)

(-2.731**)

(-2.201*)

0.006

-0.040

12.581

-7.984

-2.219

(0.297)

(-2.434**)

(6.207***)

(-3.304***)

(-3.835***)

0.066

-0.159

0.018

8.688

-6.037

-1.171

(2.679**)

(-5.508***)

(0.956)

(4.570***)

(-2.675**)

(-1.571)

Average
Adjusted
R2
14.1%
16.3%
16.3%
15.2%
15.9%
14.6%
16.3%

Asymmetric Intercepts and slopes conditional on AA

The intercept terms of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation are now
investigated for dependence upon AA. Table 5.6 shows little evidence that AA affects
the intercept either for positive or negative surprises. AA and AA*BAD are significant
only in the fourth specification where the two variables are included together and BAD,
which is once again highly significant in the other specifications, is omitted. The
estimated coefficients in this specification imply that the intercept term for firms with
high AA and negative surprises is -6.3% 47. This return is only slightly below the
intercept term for low AA firms with either positive or negative surprises, which is β0 =
-5.9% in both cases. Therefore, the results based on this specification imply the unlikely
scenario whereby high AA firms are not punished by the market any more severely for
47

This value is computed as (-0.059 + 2(0.071) – 2(0.73)).
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missing analysts’ forecasts than low AA firms, or even low AA firms that beat analysts’
forecasts. Therefore, the fourth specification is rejected, on grounds that the parameters
appear biased due to the omission of BAD. Consequently it is concluded that the
intercept terms in the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation are not dependent
upon AA.

At first glance, the inference that the magnitude of the intercept term (or earnings
torpedo effect) is unrelated to AA might seem unintuitive, as a high level of AA implies
a lower level of uncertainty regarding the ‘true’ level of expected earnings and hence a
greater degree of agreement that the earnings surprise variable is a ‘true’ measure of
unexpected earnings. However, recall from Section 5.5.1 (see also Kinney et al., 2002)
that the magnitude (or absolute value) of ES is itself related to AA, and thus for small
ES AA does not add much new information already contained in ES. Put differently,
high levels of AA are generally associated with small ES (of either sign), and there are
proportionately fewer small ES associated with lower levels of AA. Thus, AA does not
vary enough when |ES| is small for it to have an effect on the intercept term (or earnings
torpedo).
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Table 5.6: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts
Conditional on Analyst Agreement (AA)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression
equation.
UR it = β 0 + β1 AA it + β 2 BAD it + β 3 AA it * BAD it + β 4 ESit + β 5 BAD it * ESit
+ β 6 AA it * ESit + ε it
All variables are as defined in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Intercept
-0.066

AA
0.038

BAD

(-2.409**)

(1.523)

0.024

0.030

-0.128

(0.925)

(1.213)

(-5.096***)

0.011

0.038

-0.109

(0.281)

(1.357)

(-1.830*)

-0.059
(-2.286**)

AA*BAD

ES
10.218

BAD*ES
-9.677

AA*ES
2.673

(6.481***)

(-6.540***)

(5.514***)

6.878

-6.622

2.094

(4.213***)

(-4.402***)

(5.348***)

-0.016

7.437

-7.151

1.653

(-0.413)

(3.681***)

(-4.025***)

(3.078**)

0.071

-0.073

9.456

-8.808

1.446

(2.712**)

(-4.761***)

(6.206***)

(-6.256***)

(3.825***)

0.060

-0.130

6.807

-6.153

1.602

(2.531**)

(-4.708***)

(4.026***)

(-3.547***)

(3.422***)

-0.007

-0.028

9.659

-8.611

1.642

(-0.472)

(-1.364)

(7.242***)

(-7.296***)

(3.736***)

0.060

-0.160

0.025

6.499

-6.291

2.013

(2.572**)

(-2.908**)

(0.738)

(3.465***)

(-3.720***)

(4.838***)

Average
Adjusted
R2
15.4%
16.9%
17.2%
16.2%
14.3%
13.6%
16.5%

5.5.5 Response Coefficients with slope dummy variables, asymmetric
intercepts and multiple conditioning variables
Thus far, the analysis has separately investigated variation in the slope and intercepts of
the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation. Variation in the slope was found to be
explained by the control variables G, DR and AA and the negative surprise indicator
BAD, although the explanatory power of DR is lower in the presence of the other two
control variables. The most important explanatory variables for the intercept terms were
found to be BAD and G*BAD. A more complete version of this relation is now
estimated incorporating both asymmetric intercept and slope terms and the most
significant of the variables from the preceding analyses.

Table 5.7 shows the results of estimation of various specifications of the unexpected
return-earnings surprise relation. G is retained as a dummy variable for some of the
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specifications because it represents a well-established empirical fact (the value
premium), and hence its omission might bias the results. However, it is statistically
insignificant in the presence of the other variables, whose parameter estimates and
significance levels are largely unaffected by its presence. As was the case with the
previous analyses, the indicator variable for negative surprises (BAD) remains
significant by itself as a dummy variable for the intercept and when interacted with ES
as a slope dummy variables. Thus, the return-earnings surprise relation for negative
surprises is characterised by a negative intercept (generally around 5%) and a slope
which is close to zero. As was the case in Table 5.4, the coefficient on G*BAD is
generally statistically significant and of the order of around 0.05. Thus, the much larger
negative intercept term for growth stocks remains in evidence and is of similar
magnitude (around 10%).

The most remarkable feature of Table 5.7 is the coefficient of G*ES, which represents
the incremental slope of the return-earnings surprise relation for growth stocks. This
coefficient is always around 1.0 (implying an increase in ERC of around 2 for growth
stocks relative to value stocks) but is not significantly significant. The result is
remarkable because B/M is a proxy for both growth and persistence, which have been
identified in the literature as important determinants of the ERC. The difference
between Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3, where the coefficient G*ES is around 3.0 and
statistically significant, and Table 5.7 is the presence of the asymmetric intercept terms
BAD and G*BAD. Two of the specifications in Table 5.7 show that the importance of
growth on the slope of the return-earnings relation is not revived by splitting its effect
into positive and negative surprises (via the G*BAD*ES and G*GOOD*ES variables).
The final specification in Table 5.7, which excludes G*ES, has a slightly lower adjusted
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R2 (17.2%) than the similar specification which includes G*ES (18.7%). Given previous
results in the literature, the relatively small sample size (compared with US studies) and
the fact that the t-statistic on G*ES is greater than 1, this study is reluctant to conclude
that B/M has no effect whatsoever upon the slope of the return-earnings relationship.
Nevertheless, the results suggest that B/M, as a proxy for either growth or earnings
persistence, might not be as important a determinant of the slope of return-earnings
relation as was previously thought.

The results pertaining to DR*ES and AA*ES are consistent with the results of Section
5.5.2. The coefficient of AA*ES of around 2 is slightly smaller than its value (around 3)
in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, however it remains statistically significant. The coefficient of
DR*ES is small (for a slope coefficient) and statistically insignificant. Thus, the most
important variable that affects the slope of unexpected return-earnings surprise relation
in

this

study

is

AA,

a

result

consistent
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with

Kinney

et

al.

(2002).

Table 5.7: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts and Multiple Conditioning Variables
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression equation.
UR it = β 0 + β 1G it + β 2 BAD it + β 3 G it * BAD it + β 4 DR it * BAD it + β 5 ESit + β 6 BAD it * ESit + β 7 G it * ESit + β 8 DR it * ESit + β 9 AA it * ESit
β 10 G it * BAD it * ESit + β11G it * GOOD it * ESit + ε it
All variables are as per Tables 5.2 and 5.3 with the exception of GOODit, which takes the value of 1 if ESit>0 and 0 otherwise. All other details
are as per Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Intercept
0.075

G
-0.012

BAD
-0.075

G*BAD
-0.049

DR*BAD
-0.005

ES
5.623

BAD*ES
-5.534

G*ES
0.900

DR*ES
-0.296

AA*ES
1.683

G*BAD*ES

G*GOOD*ES

(1.459)

(-0.371)

(-2.826**)

(-3.055**)

(-0.193)

(2.301**)

(-2.589**)

(0.918)

(-0.361)

(3.019**)

0.074

-0.011

-0.086

-0.047

6.108

-5.73

0.719

-0.5

1.703

(1.424)

(-0.334)

(-2.239**)

(-2.093*)

(2.319**)

(-2.775**)

(0.740)

(-0.782)

(3.275***)

0.059

-0.059

-0.059

-0.004

5.902

-6.011

1.056

-0.229

1.836

(2.283**)

(-1.388)

(-2.004*)

(-0.166)

(2.383**)

(-2.937**)

(0.955)

(-0.264)

(3.081**)

0.059

-0.071

-0.056

6.387

-6.186

0.882

-0.449

1.861

(2.309**)

(-3.337***)

(-2.572**)

(2.562**)

(-3.141***)

(0.858)

(-0.693)

(3.356***)

0.058

-0.076

-0.05

5.582

-6.352

1.355

1.905

(2.421**)

(-4.248***)

(-2.137*)

(2.452**)

(-3.368***)

(1.247)

(3.759***)

0.057

-0.076

-0.053

5.994

-6.683

1.538

1.052

1.029

(2.318**)

(-5.097***)

(-2.504**)

(2.560**)

(-3.585***)

(3.326***)

(0.992)

(0.418)

20.2%
20.1%
19.4%
18.7%

0.084

-0.021

-0.103

-0.032

5.000

-5.696

1.536

1.087

2.076

(1.503)
0.060
(2.544***)

(-0.631)

(-2.516**)
-0.043
(-1.699)

(-1.161)
-0.084
(-3.288***)

(1.642)
6.739
(3.848***)

(-2.269**)
-5.933
(-3.333***)

(3.446***)
1.667
(3.821***)

(1.030)

(0.940)
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Average
Adjusted
R2
20.8%

19.4%
19.6%
17.2%

Table 5.8: Earnings Response Coefficients with Asymmetric Intercepts and Multiple Conditioning Variables (Robustness Tests)
The following table displays the estimated coefficients from the following regression equation.
UR it = β 0 + β1G it + β 2 BAD it + β 3 G it * BAD it + β 5 ESit + β 6 BAD it * ESit + β 7 G it * ESit + β 8 DR it * ESit + β 9 AA it * ESit + ε it
All variables and details are as per Tables 5.2 and 5.3, with the exception of G in the cases of ‘Growth defined by E/P’ and ‘Growth defined by
E/P+’ where G is based on ranking by earnings-to-price (E/P) and not book-to-market. In the case ‘Growth defined by E/P+’ stocks with E/P<0
are excluded from the ranking procedure.
Panel A: Estimation Based On Alternative Sample Selection Criteria
Case
Excluding Losses a
June Year End Companies a
Excluding Small ES

Intercept
0.058
(2.181*)
0.080
(2.946**)
0.082
(2.803**)

BAD
-0.066
(-2.043*)
-0.083
(-3.838***)
-0.098
(-3.850***)

G*BAD
-0.051
(-1.827*)
-0.060
(-2.286**)
-0.057
(-2.273**)

ES
6.198
(2.477**)
1.893
(0.600)
5.369
(2.085*)

BAD*ES
-6.116
(-2.422**)
-3.128
(-1.445)
-5.242
(-2.631**)

G*ES
0.730
(0.580)
2.107
(1.361)
0.879
(0.815)

DR*ES
-0.154
(-0.284)
0.138
(0.154)
-0.407
(-0.624)

AA*ES
2.246
(2.428**)
3.207
(2.738**)
1.808
(3.218***)

Average Adjusted R2
18.5%
22.8%
20.2%

Panel B: Estimation Based On Alternative Variable Definitions
Case
Market-Adjusted Returns
Growth defined by E/P b
Growth defined by E/P+ b

Intercept
0.062
(1.870*)
0.059
(2.346**)
0.056
(2.309**)

BAD
-0.074
(-3.057**)
-0.071
(-2.488**)
-0.067
(-2.258**)

G*BAD
-0.057
(-2.558**)
-0.064
(-2.308**)
-0.058
(-2.008*)

ES
6.317
(2.699**)
8.041
(3.104**)
7.936
(3.055**)

BAD*ES
-6.283
(-3.453***)
-6.171
(-2.951**)
-6.379
(-2.770**)

G*ES
0.958
(0.860)
0.048
(0.064)
-0.162
(-0.228)

DR*ES
-0.473
(-0.699)
-1.036
(-1.576)
-1.007
(-1.661)

AA*ES
1.979
(3.144***)
1.478
(2.285**)
1.925
(2.894**)

Average Adjusted R2
20.2%
19.3%
19.1%

Notes: In cases denoted by ‘a’, G*BAD is marginally statistically insignificant if the G dummy variable is included; in cases denoted by ‘b’,
G*BAD is statistically insignificant if the G dummy variable is included. In all other cases, G*BAD is statistically significant if the G dummy
variable is included.
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5.5.6 Robustness Checks
A number of factors are now investigated that might affect the results. First, the lower
information content of losses as documented by Hayn (1995) is accounted for by
excluding loss-making firms from the sample. Second, the disparity in fiscal year ends
might lead to erroneous rankings by B/M, DR and AA, and therefore the estimations are
repeated using only June year-end companies (which comprise around two-thirds of the
original sample). Third, the use of stock-split adjusted I/B/E/S data were shown by
Payne and Thomas (2003) to lead to estimates of earnings surprise erroneously close to
zero, which they argue is the explanation for the growth stock earnings-torpedo of
Skinner and Sloan (2002). Potential biases of this type are accounted for by excluding
observations where |ES|< 0.001 (which comprise about 9% of the original sample).
Fourth, to ensure the results are not dependent upon the use of size-adjusted BHAR, the
estimation is repeated using market-adjusted returns (stock return less the equalweighted return of the largest 500 stocks). Finally, the G dummy variable is redefined in
terms of E/P instead of B/M, both with and without negative E/P firms. The results are
presented in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 shows the results of re-estimating the third specification in Table 5.7 for each
of the variations discussed above, with variations based on sample choice (that is,
exclusion of losses, restriction to June year end companies, and exclusion of small
earnings surprises) presented in Panel A and variations based on alternative variable
definitions presented in Panel B. The third specification from Table 5.7 is re-estimated
because it encapsulates the main results: the importance of G*BAD and AA*ES and the
lack of significance of G*ES and DR*ES. The results in Table 5.8 do not alter the
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conclusions in Section 5.5.5, and the parameter estimates and t-statistics are similar to
those in Table 5.7. The intercept is around 6% for positive surprises and -7% for
negative surprises (slightly larger in absolute value if small earnings surprises and nonJune year end companies are excluded). The growth stock earnings torpedo is very large
and significant: the difference in negative intercept between growth and value stocks is
around -12% (2 X -0.06). The slope of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation
is positive for positive surprises but flat for negative surprises. The slope increases with
AA but does not vary with either G or DR. For June year-end companies, the slope is
statistically indistinguishable from zero (the coefficients on ES and BAD*ES are
statistically insignificant) except for high AA companies.

5.6 Interpretation and Graphical Representation of Results
The results in Table 5.7 suggest that the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation
might parsimoniously be represented as a linear function with slope increasing in
analyst agreement and with a discontinuity at zero (the earnings torpedo) which is
greater for growth stocks than for value stocks. This representation is graphed in Figure
5.1, which plots earnings surprises versus unexpected returns, along with the fitted
unexpected return-earnings surprise relation for value and growth stocks, and for low
and high analyst agreement stocks. To form the portfolios, stocks are first allocated to
the four groups Low AA Value, Low AA Growth, High AA Value and High AA
Growth based on the indicator variables AA and G. Within each group, a maximum of
15 stocks are allocated to each portfolio by ranking on earnings surprise. Also plotted
on this graph is the fitted relationship between unexpected returns and earnings surprise
estimated by including (Panel A) and excluding (Panel B) the insignificant G*ES term.
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A number of features are immediately apparent from Figure 5.1. First, the portfolios are
more dispersed horizontally in the Low Analyst Agreement panel than in the High
Analyst Agreement panel, which illustrates the earlier result that |ES| tends to increase
with forecast dispersion. Second, the same difference is not observed in the vertical
direction, in other words the relatively large variation in ES for Low Analyst Agreement
stocks is not accompanied by an increase in variation of unexpected return. Put
differently, a relatively small earnings surprise for a High Analyst Agreement stock
results in the same magnitude unexpected return as a larger earnings surprise for a Low
Analyst Agreement stock. This difference is modelled by the parameter AA*ES, and its
effect is evident in the steeper slopes observed in the right hand panel.

Value stocks are relatively insensitive to negative earnings surprises

Regardless of the difference in analyst agreement, the value portfolios with negative
surprises plot on either side of the horizontal (UR=0) axis. Thus the market does not
systematically react to the negative earnings surprises of value stocks to the extent it
reacts to the negative surprises of growth stocks or to positive surprises. If the slope of
the fitted relationship is allowed to differ between value and growth stocks (Panel A),
the ERC of value stocks with negative surprises and low analyst agreement is actually
negative (-0.75=5.582–6.352); however a Wald test reveals that this value is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, and the negative slope is not apparent if the relation is
estimated without the insignificant G*ES term. The positive slope in the right hand
panel for value stocks with negative surprises occurs solely by virtue of the coefficient
on AA*ES, which says that the market response is greater for high analyst agreement
stocks. Whilst the value portfolios in the right hand panel display an average UR that
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trends upward with ES, two of the portfolios still have ES<0 and UR>0. Thus, there is
relatively little market reaction to the negative earnings surprises of value stocks.

In contrast to negative earnings surprises, the value portfolios with positive surprises
plot in the region one would expect them to if the market reacts to the news in earnings
surprises; in other words UR>0 when ES>0 (with one exception). The unexpected
return-earnings surprise relationship thus appears to slope upwards for value stocks with
positive surprises. Therefore, although there appears to be no systematic market
response to value stocks’ negative earnings surprises, the market does respond
favourably to value stocks’ positive earnings surprises.

The Growth Stock Earnings Torpedo of Skinner and Sloan (2002)

In contrast to the value portfolios, the growth portfolios with negative surprises plot
much further below the horizontal axis, illustrating the importance of the earnings
torpedo effect for growth stocks; an observation that is unaffected by the level of
Analyst Agreement. The growth stock torpedo effect is evident in the fitted returnearnings surprise relation as the large discontinuity at ES=0 for the thick (growth stock)
line, which occurs for both Low Analyst Agreement and High Analyst Agreement
stocks. According to Skinner and Sloan (2002), it is this growth stock-torpedo effect that
accounts for the difference in average returns of value and growth stocks. Notice also
that the growth stock torpedo effect is present regardless of whether G*ES is included
(Panel A) or excluded (Panel B); the omission of G*ES has the effect of increasing the
size of the growth stock torpedo effect from -10% (= 2X-5.0%) to -16.8% (=2X-8.4%).
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Figure 5.1: Fitted Unexpected Return-Earnings Surprise Relationships
The plots display the fitted unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship for the top
1/3 of stocks ranked by B/M (Low G) and those in the bottom 1/3 (High G). Low
Analyst Agreement and High Analyst Agreement stocks are, respectively, those ranked
in the top and bottom 1/3 by forecast dispersion.
(a) Fitted Relationship Including G*ES (Value and Growth have different Slopes)

(b) Fitted Relationship Excluding G*ES (Value and Growth have the same Slope)
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Explaining the discrepancy between the returns and earnings surprises of B/M-sorted
portfolios

According to Doukas et al. (2002), analysts tend to issue earnings forecasts which are
more upwardly biased for high B/M stocks than for low B/M stocks. The median
earnings surprises implied by their results are -0.0026 for the bottom quintile of stocks
by B/M stocks and -0.0118 for the top quintile of stocks by B/M. It is well known that
returns tend to increase with B/M; for example in a study that uses the same study
period (1976 to 1997), Ali et al. (2003) report average annual returns of 13% and 21.9%
for the bottom and top quintile of stocks by B/M. Thus, returns and earnings surprises
have opposite relationships with B/M. The results above are now used to explain how
this can occur. First however, the sample is dissected based on the sign of the earnings
surprise, with the results shown in Table 5.9.

Comparing observations with positive ES, there appears to be little difference between
high and low B/M stocks in terms of the average ES and the BHAR observed over the
return window. The positive surprises and BHARS are larger for high B/M stocks than
for low B/M stocks, but on the whole there is nothing extraordinary about these figures.
The negative surprises are also larger (in absolute value) for high B/M stocks than for
low B/M stocks. Notice however, that the BHARS of high B/M stocks are
extraordinarily small in absolute value, while the BHARS of low B/M stocks are
extraordinarily large in absolute value. In the regressions this discrepancy is largely
captured by G*BAD, which accounts for 16.8% of the difference between value and
growth stocks 48. This finding is very similar to Skinner and Sloan (2002).
48

Based on the return-earnings specification that omits G*ES. If G*ES is included, G*BAD accounts for
only 10% of the discrepancy while G*ES accounts for 4 to 8%.
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Table 5.9 Cross Sectional Differences in Earnings Surprises and Buy-Hold
Abnormal Returns
The following table compares the average earnings surprises (ES) and buy-hold
abnormal returns (BHAR) of observations for high and low book-to-market (B/M)
stocks, for positive and negative earnings surprises, and across different categories of
analyst agreement (AA). All variables are calculated as per Table 5.1. High B/M stocks
are those ranked in top third of the sample each year by B/M; low B/M stocks are those
ranked in bottom third of the sample each year by B/M. Low, Mid and High AA stocks
respectively are those ranked in top, middle and bottom third of the sample each year by
forecast dispersion. The number of observations in each classification is denoted by ‘n’.
Analyst Agreement Positive Surprises
High B/M Low B/M
(G=0)
(G=2)
n
Low (AA=0)
93
47
Mid (AA=1)
72
76
High (AA=2)
52
109
All
217
232
Average ES
Low (AA=0)
0.020
0.012
Mid (AA=1)
0.013
0.007
High (AA=2)
0.007
0.005
All
0.014
0.007
Average BHAR Low (AA=0)
14.06%
6.20%
Mid (AA=1)
13.98%
13.71%
High (AA=2)
21.48%
15.02%
All
15.81%
12.80%

Negative Surprises
High B/M Low B/M
(G=0)
(G=2)
135
111
74
320
-0.058
-0.030
-0.022
-0.040
-2.15%
-4.06%
-3.89%
-3.21%

78
76
104
258
-0.032
-0.026
-0.016
-0.023
-22.92%
-23.12%
-18.02%
-21.00%

The issue of whether differences in analyst agreement can explain the discrepancy in
BHARS described above is now addressed, as value stocks generally rate much lower
on this score. In the regressions, the coefficient on AA*ES is positive and significant,
implying a direct relationship between ERC and Analyst Agreement. However, this
relationship cannot explain the discrepancy for two reasons. First, the discrepancy exists
in all AA categories, including the Low AA category where AA=0 and the incremental
effect of AA on the ERC plays no part. Second, negative surprises are larger in absolute
value for high B/M stocks than for low B/M stocks. Thus, larger negative BHARS
would be expected for high B/M stocks, for negative surprises in the high AA category.
The average negative ES amongst high AA stocks is -0.022 for high B/M stocks and 0.016 for low B/M stocks. The coefficient on AA*ES (1.667) thus implies that BHARS
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should be 2*1.667*0.006=2% lower (i.e. more negative) for high B/M stocks than for
low B/M stocks. Therefore, the discrepancy in BHARS illustrated in Table 5.9 is
actually greater by 2% for high AA stocks (and greater by 1% for mid AA stocks) after
taking analyst agreement into account.

5.7 Conclusion
This study investigated variation in the market responses to earnings surprises of
Australian stocks as a function of B/M, default risk and analyst forecast dispersion. This
was achieved by estimating the incremental effects of these variables on both the slope
and intercept terms of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relation. By examining
variation in the slope of the relationship, this study contributed an understanding of the
determinants of earnings response coefficients. By studying variation in the intercept
terms of the relationship the study added to the knowledge of the implications of the
growth-stock earnings torpedo reported by Skinner and Sloan (2002), particularly to the
value premium literature.

In the context of the ERC literature, each of the variables examined (B/M, default risk
and forecast dispersion) were found to be related in isolation to the slope of the
unexpected return-earnings surprise relation (in other words, the ERC). However, the
incremental effect of default risk on the ERC vanishes after controlling for B/M and
forecast dispersion, and therefore it is concluded that default risk is not a determinant of
the ERC. Furthermore, as the intercept terms of the unexpected return-earnings surprise
are not related to default risk the more general conclusion is reached that the market
reaction to earnings surprise is not related to default risk.
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In contrast to the results for default risk, strong evidence is found that the market
reaction to earnings surprise is related to both B/M and forecast dispersion. Consistent
with Imhoff and Lobo (1992) and Kinney et al. (2002), the slope of the unexpected
return-earnings surprise relation (ERC) is negatively related to forecast dispersion (or,
equivalently, positively related to analyst agreement). The results with regard to B/M
are, however, sensitive to the choice of functional form for the unexpected returnearnings surprise relationship. In the absence of asymmetric intercept terms, evidence is
found that the slope increases with B/M, consistent with prior results in the ERC
literature. When asymmetric intercept terms are included similar to the earnings torpedo
modelled in Skinner and Sloan (2002), the results of this study are consistent with theirs
in that B/M affects the negative intercept of the unexpected return-earnings surprise
relationship (in other words, the earnings torpedo) more than the slope of the
relationship. Thus, the market reaction to earnings surprises is inversely related to B/M,
but particularly so for small negative surprises.

Although consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002), the results are somewhat at odds
with prior results in the ERC literature in that B/M is found to affect the earnings
torpedo more than the slope of the unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship. A
possible reason for the inconsistency is the rounding error in I/B/E/S documented by
Payne and Thomas (2003), which they argue has the effect of making the earnings
surprises of growth stocks appear closer to zero than the ‘true’ earnings surprise.
However, this possibility is accounted for by re-running the tests without a substantial
proportion (9%) of the sample with zero or near-zero earnings surprises, with similar
results. Another explanation is that the earnings torpedo may in effect simply be a
manifestation of the nonlinearity of the relationship; as is well known the relationship is
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steepest in the vicinity of zero earnings surprises and flattens out for more extreme
surprises (Freeman and Tse, 1992). Thus, it is possible a nonlinear functional form of
the relationship may allow for both a steeper slope (larger ERC) for small earnings
surprises as well as variation in the slope with B/M and at the same time obviate the
need to include asymmetric intercept terms. An investigation of this possibility is
beyond the scope of the current study and therefore left as a task for future research.

Regardless of the possible explanations behind the results of this study, they have
implications for a discrepancy in the value premium literature alluded to previously.
The discrepancy is between the inverse relationship between earnings surprises and
B/M documented in Doukas et al. (2002) (which is also confirmed in this study), and
the direct relationship between stock returns and B/M. In the sample used in this study,
the discrepancy occurs only for negative surprises and is consistent with the growth
stock earnings torpedo, and therefore might at first glance appear to be explainable by
the results of Skinner and Sloan (2002). However the results of this study go further,
because it is confirmed that the discrepancy does not appear to be otherwise explainable
by differences in either default risk or forecast dispersion. These results suggest that
there is no systematic reaction of high B/M stocks to negative earnings surprises, while
low B/M stocks have a severe market reaction to negative earnings surprises.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTION
TO KNOWLEDGE, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

6.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis examined the role played by financial distress in behavioural explanations of
the value premium in Australia. Behavioural explanations argue that the value premium
is due to mispricing of value and growth stocks and not to differences in rationallypriced risk. One such explanation is the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, where the
relative mispricing is due to investors’ erroneous growth expectations of earnings
growth; a hypothesis that has previously been tested and rejected using analysts’
earnings forecasts by Doukas et al. (2002) and Mian and Teo (2004). The specific issues
examined in this thesis are (i) whether mispricing exists in Australia as a function both
of value/growth classification and of financial distress, (ii) whether the evidence
contrary to the errors-in-expectations hypothesis is sensitive to financial distress, and
(iii) the reconciliation of two apparently contradictory sets of observations: the
observation that value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks (the value
premium) and the observation that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic for
value stocks than for growth stocks.

The general research design follows the relevant literature by categorising stocks
according to their relative value/growth orientation and their relative level of financial
distress, and then testing for variation in a number of characteristics across the
value/growth and financial distress categories. Value/growth orientation is measured
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using the valuation ratios book-to-market (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P) and cash flowto-price (C/P) while financial distress is measured using distance-to-default (DD). The
examination of issue (iii) involves further categorisation by analyst agreement, which is
measured using analyst forecast dispersion. The characteristics of interest which
correspond to the three issues are, respectively, (i) raw and risk-adjusted stock returns
and changes in firm profitability, (ii) analysts’ forecast errors and (iii) the market
reaction to earnings surprises. The research issues were examined through a series of
research questions, the findings for which will be discussed below. The analyses were
performed on data covering the period from 1995 to 2008, for Australian stocks with
fully-paid ordinary shares in the top 300 by market capitalisation with the exclusion of
listed property trusts, investment trusts, and foreign or dual-listed companies.

Are Australian stocks mispriced when their valuation ratios (B/M, E/P or C/P) are
either high or low relative to their level of default risk?

This research question addresses the first issue discussed above, regarding the existence
of mispricing in Australia as a function both of value/growth classification and of
financial distress, and was initially investigated by testing two hypotheses. These
hypotheses are (i) that portfolios of stocks with high valuation ratios and high DD have
positive alphas, and (ii) that portfolios of stocks with low valuation ratios and low DD
have negative alphas. The portfolio alphas are defined in terms of empirical
implementations of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama-French threefactor model and the Carhart four-factor model. Hypothesis (i) is consistent with
underpricing of value stocks with low financial distress, while hypothesis (ii) is
consistent with overpricing of growth stocks with high financial distress. In addition to
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the direct evidence based on the portfolio alphas, the discussion here will also consider
the variation in raw portfolio returns.

The results of chapter 3 are consistent with the mispricing hypotheses. Average
portfolio returns increase with valuation ratios and with DD, such that the highest
portfolio returns are observed for low default risk value portfolios while the lowest
returns are observed for high default risk growth portfolios. This pattern is also evident
in the portfolio alphas: low default risk value portfolios have statistically-significant
positive alphas while high default risk growth portfolios have statistically significant
negative alphas. The results generally hold for each of the three valuation ratios, each of
the three asset-pricing models and for both equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolio
returns. The principal findings of chapter 3 can be summarised in Figure 6.1, which
plots the equal-weighted returns and four-factor alphas as a function of (i) B/M and DD
and (ii) E/P and DD. Figure 6.1 shows that low default risk value stocks, which are
represented either by the high DD, high B/M or the high DD, high E/P cells, have
relatively high average returns and positive portfolio alphas; a result consistent with the
underpricing hypothesis (i). Figure 6.1 also shows that high default risk growth stocks,
which are represented either by the low DD, low B/M or the by low DD, low E/P cells,
have relatively low average returns and negative portfolio alphas; a result consistent
with the overpricing hypothesis (ii). The findings are consistent with the tenor of
overseas studies which have documented undervaluation of financially healthy value
stocks and overvaluation of financially distressed growth stocks, for example Piotroski
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(2000), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Mohanram (2005) and Bird and Casavecchia
(2007a) 49.

It is acknowledged that the findings to this point might be consistent with deficiencies
in the asset pricing models used to risk-adjust returns (in other words, to compute the
portfolio alphas). However it is argued that inadequacy of asset pricing models which
are based on the premise of rational pricing is not the likely explanation for the results.
To this end, chapter 3 also confirmed that both the raw returns and portfolio alphas are
inversely related to other measure of risk not specifically included in the asset pricing
models – namely portfolio volatility (both total and residual) and default risk itself.
Thus, a rational asset pricing explanation for the results faces the difficulty of
explaining this inverse relationship with alternative risk measures.

To further develop an understanding of the potential mechanisms by which mispricing
might occur (for example underreaction and/or overreaction), chapter 3 also presented
some evidence based on characteristics related to profitability and changes in
profitability. This evidence is consistent with an underreaction mechanism. The findings
show that low default risk value stocks are characterised by improving financial health
while high default risk growth stocks are characterised by declining financial health. For
example, the rate of change of return on assets is greater for low default risk value
stocks than for high default risk growth stocks. Similarly, the (price-deflated) rate of
change of earnings-per-share (EPS) is greater for low default risk value stocks than for
high default risk growth stocks. Put differently, the change in profitability increases
steadily with valuation ratios as well as with DD. It is pertinent to note that these trends
49

The Mohanram (2005) findings are couched in terms of the portfolio selection of financially healthy
growth stocks to deliver high future returns (relative to otherwise similar growth stocks); a similar finding
to the relative underperformance of financially distressed growth stocks.
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in financial performance, which were observed prior to portfolio formation, are
matched by similar trends in stock returns after portfolio formation: low default risk
value stocks continue to perform well while high default risk growth stocks continue to
perform poorly. The findings are inconsistent with the overreaction behaviour
postulated in some models as the mechanism behind the value premium, for example
Barberis et al. (1998), Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003), but are
consistent with the momentum life cycle postulated by Lee and Swaminathan (2000).

How do median analysts’ forecast errors vary with valuation ratios and default risk?

This research question addresses the second issue discussed above, namely whether the
evidence contrary to the errors-in-expectations hypothesis is sensitive to financial
distress, and is the basis for the analysis in chapter 4. The errors-in-expectations
hypothesis suggests that investors are overly optimistic regarding the future prospects of
and consequently pay prices that are too high for growth stocks. Some evidence
contrary to this hypothesis has emerged from empirical studies based on analysts’
earnings forecasts (Bauman and Miller, 1997; Doukas et al., 2002; Mian and Teo,
2004). Most notably, Doukas et al. (2002) find that analysts’ short term earnings
forecasts exceed actual earnings numbers by greater amounts for value stocks than for
growth stocks (in other words, analysts’ forecasts appear to be more optimistic for value
stocks than for growth stocks). Chapter 4 contains a similar analysis using Australian
data, but unlike previous studies controls for financial distress, measured as above by
DD.
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The principal findings from chapter 4 are summarised by Figure 6.2. Forecast errors are
the amounts by which analysts’ EPS forecasts exceed subsequently announced EPS
numbers; therefore large forecast errors imply overly optimistic forecasts. In univariate
tests (not shown), a similar but weaker relationship to that reported by Doukas et al.
(2002) is obtained between forecast errors and B/M. However, this relationship is
completely subsumed by a much stronger relationship between forecast errors and DD.
When portfolios are sorted by DD and B/M (as in the left-hand panel of Figure 6.2), the
largest forecast errors are observed for low DD (in other words, high default risk) firms.
Although there are some deviations, the variation in forecast errors with default risk is
statistically significant and dominates the variation in forecast errors with B/M (which
is not statistically significant).

A slightly different picture emerges when portfolios are sorted by E/P and DD (the
right-hand panel of Figure 6.2) rather than by B/M and DD; however the conclusion is
similar: the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and financial distress
dominates the relationship between analysts’ forecast errors and the valuation ratio (E/P
in this case). There is some evidence in Figure 6.2 that forecast errors are inversely
related to E/P. Thus, the pattern of forecast errors observed for portfolios sorted by E/P
and DD is closer to that predicted by the errors-in-expectations hypothesis than the
pattern observed for B/M and DD sorted portfolios. However, on closer inspection most
of the variation in forecast error with E/P is due to the very large forecast errors of
negative E/P firms. The variation in forecast errors with E/P is statistically significant if
negative E/P firms are included in the sample, but if negative E/P firms are excluded the
variation in forecast errors with E/P is statistically significant only amongst low DD
firms. Within each E/P category, forecast errors generally vary inversely with DD (that
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is, they vary directly with default risk), and this variation is statistically significant.
Thus, the conclusion from the portfolios sorted by E/P and DD is similar to that
obtained from the portfolios sorted by B/M and DD. Analysts’ forecast errors are more
strongly related to the firm’s state of financial distress or health than to valuation ratios,
where financial distress is indicated either by negative earnings or by a low DD score.

How does the market reaction to earnings surprises vary with valuation ratios, default
risk and forecast dispersion?

This research question deals with issue (iii); in other words it attempts to increase our
understanding of how earnings surprises for value stocks can be relatively large and
more negative than those for growth stocks, while value stocks can continue to earn
higher returns than growth stocks. To this end the final empirical study of this
dissertation examined the market reaction to earnings surprises for variation across
value/growth, default risk and forecast dispersion categories. Earnings surprises are
incidences where companies announce earnings that are different from the market’s
expectations; measured in this dissertation similarly to the errors in consensus analysts’
forecasts discussed above and in chapter 4. The market reaction to earnings surprise is
generally manifest in terms of an ‘unexpected’ stock return or difference between a
stock’s return and the return of the market over the same period. As discussed in chapter
5, the severity of the market reaction to earnings surprises is measured by both the slope
of the relationship between unexpected returns and earnings surprises as well as the
intercept of this relationship. Both the slope and intercept are permitted to vary with a
stock’s B/M ratio, its level of default risk, and analyst agreement. Thus, a relatively
severe market reaction to earnings surprises for a particular category of stocks might be
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demonstrated by a relatively large slope (ERC) or a relatively large negative intercept
for negative surprises.

Consistent with prior literature, the results of chapter 5 demonstrate that the market
reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise is inversely related to its B/M ratio and directly
related to the degree of analyst agreement regarding expected (forecast) earnings. After
controlling for B/M and analyst agreement however, there was no residual effect of
default risk on the market reaction to earnings surprises. In other words, the market
reaction is relatively strong for growth stocks and for earnings forecasts with a high
degree of analyst agreement, and relatively muted for value stocks and for earnings
forecasts with a relatively low level of analyst agreement 50. The results of the analysis
are illustrated in Figure 6.3, which shows the fitted relationship between unexpected
(buy-hold abnormal) returns and earnings surprises.

Figure 6.3 illustrates a major difference between low B/M stocks and high B/M stocks
regarding the returns-earnings relationship; namely the intercept term for negative
earnings surprises. Consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002), this intercept term is
larger and more negative for low B/M stocks than for high B/M stocks, implying that
growth stocks suffer a large, negative market reaction for negative earnings surprises
regardless of the magnitude of the surprise. When the asymmetric intercept term was
not explicitly modelled, the slope (earnings response coefficient) was also found to be
larger for low B/M than for high B/M stocks; a result also consistent with prior results
in the literature (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Biddle and Seow, 1991; Skinner and Sloan,
2002) and with valuation models discussed in Ohlson (1995) and Burgstahler and
50

Although Collins and Kothari (1989) argue that B/M might be relevant to earnings response
coefficients because it proxies for earnings persistence, the chapter 5 findings were also obtained using
E/P instead of B/M.
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Dichev (1997). However, when the regression tests allowed for variation in both the
intercept and slope, no statistically significant variation between high and low B/M
stocks was found in the slope term. Hence value and growth stocks plot along the same
line in Figure 6.3 for positive surprises and differ only in the intercept for negative
surprises.

Unlike B/M however, the effect of analyst agreement (on the relationship between
unexpected returns and earnings surprises) is primarily observed through variation in
the slope and not through variation in the intercept. This finding is illustrated by a
comparison of the left and right panels in Figure 6.3. The slope of the relationship is
steepest in the case of high analyst agreement (low dispersion) stocks, represented in the
right-hand panel. Thus, high analyst agreement stocks have a greater market reaction to
earnings surprises than low analyst agreement stocks. The incremental effect of analyst
agreement on the slope applies to both high B/M and low B/M stocks, and to both
positive and negative earnings surprises. Furthermore, the findings are consistent with
prior literature that documents a direct relationship between earnings response
coefficients and analyst agreement (Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Kinney et al., 2002).

Whilst analyst agreement affects the severity of the market reaction to earnings surprise,
it does not explain the conundrum behind issue (iii); namely the observation that
analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic (earnings surprises are more negative)
for value stocks than for growth stocks despite the fact value stocks have higher returns
than growth stocks. The best explanation for this conundrum that can be offered
following the analysis in chapter 5 is that value stocks remain relatively unpunished by
the market for missing earnings expectations while growth stocks are heavily punished
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for missing earnings expectations. Although this result is known from previous studies
(Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Chan et al., 2006a), a major contribution of the analysis here
is to show that the effect exists independently from differences in analyst agreement
(and, as discussed above, default risk). Put differently, the finding that growth stocks are
more heavily punished for negative surprises than value stocks holds for low analyst
agreement stocks as well as for high analyst agreement stocks, and is not explained by
differences in analyst agreement between value and growth stocks.

6.2 Contributions to Knowledge
This dissertation makes several contributions to the Asset Pricing Literature. The
contributions increase knowledge in three general areas: (i) the pricing of default risk in
equity markets, (ii) the existence of market inefficiencies and mispricing in the
Australian equity market and (iii) behavioural explanations of cross-sectional stock
return differences. The contributions to each of these three areas will now be discussed
in detail.

6.2.1 Rational Pricing of Default Risk
As has been discussed previously, the weight of recent empirical evidence in the finance
literature suggests that default risk is not priced in equity markets (Dichev, 1998;
Gharghori et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2008). The implications of this general finding
are that stocks of distressed companies do not have higher expected returns than stocks
of otherwise financially healthy companies, and therefore the HML factor in the FamaFrench three-factor model is not a proxy for a priced financial distress risk factor. The
findings in chapter 3 are consistent with and further support the weight of recent
empirical evidence against a priced distress factor.
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However, the findings in Chapter 3 go further than rejecting a positive default risk
premium. On the contrary, the findings are consistent with a negative default risk
premium as documented by Campbell et al. (2008) and others; and when a firm’s level
of default risk is at odds with (either too high or too low given) the firm’s valuation
ratios, the findings are consistent with mispricing rather than with rational pricing. Thus
the results pertaining to the relationship between stocks returns, default risk and
valuation ratios fail to support a rational pricing explanation for the value premium. The
results are consistent with several recent studies finding evidence of overvaluation of
distressed growth stocks and of undervaluation of financially healthy value stocks
(Piotroski, 2000; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Mohanram, 2005; and Bird and
Casavecchia, 2007a); the contributions made to this body of knowledge are: (i) in the
use of a single variable to define a firm’s state of financial distress or health, (ii) the
robustness of the results across several valuation ratios (B/M, E/P and C/P) and (iii) the
application of the analysis to large-capitalisation Australian stocks.

The finding that default risk does not appear to be rationally priced has implications for
research that deals with the relationship between earnings and stocks returns, or that
attempts to determine the factors determining the market reaction to earnings surprises.
Theoretically the ERC, or slope of the relationship between unexpected returns and
unexpected earnings, is inversely related to a firm’s systematic risk, and if the CAPM is
valid, to equity betas (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989).
Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) point out that if default risk represents a form of priced
risk not adequately reflected in observed equity betas, then response coefficients will
similarly be inversely related to default risk.
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There is limited empirical evidence that directly tests the conjecture that response
coefficients (or the market reaction to earnings surprises in general) vary with default
risk. Dhaliwal and Reynolds (1994) observe an inverse relationship between ERC and
default risk, measured in terms of either bond ratings or debt-to-equity ratios, after
controlling for equity beta. Billings (1999), on the other hand, finds that the relationship
between default risk and response coefficients is largely explained by the negative
correlation between default risk and growth. The findings in Chapter 5 show that after
controlling for growth and differences in analyst agreement, default risk is not a
determinant of the market reactions to earnings surprises; a finding that further supports
the earlier conclusion that default risk is not priced in equity markets. The main
contributions in this regard are that the results in this thesis (i) control for analyst
agreement and (ii) employ an alternative and arguably cleaner measure of default risk
(DD) than ratios or statistical models upon which bond ratings are based (Vassalou and
Xing, 2004; Gharghori et al., 2006b).

6.2.2 Market Inefficiency and Mispricing
This thesis contributes to the literature regarding market efficiency, primarily through
the analysis of portfolio returns in chapter 3 and the analysis of analysts’ forecast errors
in chapter 4. The findings in this thesis are consistent with inefficiency, rather than
efficiency, of the Australian stock market. Strong-form market efficiency postulates that
all publicly-available information is reflected in security prices, such that it is not
possible to earn abnormal returns by trading on the information in financial statements
or in security prices. However, the findings of this thesis demonstrate that over the
sample period tested, it was indeed possible to form portfolios with abnormally high
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and abnormally low subsequent returns, using the information in financial statements
and past security prices, a finding inconsistent with market efficiency. Furthermore, it
was also demonstrated that over the sample period tested, analysts’ earnings forecasts
were overly optimistic for firms with high default risk and for firms with negative
earnings; a finding that is consistent with analyst underreaction to distress and therefore
also inconsistent with market efficiency. The conclusion that analysts underreact to
distress is consistent with the majority of studies on analyst efficiency (Abarbanell and
Bernard, 1992; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Cohen and Lys, 2003), and in particular
with the findings of Easterwood and Nutt (1999) who find that analysts underreact to
bad news (but not to good news).

Whilst there is a vast extant body of literature on market efficiency (with support for
both the efficiency and inefficiency arguments), the main contribution of this thesis to
knowledge of the subject stems from the use of DD to measure default risk. DD
employs, in addition to the information in a firm’s financial statements, recent share
price information to infer the market’s perception of the firm’s default risk. Thus, the
DD calculation implicitly (and not unreasonably) assumes that at the time of
calculation, share prices have reacted to prior changes in each firm’s economic
fundamentals. However, the results of this thesis suggest that the reaction to prior
changes in each firm’s economic fundamentals is an underreaction, because the
direction of price changes continues after the time of measurement of DD. For example,
overvalued (high default risk growth) stocks exhibit poor prior returns and declining
earnings, but also have low future returns. Similarly, analysts’ earnings forecasts are too
high for this group of firms (as they are for low DD and distressed firms in general),
consistent with analyst underreaction to poor prior returns and declining earnings. Thus,
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the findings also add to the accounting literature that deals specifically with analyst
efficiency.

This thesis also presented some findings consistent with the existence of mispricing in
the Australian stock market, as summarised in Section 6.1. The specific hypothesis
tested was that growth stocks with high default risk are overvalued while value stocks
with low default risk are undervalued; a system of mispricing that is consistent with
several recent studies such as (Piotroski, 2000; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Mohanram,
2005; Bird and Casavecchia, 2007a). There are two main contribution of this thesis to
studies in this particular body of literature (and therefore also to the more general
literature on return predictability). The first contribution pertains to the use and choice
of a single variable, DD, to identify overvalued growth stocks and undervalued value
stocks. In contrast, Piotroski (2000), Mohanram (2005) and Bird and Casavecchia
(2007a) all employ dissimilar composite variables to define financial health, thus
diminishing the external validity of these studies; Griffin and Lemmon (2002) employ
Ohlson’s O-score in a similar fashion to identify overvalued growth stocks. DD is
arguably a more accurate and theoretically sound measure of financial health than the
measures used in the above studies, and is now widely employed in both academic
studies and in practice.

The second contribution of the thesis to the above body of literature (mispricing as a
function of value/growth and financial health) pertains to the choice of sample. There
are few studies of this specific form of mispricing in the Australian market, and to the
best of the author’s knowledge no published studies that focus specifically upon large
capitalisation stocks. Two interpretations are offered here for the findings and their
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support of mispricing amongst large stocks. First, it could be argued that the findings
contradict the limits-to-arbitrage thesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which argues that
mispricing exists because it is costly for arbitrageurs to drive prices back to fundamental
values. Arbitrage might reasonably be expected to be less costly for large stocks,
because of greater analyst coverage (and therefore more information) and liquidity, and
lower idiosyncratic volatility and bid-ask-spreads (Ali et al., 2003); therefore mispricing
might reasonably be expected to be less prevalent amongst large stocks. Second, it
could alternatively be argued that the findings imply that arbitrage is indeed costly (and
inefficiency is prevalent) for the Australian market in general or for the firms
specifically identified as being mispriced, relative to larger equity markets such as the
American market. The costly-arbitrage argument is also supported by the observations
that relatively few firms are indeed identified as mispriced and that the high default risk
growth portfolios possess high residual volatility, making arbitrage difficult.

6.2.3 Behavioural Explanations of Cross-sectional Return Differences
It has already been argued that the findings of this thesis are inconsistent with market
efficiency and with rational asset pricing. Furthermore, this thesis makes contributions
to the alternative asset pricing paradigm, which involves behavioural explanations of
cross-sectional stock return differences. The contributions specifically pertain to the
errors-in-expectations hypothesis, the momentum life cycle, and the cognitive biases
and other assumptions underlying various behavioural finance theories.
6.2.3.1 The Errors-in-Expectations Hypothesis
A number of previous studies have tested the errors-in-expectations by comparing the
analysts’ forecast errors of value and growth stocks. A noteworthy study is Doukas et
al. (2002), because they find a relationship between forecast errors and B/M that is the
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exact opposite of that predicted by the errors-in-expectations hypothesis. A major
contribution of this thesis has been to demonstrate that, in the Australian sample used in
the analysis, the relationship between B/M and analyst forecast errors is completely
subsumed by the relationship between analyst forecast errors and distress. Thus, high
B/M stocks have overly optimistic earnings forecasts because, as discussed earlier, such
forecasts tend to be too high for distressed firms and because B/M is correlated with
distress. The pattern of forecast errors that results from classifying firms according to
value/growth as well as default risk is similar to the pattern of mispricing from the same
classification; put differently overvalued firms have earnings forecasts that are more
optimistic than those of undervalued firms. This specific finding is consistent with the
predictions of errors-in-expectations hypothesis and similar to that obtained by Bartov
and Kim (2004) who use the level of accruals in reported earnings rather than default
risk to define mispriced value and growth firms. However, the driving factor behind the
results here appears to be analyst underreaction to distress; a mechanism which is
inconsistent with the extrapolation behaviour underpinning the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis.

The analysis of market reactions to earnings surprises (Chapter 5) provides a further
contribution to our understanding of analyst forecast-based tests of the errors-inexpectations hypothesis. Previous studies have demonstrated that growth stocks react
more strongly to earnings surprises than value stocks, in particular it has been
demonstrated that growth stocks are punished severely by the market for missing
earnings expectations while value stocks are not (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Chan et al.,
2006a). The findings in this thesis not only confirm this result, but moreover
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demonstrate that it is not due to differences in either default risk or forecast dispersion
between value and growth stocks.

Skinner and Sloan (2002) argue that the extreme reaction of growth stocks to even
marginally negative surprises is consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis,
because it demonstrates that investors are informed that their growth expectations are
too optimistic and subsequently revise their expectations and valuations downwards
following negative surprises. However, a different interpretation is offered here based
upon the findings of both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Earnings forecasts for value stocks
are more optimistic on average than those of growth stocks because most value stocks
are distressed and because analysts underreact to the distress-related information in
stock prices and earnings changes (Chapter 4). The application of analysts’ earnings
forecasts to tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis, which is based upon longterm overreaction, might therefore be invalid because such forecasts are subject to
underreaction.

Furthermore, growth stocks are punished by the market for missing earnings forecasts
while value stocks are not (Chapter 5), a corollary of which is that the over-optimistic
earnings forecasts of value stocks are not instrumental in their low valuation (i.e. their
low prices or their high B/M ratio). In other words, the market appears to disregard the
earnings forecasts of value stocks relative to those of growth stocks, suggesting that
differences in such forecasts might not be representative of differences in investors’
growth expectations. In summary, a potential explanation offered here for the findings
in Chapters 4 and 5 is that errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts might not be valid as
measures of the errors in investors’ long-term growth expectations (and therefore might
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conceivably be inadmissible in tests of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis), because
(i) such forecasts are influenced by analyst short-term underreaction and (ii) they appear
to be ignored by investors in value stocks.
6.2.3.2 The Momentum Life Cycle
The findings in this thesis contribute to an understanding of the momentum life cycle
postulated by Lee and Swaminathan (2000). Lee and Swaminathan (2000) focus on the
interaction between trading volume and momentum, but do however make analogies
between trading volume and value/growth measures; namely that stocks with high
trading volume possess many characteristics of growth stocks while stocks with low
trading volume possess many characteristics of value stocks. They find that momentum
appears to be strongest amongst stocks with high trading volume and poor recent returns
(which continue to perform poorly), and amongst stocks with low trading volume and
high recent returns (which continue to exhibit high returns). Lee and Swaminathan
(2000) explain their results in terms of a model they refer to as the momentum life
cycle.

According to the momentum life cycle, stocks go through periods of favouritism and
neglect. High momentum stocks are argued to be experiencing a period of favouritism
in their life cycle, beginning with a phase of low trading volume (‘low volume
winners’). Low volume winners are the most likely stocks to continue to deliver high
returns. As sentiment towards a low volume winner increases, accompanied by high
returns, trading volume increases. Eventually, the low volume winners become
expensive growth stocks characterised by high trading volume and the tendency to
subsequently disappoint investors with return reversals (‘high volume winners’). From
here, stocks become ‘high volume losers’, companies with poor recent returns and high
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trading volume. High volume losers are the most likely companies to continue to deliver
poor returns. Stocks in this stage of their momentum life cycle become increasingly
unpopular and neglected, resulting in falling trading volume. Finally, the stocks become
‘low volume losers’, in other words companies that have had extended periods of poor
returns accompanied by diminishing trading volume.

The overpriced growth stocks identified in Chapter 3 are characterised by relatively
poor recent returns and lower profitability than other growth stocks. This group of
companies are highly likely to deliver poor returns and, from the results of Chapter 4, to
disappoint investors with an earnings torpedo. Thus, overpriced growth stocks share
many of the characteristics of the high volume losers in the momentum life cycle. On
the other hand, the underpriced value stocks identified in Chapter 3 are characterised by
high recent returns and higher profitability than other value stocks. This group of
companies are highly likely to deliver high returns and to pleasantly surprise investors
with better-than-expected earnings. Thus underpriced value stocks share many of the
characteristics of the low volume winners in the momentum life cycle.

The relevance of the findings of this thesis to the momentum life cycle is further
illustrated by the link between DD and momentum. Stocks which rank highly on DD
also tend to have high momentum by virtue of the drift term µ in the calculation;
moreover the relationship between DD and momentum is intuitive because it implies
that all else equal, changes in the market’s assessment of a firm’s default risk are
reflected in movements in the firm’s stock price. However, DD encapsulates additional
information besides momentum, as is evident from the alphas of low DD growth and
high DD value portfolios calculated using the Carhart four-factor model. As the fourth
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factor in this model represents momentum, the significance of the alphas of these
portfolios demonstrates they are not merely de-facto low momentum growth and high
momentum value portfolios respectively.

Given that DD and momentum are not merely proxies for one another, the contribution
of this thesis to our understanding of the momentum life cycle can be stated as follows.
Results similar to those of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) can be obtained using DD
instead of momentum, and using value/growth measures instead of trading volume.
Whilst Lee and Swaminathan (2000) confirm that trading volume is related to
value/growth; the findings here are consistent with the idea that DD captures sentiment
in the same manner as momentum in the momentum life cycle. Moreover, DD may be a
more complete measure of market sentiment towards a stock than momentum because it
includes capital structure-related information and theoretically at least, it directly
measures the market’s assessment of the firm’s state of financial health.
6.2.3.3 Contributions to Behavioural Finance Theory
The findings of this thesis provide evidence regarding a number of behavioural finance
theories which have been proposed to explain asset pricing anomalies such as
momentum and long-term reversals, where the term ‘long-term reversals’ also includes
the value premium. In particular, the findings are inconsistent with the model of
Barberis et al. (1998) which treats the value premium as an overreaction and momentum
as an underreaction. According to the model, investors are subject to a
‘representativeness bias’, whereby investors observing a series of earnings changes
mistakenly infer that earnings follow a trend, when in fact earnings changes are random.
The model also specifies that investors are subject to a ‘conservatism bias’, whereby
investors who observe a single earnings change mistakenly infer that earnings are mean
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reverting, and update their prior expectations (of future earnings) insufficiently. Thus,
under the Barberis et al. (1998) model, the representativeness bias leads investors to
overreact to consistently good performance, causing prices to overshoot their
fundamental values; a mechanism consistent with the exposition of the errors-inexpectations hypothesis in Lakonishok et al. (1994), where investors extrapolate
previous good performance too far into the future.

However, the findings in this thesis are difficult to reconcile with the model of Barberis
et al. (1998), insofar as the investor behaviour underpinning the value premium.
According to this model, the value premium is characterised as an overreaction while
momentum is characterised as an underreaction. As discussed above, the findings within
this thesis are not consistent with the characterisation of the value premium as an
overreaction. Specifically, the value premium in Australia appears to be primarily
attributable to two groups of stocks: overpriced growth stocks and underpriced value
stocks. Overpriced growth stocks are stocks of companies whose fortunes have turned
for the worse, with low profitability and poor returns. However, the market appears to
be slow in recognising the distress of these companies, as prices are too high and
analysts too optimistic relative to other growth stocks. Underpriced value stocks, on the
other hand, have higher profitability and returns than other value stocks. Again, the
market appears slow in recognising the improving fortunes of these companies, as
prices are too low and analysts too pessimistic relative to other value stocks. This
behaviour is more consistent with the conservatism bias, which Barberis et al. (1998)
rely on to explain momentum, than with the representativeness bias.
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It is pertinent to note that other studies are also inconsistent with explanations of the
value premium that rely upon the representativeness bias. Dechow and Sloan (1997)
argue that the value premium appears unrelated to investors’ extrapolation of past
earnings trends, arguing instead that it bears a very strong relationship to the biased
growth forecasts of analysts. Chan et al. (2004) find that neither the consistency nor the
trends in earnings performance are related to future stock returns. They do, however,
find evidence of an underreaction to recent accounting performance which is consistent
with a conservatism bias 51.

The findings in this thesis also constitute evidence regarding a number of other
assumptions adopted in other behavioural finance theories. The delayed reaction of
prices and analysts to public information embedded in prices and financial information
is consistent with the slow diffusion of information assumption in Hong and Stein
(1999), and also with the prediction of the Daniel et al. (1998) model that investors
underreact to public information (a consequence of two separate cognitive biases,
overconfidence and biased self-attribution). The findings of this thesis are consistent
with the modelling of the value premium in Daniel et al. (1998) as a gradual correction
of prices (in other words, an underreaction) following the arrival of public information,
and therefore inconsistent with the modelling of the value premium as an overreaction
in Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999).

51

Chan et al. (2004) argue that their rejection of the representativeness bias rules out the majority of
behavioural finance theories of cross-sectional return patterns; however Daniel (2004) points out that this
finding is only relevant to the model of Barberis et al. (1998) and not to other theories which do not
specifically rely on the representativeness bias, such as Hong and Stein (1999), Daniel et al. (1998) and
Daniel and Titman (2004) (the latter subsequently published as Daniel and Titman (2006)).
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6.3 Limitations of the Research
A limitation of the thesis is the relatively small sample size, which consists of the
largest 300 stocks on the Australian stock exchange minus property and investment
trusts and foreign or dual-listed shares, and which covers a thirteen-year period. The
limited time period suggests that robustness and business-cycle variation in the results
might be tested in future studies through replication over longer or alternative time
periods. The limited cross-section posed some difficulties for the portfolio-sorting
procedures, resulting in relatively small portfolios representing the high default risk
growth and low default risk value categories of stocks. The small number of stocks in
the high default risk growth and low default risk value portfolios implies that
disproportionately few stocks are indeed mispriced amongst the largest 300 stocks on
the ASX. However, mispricing is less likely amongst large stocks than amongst small
stocks (Ali et al., 2003), and therefore the fact that even a small number of mispriced
securities could be identified in effect strengthens the arguments for mispricing and for
inefficiency of the Australian stock market. Moreover, the fact that relatively few stocks
are mispriced supports the costly arbitrage argument (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) for the
existence of mispricing, because it is difficult for arbitrageurs to form diversified hedge
portfolios to exploit and therefore eliminate any mispricing.

A limitation of the tests of mispricing in chapter 3 are that they rely on static asset
pricing models (the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model and the Carhart fourfactor model) to risk-adjust returns. The analysis does not consider conditional asset
pricing models (for example, Jagannathan and Wang, 1996, and Lettau and Ludvigson,
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2001) which might capture time-variation in systematic risk or other models that
attempt to relate variations in risk premiums with business-cycle variation. Although
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is possible that a model of this type might explain the
significant alphas of high default risk growth and low default risk value portfolios
estimated from static models. However, any candidate rational asset pricing model faces
the difficulty of explaining the negative default risk premium evident not just in the
results of Chapter 3, but also in other studies such as Dichev (1998) and Campbell et al.
(2008). It is therefore argued that a rational pricing explanation for the results of
Chapter 3 will be difficult to arrive at; however the possibility can not be ruled out
altogether.

A further limitation pertains to the external validity of the findings; in particular the
findings from Chapter 4 dealing with the relationship between valuation ratios, default
risk and analyst optimism. These findings are based on Australian data; however the
prior studies which motivate the research are the US-based study by Doukas et al.
(2002), and to a lesser extent the Japan-based study by Mian and Teo (2004). The
findings from Chapter 4 support the contention that the direct relationship between B/M
and analyst optimism documented by Doukas et al. (2002) is sensitive to default risk;
however it remains to be seen whether these findings are confirmed in the US data upon
which that study is based, or indeed in other overseas markets besides the US.

Similarly, the external validity of two specific findings from Chapter 5 might also be
questioned. These findings are: (i) that default risk does not affect the market reaction to
earnings surprises independently of B/M and dispersion, and (ii) that differences in
dispersion are not responsible for the anomalous observation that analyst optimism
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increases with B/M (the observation is anomalous because returns also increase with
B/M). It is left as a task for future research to replicate these findings on other markets.
The third important finding from Chapter 5 is that the anomalous relationship between
analyst optimism and B/M is largely explainable by the lack of market response to value
stocks’ negative surprises. External validity is less of an issue for this particular finding
because it is consistent with the US-based results of Skinner and Sloan (2002). External
validity is also less of a limitation for Chapter 3, because the findings are generally
consistent with overseas studies (Piotroski, 2000; Griffin and Lemmon, 2002;
Mohanram, 2005; and Bird and Casavecchia, 2007a).

6.4 Extensions and Future Research

6.4.1 Value/growth, Default Risk and Mispricing
There are at least three potential extensions of the findings and analysis of Chapter 3,
which dealt with mispricing as a function of value/growth and default risk. The first
potential extension is an investigation of temporal variation in the portfolio alphas
similar to the analysis in Lewellen (1999). Such an investigation might reveal temporal
variation in mispricing (in other words, time variation of portfolio alphas) or perhaps an
explanation of the findings consistent with rational pricing, for example time variation
in risk factor loadings.

The second potential extension of Chapter 3 might be to more directly relate the
findings to the momentum life cycle of Lee and Swaminathan (2000). Although the
findings of this thesis are consistent with the momentum life cycle, there remain some
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unaddressed issues. First, Lee and Swaminathan (2000) classify stocks according to
trading volume and price momentum rather than value/growth and default risk;
therefore it is worthwhile to replicate the study of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) using
Australian data. Second, it is worthwhile to test whether low default risk value stocks
are typically the same stocks as low volume winners and whether high default risk
growth stocks are typically the same stocks as high volume winners. Whilst Lee and
Swaminathan (2000) do investigate the link between trading volume and value/growth,
an equally pertinent question might be how closely momentum and DD are related, and
whether DD conveys additional information relevant to the momentum life cycle
besides momentum.

The final potential extension of Chapter 3 is an examination of the differences between
large capitalisation and small capitalisation stocks listed on the ASX. The findings of
Chapter 3 suggest a large and statistically significant value premium specifically
amongst large capitalisation Australian stocks. Whilst other studies have not
emphasised this specific finding, it is readily apparent from the largest two size quintiles
in the two-way sorts on size and B/M in both Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004),
as well as from a similar analysis presented in Table 3A.1. However, both Halliwell et
al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004) fail to find a significant value premium amongst the smaller
size quintiles, a result also apparent in Table 3A.1; in other words, returns increase with
B/M for large stocks on the ASX but not for small stocks on the ASX. Chapter 3 also
reports that size (market capitalisation) does not appear to be related to returns for the
largest 300 stocks on the ASX by market capitalisation. This result is also consistent
with both Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004), who find a significant size effect
only amongst the smallest size quintiles of ASX stocks, and little variation in returns
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with size amongst the largest size quintiles. The findings of Chapter 3, along with those
of Halliwell et al. (1999) and Gaunt (2004), therefore suggest that large and small
stocks on the ASX behave differently: the largest stocks exhibit a value premium while
the smallest stocks exhibit a size effect. A potentially fruitful area of research might be
to explain this disparity between large and small ASX stocks, perhaps as a function of
trading frequency, bid-ask bounce or other market microstructure effects.

6.4.2 Analyst Optimism
As discussed earlier, one of the limitations of the thesis is the external validity of the
investigation of the role played by default risk in tests of the errors-in-expectations
hypothesis based upon analyst optimism. It was previously stated that the relationship
between analyst optimism and default risk (or financial distress more generally)
completely subsumes any relationship between analyst optimism and B/M; however this
finding is based upon Australian data rather than the US data employed by Doukas et al.
(2002), who documented the strength and statistical significance of the latter
relationship. Therefore, it is worthwhile to replicate the analysis using the same data as
Doukas et al. (2002), in other words to validate the findings of Chapter 4 using US data.

The findings of Chapter 4 along with those of Doukas et al. (2002) and Mian and Teo
(2004) show that analysts’ forecast errors do not display biases consistent with errorsin-expectations based upon extrapolation of past earnings, although analyst optimism
does appear to be related to the direction of mispricing. However, evidence based upon
longer-term growth forecasts is more supportive of the errors-in-expectations hypothesis
(La Porta, 1996; Dechow and Sloan, 1997) as is evidence that valuation ratios are
directly related to past earnings growth but not to future earnings growth (Lakonishok et
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al., 1994; Chan et al., 2003). A potentially fruitful area of future research might
therefore be to explain the conflicting inferences resulting from short term earnings
forecasts and longer term growth forecasts.

One reason why the relative errors in short-term earnings forecasts might not fully
reflect the errors in long term growth expectations is because of the sluggishness of
mean reversion in earnings growth. Fuller, Huberts and Levinson (1993) show that low
E/P stocks continue to maintain higher earnings growth than high E/P stocks for periods
up to eight years, however the growth differential is concentrated in the first two years
and diminishes substantially after this period of time; this finding of a concentration of
(and continuation of) the earnings growth differential in a relatively small number of
years is also documented in Lakonishok et al. (1994). Therefore, the two-to-three year
horizon typical of most analysts’ earnings forecasts covers a period when growth stocks
are likely to continue to experience substantially greater earnings growth than value
stocks. Consequently, the errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts might not capture the
mean reversion in earnings growth that only occurs after several years have elapsed, a
possibility that could potentially explain why evidence from forecast long-term growth
rates is generally consistent with the errors-in-expectations hypothesis but evidence
from (shorter-term) earnings forecasts is not. The relationship between the errors from
both types of forecasts (earnings and long-term growth) and the value premium is
beyond the scope of this thesis but warrants further investigation.

6.4.3 Market Reactions to Earnings Surprises
A potential area of future research might be the link between the ‘earnings torpedo
effect’ (the large negative return associated with marginally negative earnings surprises)
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documented by Skinner and Sloan (2002) and the nonlinearity of the return-earnings
surprise relationship. This relationship is well known in the ERC literature to be Sshaped, being steepest in the vicinity of zero earnings surprises and flattening out for
more extreme surprises (Freeman and Tse, 1992). It is possible a nonlinear functional
form such as the arctan function used in Freeman and Tse (1992) might fit the data
better and more parsimoniously than a functional form that includes an asymmetric
intercept term. Future research on the value premium might conceivably attempt to
differentiate value and growth stocks by variation in one or two shape parameters of a
nonlinear return-earnings surprise relationship, rather than variation in the large number
of dummy variables necessary to capture asymmetric slope and intercept terms as in
Skinner and Sloan (2002). The arctan function in Freeman and Tse (1992) contains one
parameter for the intercept and two parameters to describe the S-shaped return-earnings
relationship, and is therefore suitable for this purpose.

Having confirmed that default risk is a relatively unimportant factor in the market
reaction to earnings surprises, the findings of this thesis warrant further investigation of
the role of both value/growth and analyst dispersion in this regard. As discussed above,
such an investigation might be more tractable using a nonlinear model of the returnearnings relationship with one or two parameters, rather than a linear model with a large
number of dummy variables. It is plausible that the findings here and in Skinner and
Sloan (2002) of a large and asymmetric intercept term for growth stocks might be
masking a steep, but positively sloped, return-earnings relationship for growth stocks,
particularly in the vicinity of relatively small earnings surprises. Such a steeply-sloped
relationship might be due to the fact that growth stocks generally have lower dispersion
than value stocks (Doukas et al., 2004), and might not be apparent in a linear model
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with slope and intercept dummy variables. Thus, a potential research topic might be to
employ a nonlinear return-earnings relationship to jointly model the effects of growth
and analyst dispersion on earnings response coefficients.
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Figure 6.1: Returns and Four-Factor Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Value/Growth (B/M and E/P) and Distance-to-Default (DD)
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Figure 6.1: Returns and Four-Factor Alphas of Portfolios sorted by Value/Growth (B/M and E/P) and Distance-to-Default (DD)
(continued)
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Figure 6.2: Price-Deflated Analysts’ Forecast Errors of Portfolios sorted by Value/Growth (B/M and E/P) and Distance-to-Default
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Figure 6.3: Fitted Unexpected Return-Earnings Surprise Relationships
The plots display the fitted unexpected return-earnings surprise relationship for the top
1/3 of stocks ranked by B/M (Low G) and those in the bottom 1/3 (High G). Low
Analyst Agreement and High Analyst Agreement stocks are, respectively, those ranked
in the top and bottom 1/3 by forecast dispersion. The plotted points are the average
unexpected returns and earnings surprises of portfolios formed by sorting stocks on the
size of the earnings surprise within each growth/analyst agreement classification.
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